Future Contingents. Indeterminism, Temporal Logic and Semantics by Gallina, Francesco
  
      
 
 
 
Sede A  inistrativa: Università degli Studi di Padova 
 
Diparti ento di Filosofia 
 
CORSO DI DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN FILOSOFIA 
CURRICULUM IN FILOSOFIA TEORETICA E PRATICA 
CICLO XXIX 
 
 
 
FUTURE CONTINGENTS. 
INDETERMINISM, TEMPORAL LOGIC AND SEMANTICS 
 
 
 
 
Tesi redatta con il contributo finanziario dell’Università degli Studi di Padova 
 
Coordinatore: Ch. a Prof.ssa Francesca Menegoni 
Super isore: Ch. o Prof. Pierdaniele Giaretta 
 
 
 
       Dottorando : Francesco Gallina 
          

Contents
Introduction 3
1 Fatalism and indeterminism 7
1.1 The Aristotelian argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 The Master Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Physical Indeterminism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.1 The measurement problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.2 Collapse theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4 Let us look ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2 Two frameworks for indeterminism 21
2.1 Divergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.1.1 Kamp Frames and Ockhamism . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 Branching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2.1 Trees and Ockhamism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3 Divergence and Branching at work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3.1 Perfect natural properties and collapsing towers. . . 36
2.3.2 The expressive adequacy argument and the dupli-
cate talk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.3.3 Lewis against the Overlap condition: demarcation of
worlds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.3.4 Lewis against the Overlap condition: contradictory
individuals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.4 Some conclusions and a problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3 The revisionary strategy. 59
3.1 Peirceanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.1.1 Peirceanism, the Aristotelian argument and theMas-
ter argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.1.2 Against the Peircean view . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.1.3 Assessing Peirceanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
i
ii CONTENTS
3.2 Thomason’s first interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.2.1 De re suppositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.2.2 De dicto suppositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.3 Thomason’s second interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.4 Supervaluationism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.4.1 Against the Supervaluationist view. . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.4.2 Assessing Supervaluationism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.5 Relativism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.5.1 Against Relativism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.5.2 Assessing Relativism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4 The conservative strategy and actuality 125
4.1 Belnap’s viewpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.2 Belanp’s view and Supervaluationism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.3 Belnap’s view reformed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.4 Many worlds and Ockhamism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.5 The many-worlds view and determinism. . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.6 Many worlds and actuality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
4.7 The Choice principle and relational actuality . . . . . . . . 145
4.8 The Choice principle and substantial actuality . . . . . . . . 150
4.9 “We have a single future” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
4.10 Metaphysical worries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
4.11 Towards the Thin red line semantics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5 Thin Red Line 163
5.1 Recursive thin red line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
5.2 Post-semantic thin red line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
5.2.1 Actual history and contexts of use . . . . . . . . . . . 173
5.2.2 On considering a history as actual . . . . . . . . . . 175
5.3 Counterfactuals and the thin red line . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
5.3.1 Objection 2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
5.3.2 Counterfactual semantics with the limit assumption 190
5.3.3 Counterfactual semantics without the limit assump-
tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
5.3.4 Objection 2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
5.3.5 Counterfactual retrospective assessments. . . . . . . 203
6 Conclusions 205
Abstarct
This essay is about the problem of future contingents, that is, statements
predicting future events that are neither historically impossible, nor in-
evitable. The analysis intersects metaphysics, logic, philosophy of lan-
guage and philosophy of science. In particular, the essay explores why
indeterminism – viz., the doctrine that the present, the past, and the laws
of nature do not necessitate the future – may be taken as a sensible the-
sis. Furthermore, several semantics for indeterministic, modal temporal
languages will be considered. It is argued that the modal, temporal logic
that best fits indeterminism is a version that mirrors the so-called TRL
metaphysics. The advocates of the TRL metaphysics, indeed, can evoke a
substantive notion of actuality to tell themselves apart from determinist,
many worlds theorists. And the notion of substantive actuality assumed
by TRL theorists may be easily reflected at the (post)semantic level, yield-
ing a temporal logic which meets several desiderata.
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Introduction
Intuitively, what is possible changes with time. At the present time, some
things are still possible, others have become impossible. The future is con-
tingent, it can turn out one way or another. The past is necessary, entirely
settled.
To be sure, when I say that the past is necessary I do not mean neces-
sary in the logical sense. Logic is consistent with any past one can conceive.
Neither I mean that the past is epistemically necessary, that is, roughly, un-
questionable or certain. One can doubt the past as well as nearly anything
else.
When I say that the past is necessary I mean necessary in a historical
sense. To be historically necessary is to be inevitable. What makes histori-
cal necessity special as compared to, say, logical or metaphysical necessity
is its privileged relationship with time. The past is historically necessary
because it is past: past things cannot go otherwise anymore.
But a lot of future things are now historically contingent: whether Brazil
will win the next World Cup, who will be the next president of the USA,
even the flavour of your next ice-cream. A future contingent is a statement
that predicts some of these things. More generally:
Future Contingents A statement is a future contingent at a moment m
if it predicts something (a state of affairs, or an event, or what have
you) that is contingent at m.
Thus far, however, I have taken indeterminism – viz., the view that the
future is contingent – to be an intuitive, true thesis. But there are two clas-
sical arguments – viz. the Aristotelian argument and the Master argument
– which seem to deny that there are future contingents. According to these
arguments, indeed, there are plausible premises that entail fatalism, that
is, the view that if it will be the case that A, it is inevitably so. And if
fatalism holds, the future is settled, not contingent.
The first Chapter explores the Aristotelian and the Master arguments.
As we shall see, these two arguments allow to isolate two separate ques-
tions. On the one hand, the Aristotelian argument entails that bivalence
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and indeterminism are incompatible. The Master argument, on the other
hand, entails that indeterminism contradicts certain tense-logical princi-
ples. On the face of it, one may be tempted to drop indeterminism, and
thus save both bivalence and those tense-logical principles that are em-
ployed in the Master argument. I shall argue that one should resist to
make such a choice, for indeterminism seems to be required to make sense
of some fundamental, physical theories.
Given that indeterminism is a sensible hypothesis, Chapter 2 com-
pares two framework that are usually adopted to model future contingen-
cies. On the one hand, the divergentist approach defines indeterminism
over a set of non-overlapping, possible worlds. These worlds, in turn, may
bear significant similarity relations to one another. On the other hand, the
branching approach adopts a collection of overlapping possible worlds,
branching towards the future. Both frameworks have rigorous mathemat-
ical translations, and they are apt to define two temporal logics which
reject the fatalists arguments of Chapter 1. The two frameworks, however,
are incompatible with one another, and they represent two alternative ac-
counts of indeterminism. As I will try to argue, the branching conception
has some virtues that divergence lacks. Thus the branching conception
should be preferred to divergence when it comes to define indeterminism
in terms of possible worlds.
Chapter 3 considers three semantics which interpret a temporal-modal
language over a tree structure. Peirceanism, Supervaluationism and Rel-
ativism are very different, but they share the assumption that, given a
branching conception of indeterminism, the truth of tensed statements
should be relativised tomoments only. These three strategies, even if promis-
ing, cannot account for several desiderata concerning the logic of a tensed
language. Themotivations for adopting supervaluationism, as well as those
for subscribing to relativism, however, highlight an important, metaphys-
ical problem. According to supervaluationists and relativists, indetermin-
ism requires that actuality can only be a perspectival, relative property.
The relational reading of actuality, in turn, is shared by those branching
theorists who claim, against supervaluationism, that the truth of tensed
statement should be relativised to moments and possible worlds (histo-
ries).
Chapter 4 presents a deterministic interpretation of the tree – viz., the
many-worlds theory. This theory assumes that everything that is possi-
ble is bound to obtain, and thus it is perfectly compatible with the adop-
tion of a relational account for actuality. Accordingly, it will be argued
that, as far as indeterminism is concerned, branching theorists need a
substantial, non-relational notion of actuality. This notion is required to
CONTENTS 5
tell apart branching indeterminists from branching, many-worlds deter-
minists. Moreover, substantial actuality helps to define some principles
that only an indeterminist may – and, in my view, should – accept. These
principles, in turn, entail that there must exist a unique history (possible
world) that is substantially actual.
Chapter 5 explores the so-called Thin red line semantics, which share
the intuition that there exists a unique, privileged history. It will be argued
that there is a semantics – the so-called post semantic thin red line –which
perfectly mirrors the metaphysical principles that a branching indeter-
minism should adopt. The post semantic thin red line, furthermore, does
not suffer from the logical and semantical flaws that affect other frame-
works, and it overcomes several objections raised against the Thin red line
approach. Hence, the post semantic thin red line is the most plausible se-
mantics to interpret future contingents.
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Chapter 1
Fatalism and indeterminism
This chapter explores the Aristotelian and the Master arguments. As we
shall see, these two arguments allow to isolate two separate questions.
On the one hand, the Aristotelian argument entails that bivalence and
indeterminism are incompatible. TheMaster argument, on the other hand,
entails that indeterminism contradicts certain tense-logical principles.
On the face of it, one may be tempted to drop indeterminism, and thus
save both bivalence and those tense-logical principles that are employed
in the Master argument. I shall argue that one should resist to make such
a choice, for indeterminism seems to be required to make sense of some
fundamental, physical theories.
1.1 The Aristotelian argument
Que sera sera (Whatever will be will be) is a popular song from the 50’s. The
singer, Doris Day in the original, wonders about her future – Am I going
be happy? What about my future child? etc. The answer these questions is
always the same:
(1) Whatever will be will be.
It is natural to take (1) as a fatalist motto. Under this view, fatalism is an
unhopeful, passive attitude toward the future. Clearly, we may use (1) to
express this kind of attitude. However, both this attitude and (1) do not
correspond to the philosophical thesis known as fatalism. Moreover, (1) is
a logical truth that may be formulated as ‘If it will be the case that A, then
it will be the case that A’. Fatalism, however, is a more interesting claim:
‘If it will be the case that A, then, necessarily, it will be the case that A’.
Aristotle elaborates a famous fatalist argument in hisDe Interpretatione
(19a23-25):
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For if every affirmation or its negation is true or false it is nec-
essary for everything either to be the case or not to be the case.
[...] For if it is true to say that it is white or not white, it is nec-
essary for it to be white or not white: and if it is white or not
white, than it was true to say or deny this. If it is not the case it
is false, if it is false it is not the case. So it is necessary for the
affirmation or the negation to be true. It follows that nothing
either is happening, or will be or will not be, by chance or as
chance has it, but everything of necessity and not as chance has
it [...].
Aristotle’s fatalist argument can be summarised as follows.1 Consider the
statement:
(2) Tomorrow there will be a sea battle.
Even if nowwe do not knowwhether (2) is true or false, there is something
we can be confident with, namely, that (2) is either true or false. Let us
start by assuming that (2) is true. If it is now true that tomorrow there will
be a sea battle, then the battle is fated, inevitable. (It is always too late to
change the present.) What is inevitable is not contingent. Therefore:
(3) It is not contingent that tomorrow there will be a sea battle.
But the same conclusion is got if we assume that (2) is now false. For again,
if it is now false that the sea battle will take place, then it is too late tomake
it happen. The battle is now historically impossible – and nothing impos-
sible is contingent. As the argument does not depend on any particular
feature of either the sea battle or (2), it generalises. Everything is either
inevitable or impossible, nothing is contingent.
In general,
(P) (a) If A is true at a moment m, then ‘Necessarily, A’ is true at m.
(b) If A is false at a moment m, then ‘Possibly, A’ is false at m.
But given that bivalence holds relative to moments,
(B) Either A is true at a moment m, or A is false at m,
it follows that
1This is the standard reconstruction. For a discussion and alternative reconstructions,
see Whitaker (2002).
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(C) For any statement A, either ‘Necessarily A’ is true at m, or ‘Possibly
A’ is false at m.
Therefore, there are no future contingents and everything is necessary. The
conclusion (C) entails fatalism, according to which the future is historically
inevitable (see Rice 2015). Furthermore, (C) is a consequence of the so-
called causal determinism (see Hoefer 2015), according to which, for any
moment m, the state of the world at m and the laws of nature necessitate
any later state. Whether fatalism is committed to the inevitability of the
future, causal determinism grounds fatalism on the laws of nature.
It is worth noticing that a key role in the argument is played by the
premise that truth satisfies bivalence relative to anymoment: for every mo-
ment m, each statement (including future contingents) is either true at m
or false at m. Accordingly, even if the argument is valid, it does not show
that nothing is contingent. At best, it proves that contingency and biva-
lence (relative to moments) are incompatible, mutually exclusive. Indeed,
Aristotle’s solution – as standardly reconstructed – involves the rejection
of bivalence.
There are three reasonable reactions to this fatalist argument: drop-
ping contingency, giving up bivalence, or rejecting the argument (and so
sticking to both bivalence and contingency). We can put this dialectical
situation in the form of a question:
(Q1) Are we to drop indeterminism, bivalence, or neither?
As we shall see, each possible reply to (Q1) comes with its own difficulties.
To offer a solution to the problem of future contingents is to choose an
answer and solve, or put into perspective, the corresponding difficulties.
Today, to solve the problem of future contingents requires providing a
semantics for modal and temporal languages, along with a rigorous inter-
pretation of future contingents. Hence, it is impossible to give a picture
of the contemporary debate on future contingents without taking into ac-
count formal languages and their semantics.
Be as it may, next section explores a further, fatalist argument.
1.2 The Master Argument
Indeterminists have to face another problem related to the logic of time.
As Arthur Prior points out, there is an ancient argument – the so-called
Master argument – that supports the fatalist view. Most likely, the Mas-
ter Argument is due to the megaric Diodorus Cronus, even if it has been
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readapted by many medievals logicians. In what follows, I present the ver-
sion of the argument that Arthur Prior presented in his famous Time and
Determinism. The strength of the argument relies on the fact that (appar-
ently) innocuous and intuitive premises about time logically entail the fa-
talist’s thesis: if something will be the case, it is inevitably so.
In order to present the argument in a fully rigorous way, a modal
temporal language is needed. For the present purposes, it suffices to en-
rich the standard propositional language with three sentential operators:
F(n),P(n),!. The set of wffs of the new language thus obtained is specified
by the following rule (p varies over atoms, A and B over wffs, and n over
positive numbers).2
LT ::= p | ¬A | A∨B | F(n)A | P(n)A | !A
Atoms represent present tensed statements (for instance, “There is a sea
battle” is one of those). LT has two temporal operators, F(n) and P(n). Their
intuitive readings are “In n time units hence, it will be the case that” and
“n time units ago, it was the case that” respectively. The primitive, modal
operator of LT is !, and it reads “It is now unpreventable that”. For in-
stance, if the atom p corresponds to “There is a sea battle” while time
units are days, then
“F(1)p” reads “Tomorrow, there will be a sea battle”.
“P(1)p” reads “Yesterday, there was a sea battle”.
“!p” reads “It is now unpreventable that there is a sea battle”.
With the language LT at hand, let us run Prior’s version of the Master
argument:
1. P(n)A→ !P(n)A PNP
2. P(n)F(n+m)A→ !P(n)F(n+m)A By 1, substitutivity.
3. F(m)A→ P(n)F(n+m)A PR
4. F(m)A→ !P(n)F(n+m)A By 2, 3, transitivity.
5. !(A→ B)→ (!A→ !B) K
6. !(P(n)F(n+m)A→ !F(m)A) NCPR
7. !P(n)F(n+m)A→ !F(m)A By 5, 6, transitivity.
∴ F(m)A→ !F(m)A By 4, 7, transitivity.
Notice that the inferential rules applied within the argument are pretty
simple and intuitively sound. The argument involves the substitutivity of
logically equivalent formulas (step 2), along with the transitivity of the
2The material conditional, classical conjunction and the historical possibility operator
are defined in the usual way.
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material conditional (steps 4, 7 and ∴). Hence, from an indeterministic
perspective, the Master argument could be rejected only by refuting (at
least) one schema among PNP, PR, K and NCPR.
Principle K is the so-called Kripke’s schema, used to define the set of
normal modal logics. Moreover, it seems to capture a basic modal truth,
that is, the distribution of necessity over the material conditional. Hence,
it seems unreasonable to reject it.
The NCPR schema corresponds to the necessitation of the converse of
the principle of retrogradation, PR. At a first sight, NCPR can strike as
counterintuitive, but it is implied by some very basic principles, as the
following inferential pattern shows.
1. P(n)F(n+m)A Hypothesis.
2. P(n)F(n)A→A First assumption.
3. F(m)F(n)A↔ F(m+n)A Second assumption.
4. P(n)F(n)F(m)A By 1, 3, substitutivity.
5. F(m)A By 2, 4, MP.
6. P(n)F(n+m)A→ F(m)A By 1, 5,→ intro.
∴ !(P(n)F(n+m)A→ F(m)A) By 6, necessitation.
Thus, even rejecting NCRP seems a bad idea.
As for PR, the principle of retrogradation, it expresses the idea that if
something is true today – namely, that tomorrow there will be a sea battle
– then yesterday it was the case that “Tomorrow there will be a sea battle”
would have been true a day later. One may reject PR by saying that, if
a future event was neither inevitable, nor impossible (or, as Prior would
say, if a future event was not ‘present in its causes’), it would have been
untrue to say that it was going to happen.3 However, this criticism works
only if the future operator F(n) does not only have a temporal meaning – it
makes you look forward along the time line – but it also conveys a strong
modal force – it expresses some sort of inevitability. Under a more natural
understanding of F(n), PR seems to be fine. Be as it may, there is room to
think that PR can fail to be valid, and an indeterminist may say a story in
order to reject it.
A much more controversial principle is PNP, the principle of the ne-
cessity of the past. To see why, let us focus on one of its instances:
(PNP1) If yesterday it was the case that A, then, inevitably, yesterday it
was the case that A.
3This is the reason why the Peircean semantics rejects RP, and, therefore, the Master
argument.
12 CHAPTER 1. FATALISM AND INDETERMINISM
P(1)A→ !P(1)A
Notice that the schematic letter A in (PNP1) can be replaced by any for-
mula of LT . Accordingly, if PNP were valid, the following sentence –
obtained by substituting A with “two days hence it would be rainy” in
(PNP1)– would be valid as well.
(PNP2) If yesterday was the case that two days hence it would be rainy,
then, inevitably, yesterday was the case that two days hence it would
be rainy.
P(1)F(2)p→ !P(1)F(2)p
It is easy to see what is wrong with (PNP2); even though both its an-
tecedent and consequent begin with the past operator P(1), both compo-
nents are not about the past. What they really talk about is the future. As
Prior (1967: 124) puts it, (PNP2) has “traces of futurity”. Thus, in general,
PNP allows to take as validities sentences with this kind of traces of futu-
rity. Actually, any sentence of LT that talks about the future is equivalent
to a sentence that begins with P(n).4 For instance, F(1)A (“In one time unit
hence, it will be the case thatA) is equivalent to P(1)F(2)A (“One time unit
ago, it was the case that, two time units after, A”).
But one can notice that asking whether PNP should be considered as
valid is asking whether one should endorse (or reject) fatalism (deter-
minism). Thus, assuming this schema as a premise within an argument
in favour of fatalism appears to beg the question that is at stake, that is,
whether fatalism (or indeterminism) holds. The Master argument assumes
fatalism to conclude that fatalism is true.5
Obviously, the objection just raised against PNP holds only F(n) does
not convey a strongmodal meaning. Indeed, if predicting thatAwill occur
amounts to predict that it is inevitable that A will occur, PNP is perfectly
right. Under this perspective, having traces of futurity just means having
traces of future inevitability.6 However, an indeterminist who takes this
route would be much more recalcitrant to regard PR, instead of PNP, as a
validity.
4See, for instance, step 6 in the derivation of NCPR.
5This is one motivation for adopting the so-called Ockhamist semantics.
6This is the way a Peircean would argue against an advocate of the Ockhamist seman-
tics.
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In conclusion, there are three possible reactions to the Master argu-
ment: dropping indeterminism, rejecting PR, or denying PNP’s validity.
This dialectic situation is summarised in the following question:
(Q2) Are we to drop indeterminism, PR, or PNP?
As we shall see, there are several reasons suggesting that there are future
contingencies. And if one can sensibly resist to the fatalistic motto that ev-
erything that will happen – or everything that it is possible that will hap-
pen – is inevitably going to happen, one can reasonably reject the fatalistic
conclusions entailed by both the Aristotelian and the Master arguments.
Next section highlights why one may doubt that fatalism is true.
1.3 Physical Indeterminism
1.3.1 The measurement problem
Thus far, both (Q1) and (Q2) leave open the option of rejecting indeter-
minism. As I’ll try to argue, this option should be resisted, for there are
good reasons to hold that future contingencies are required to make sense
of physical reality.
In my view, the best way to argue in favour of indeterminism has to do
with the stochastic behaviour that quantum physical systems may exhibit.
The stochastic behaviour of quantum systems, in turn, can be appreciated
by focusing on the classical quantum puzzle known as the measurement
problem.
Themeasurement problem characterises the tension between two prin-
ciples of Von Neumann (1955)’s standard formulation of quantum me-
chanics, namely, the Dynamical and the Collapse postulates. Let us start
with the former.
Dynamical postulate: When no measurements are going on, the states of
all physical systems invariably evolve in accordance with the dynam-
ical equations of motion.7
The (standard) equation of motion for quantum systems is the Schrödinger’s
equation (or its relativistic generalisations), which allows to determine the
undisturbed state of a system S at all times, given the state that S has at a
time.
Experimental evidence tells us that any measurement of the compo-
nent of the spin of an electron can have only two outcomes: the spin can
7See Albert (2009: 80).
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either be measured “up” (relative to a given axis), or it can be measured
“down” (relative to the same axis).8 Suppose that, at t0, it is known that
the electron a has spin up along the z axis (that is, at t0 it is known that
a is in the state ↑z). If one then measures the spin of a along the x axis at
a time later than t0, one has 1/2 chance to find a in the state ↑x, and 1/2
chance to find a in the state ↓x. And the same happens if, at t0, it is known
that a has spin down along the z axis: again, at a time later than t0, one has
1/2 chance to find a in the state ↑x, and 1/2 chance to find a in the state ↓x.
Apparently, the value of the spin along z at t0 is not correlated with the
value of the spin along x at t1.
But given that the spin’s state of a along z is known at t0, one may apply
the Dynamical postulate to see what the Schrödinger’s equation predicts
about the x-spin state that a should have at t1. In general, the Schrödinger’s
equation is said to describe a at t1 as being in a superposition of having
spin up along x, and having spin down along x. Formally, one may express
the state of a at t1 – as it is predicted by the Schrödinger’s equation – as
follows.
(2) | a, t1 > =
√
1
2 | ↑x> +
√
1
2 | ↓x>
It is pretty difficult to understand what kind of state a sentence such as
(2) may represent. Even worst, the Schrödinger’s equation predicts that
macroscopical objects such as measuring devices can be in superpositions
as well. Assume, for instance, that “|x-up>” denotes the state of a device
measuring a being in state ↑x, while “|x-down>” refers to the state of the
same device as measuring a being in state ↓x. And suppose that the device
is set up right. And, once again, assume that the Schrödinger’s equation
predicts that, at t1, a is in a superposition of being ↑x and ↓x. Then, the
very same equation predicts that, at the time of the measurement (t1), the
state of the system composed of both the electron a and the measurement
device is in the following superposition:9
(3)
√
1
2 |x-up> | ↑x> +
√
1
2 |x-down> | ↓x>
But what does it mean for a measuring device, as well as for any other
physical system, to be in a superposition? As Albert & Loewer (1988: 125)
point out,
When textbook writers attempt to explain what it is for an elec-
tron to be in, for example, the spin state ↑x + ↓x they are re-
duced to saying things like “it neither has x-spin up nor x-spin
8The following elementary, quantum mechanical facts are taken from Weber (1993).
9See Albert (2009: 75).
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down but is in some sense in both states and in neither”. [...] So
one problem is to “interpret” superpositions. (Albert & Loewer
1988: 195)
Thus, one of the major problem of interpreting superpositions is that we
never observe a physical system as “being in some sense in both states and
in neither”. It is an obvious characteristic of our experience, indeed, that
we always observe physical objects as being in definite states, that is, as
being either in a state or in another.
Recall that, by theDynamical postulate, a statement such as (2) (as well
as (3)) is meant to describe a, intended as an undisturbed, isolated physical
system. And, obviously, any act of measurement perturbs the system thus
measured. Hence, one may think that a measurement of a’s spin along x
at t1 perturbs a itself, forcing the electron to “jump” to one definite state
among ↑x and ↓x. This is what the Collapse postulate guarantees.
Collapse postulate: When a measurement takes place at time t, the state of
the measured system S collapses over one element of the superposi-
tion (if any) among those described by the equations of motion of S
at t.10
According to the Collapse postulate, if one measures a’s spin along x at t1,
the measurement induces a’s state to collapse, and a’s state is thus instan-
taneously reduced to one element of the superposition (i.e., either a is in ↑x
at t1, or it is in ↓x at t1). Hence, the Collapse postulate seems to guarantee
the accordance of standard quantum mechanics with our experience: in-
deed, it entails that whenever one observes a physical system, that system
collapses over a definite state.
Furthermore, by applying the so-called Born rule, one can compute
the probability of the outcomes, conditional on the fact that specific mea-
surement procedures are actually performed. For instance, if the solution
of the Schrödinger’s equation for a at t1 is (2), the Born rule tells us that,
if one carries a measurement of the x-spin of a at that time, one has 1/2
chance to obtain ↑x, and 1/2 chance to obtain ↓x.
Accordingly, if standard quantum mechanics captures everything that
there is to know about quantum systems, one can plausibly say that nature
behaves stochastically. And thus, one may appeal to standard quantum
mechanics to hold that fatalism is false. But this conclusion might be too
hasty.
10See Albert (2009: 80).
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As they are standardly understood, indeed, the Dynamical and the Col-
lapse postulates are deeply problematic, for the notion of measurement
plays a crucial role in both of them.
What these laws actually amount to (that is: what they actually
say) will depend on the precise meaning of the word measure-
ment (because these two laws entail that which one of them is
being obeyed at any given moment depends on whether or not
a “measurement” is being carried out at that moment). And it
happens that the word measurement simply doesn’t have any
absolutely precise meaning in ordinary language; and it hap-
pens (moreover) that von Neumann didn’t make any attempt
to cook up a meaning for it, either. (Albert 2009: 80-81)
Hence, the measurement problem: how to deal with the notion of mea-
surement? And relatedly, how the Dynamical and the Collapse postulates
have to be understood?
1.3.2 Collapse theories
Scientists and philosophers have developed several ways to overcome the
measurement problem. The problem, however, has not been solved yet.
More precisely, none of the attempts to solve the measurement problem
has achieved the unanimous consensus of the scientific community.11
Be as it may, there is a family of candidate solutions according to which
nature evolves stochastically. These solutions, in turn, are labeled as col-
lapse theories, and their foundational program traces back to the work of
Ghirardi et al. (1986).12
Collapse theorists hold that “measurement”, whatever its meaningmay
be, does not have to occur within the postulates of any respectable account
of nature.13 This point, after all, is pretty sensible: measurements seem to
be nothing over and above certain interactions taking place among phys-
ical systems, and the interactions occurring between physical systems are
what physics is supposed to account for. What is controversial, still, is how
to deal with those postulates that scientists apply in their daily work, and
in which the notion of measurement plays a crucial role.
Recall that the Collapse postulate was invoked to establish a link be-
tween the Dynamical postulate and the world as we see it. If physical sys-
11For a review of these attempts, see Albert (2009).
12See Ghirardi (2016).
13See Albert & Loewer (1996: 83), Ghirardi et al. (1986: 471) and Ghirardi (1993: 186).
1.3. PHYSICAL INDETERMINISM 17
tems evolved in accordance with the Schrödinger’s equation only, the de-
vice at t1 should be in a superposition of measuring a in state ↑x, and
measuring a in state ↓x. This latter conclusion obviously contradicts our
experience, for we always see the device either as measuring a in state ↑x,
or as measuring a in state ↓x.
Standard quantum theorists attempt to avoid the undesirable conclu-
sion by adopting theCollapsepostulate. Collapse theorists, on the contrary,
claim that such a conclusion, being incompatible with our experience,
forces to reject the Schrödinger’s equation. In their view, the Schrödinger’s
equation has to be modified to obtain an equation that
[...] represents amathematically precise and successful attempt
to achieve the two divergent aims [...] of leaving the physics of
microscopic systems essentially unaltered [w.r.t standard quan-
tum predictions] but at the same time of forbidding the oc-
currence of superpositions of macroscopically distinguishable
states. (Ghirardi 1993: 189)
One may suspect that collapse theorists are introducing a dichotomy be-
tween microscopic and macroscopic objects. And one may object that this
dichotomy is as arbitrary as that between measured and undisturbed sys-
tems. But this is not so. Let us see why.
According to collapse theorists, a system such as an electron can be
in a superposition such as that described in (2). The equations of motion
assumed by collapse theorists, however, predict that every so often the
electron’s state spontaneously collapses over one of the elements of the
superposition (if any). The collapse, in turn, does not necessarily involve
measurements, for it corresponds to a natural mechanism of nature. Col-
lapse processes, indeed, are predicted by the very equations which govern
a system’s evolution, and which a collapse theorist adopts. For instance,
whenever a is in a given z-spin state, collapse theories associate a to a
given frequency λ. This frequency, in turn, measures the probability for
a to collapse into ↓x or into ↑x within a given interval of time.
14 Thus, a
collapse is taken to be a natural processes, predicted by specific equations.
Furthermore, collapse processes occur at random. In other terms, the new
equations, in general, do not establish with absolute certainty when a will
collapse. They only allow to compute the probability for a to collapse over
one definite state at a given time.
Furthermore, collapse theories also entail that, when a’s collapse does
occur, a has a certain probability of collapsing over ↑x, and a certain prob-
14See Ghirardi (2015: 366).
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ability of collapsing over ↓x. In general, however, one cannot predict with
absolute certainty which state will characterise a after the occurrence of a
collapse. Hence, whenever a collapse takes place, a “jumps” stochastically
into a unique element of the superposition. Accordingly, the time of the
collapse of a system, as well as the state that characterises the system after
the collapse, are governed by laws which are genuinely probabilistic.
It is important to stress that both the specification of WHEN
as well as the one of WHERE the localizations take place in-
troduce stochastic elements, and that the rule about WHERE
it occurs introduces nonlinear feature in the theory. (Ghirardi
1993: 190)
Clearly, one may ask whether collapse theories can avoid superpositions
of macroscopic objects such as (3). As a matter of fact, collapse theories
predict that the higher is the number of the components of a system, the
higher is the probability for the system to collapse in a small period of
time. For instance, the frequency λ is often chosen to ensure that the mean
lifetime of a superposition of a single proton is 1016 seconds, a quite long
period indeed. If a systems is composed by 1020 particles, however, the
mean lifetime of a superposition for such a system is 10−5 seconds.15 Su-
perpositions of macroscopic objects are unstable, for macroscopic objects
tend to collapse into definite states in a considerably short amount of time.
This, in turn, is the solution that collapse theorists give to the measure-
ment problem. As Albert & Loewer (1996) put it, any measurement-like
interaction
[h]as nothing whatever to do with the occurrence of [...] col-
lapses: all superpositions of states in which macroscopic ob-
jects are in macroscopically different positions (no matter how
those states may happen to have been gotten into) are clearly
unstable on this theory. (Albert & Loewer 1996: 86)
To sum up, collapse theories are plausible solutions to the measure-
ment problem, and they entail that nature behaves stochastically. The ran-
domness that physical systems may exhibit, according to these theories,
involves both the time of the occurrence of a collapse, and the state one
system may assume after the occurrence of such a collapse. Collapse the-
ories, moreover, assume that the statistical character of predictions is not
an objective, non-epistemic matter. And since collapse theories are plau-
sible physical accounts, there is room to resist to one of the options left
open by (Q1)-(Q2) – viz., that of denying indeterminism.
15See Bell (2004: 203-204) and Ghirardi (2015: 370).
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1.4 Let us look ahead
As we have seen, the Aristotelian argument – if sound – shows that biva-
lence is incompatible with indeterminism. The Master argument, more-
over, points out that certain tense-logical principles entail the fatalists’
thesis (i.e. if it will be the case that A, it is inevitable that it will be the
case thatA). Thus, the Aristotelian argument, along with the Master argu-
ment, highlight the following problems.
(Q1) Are we to drop indeterminism, bivalence, or neither?
(Q2) Are we to drop indeterminism, PR, or PNP?
Both questions leave open the possibility of rejecting indeterminism. How-
ever, it is reasonable to think that indeterminism may play a crucial role
when it comes to account for nature’s behaviour. Collapse theories, indeed,
entail exactly that nature, at a fundamental level, evolves stochastically.
Therefore, the option of rejecting indeterminism can be resisted.
But how to deal with bivalence? And how to deal with the premises
occurring in the Master argument? In order to answer these questions,
one needs a framework to interpret tensed languages. Such a framework,
moreover, should reflect some features that an indeterministic, physical
reality should have.
Next chapter compares two approavhes usually adopted by indeter-
minists, and explores their role in answering (Q1)-(Q2).
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Chapter 2
Two frameworks for
indeterminism
In what follows, I consider two frameworks which help to overcome the
fatalist arguments we have encountered thus far. The two frameworks
are very common in the philosophical literature, and they are known as
the branching view and the divergence approach, respectively. As Placek
(2012: 28) points out, each framework plays two roles.
On the one hand, they (partially) elucidate what may mean that the fu-
ture is unsettled, or that the reality which we inhabit evolves indetermin-
istically. In other terms, both framework are helpful to define objective
indeterminism, intended as a metaphysical doctrine.1
On the other hand, the two frameworks are useful to interpret modal
temporal languages, and to “offer a semantics for languages with historical
modalities, tenses, and indexicals” (Placek 2012: 28). As we shall see, there
are temporal logics – defined against branching (or divergentist) models –
which invalidate the arguments for determinism we have seen in the first
chapter.
But the two frameworks, however, are incompatible with one another.
Indeed, there is a principle – what it will be called the No-Overlap condi-
tion – that is explicitly assumed by the divergentist approach, while it is
1For recent attempts aiming at rehabilitating objective indeterminism, see Williams
2008 and Barnes & Cameron 2009, 2011. In what follows, both the branching and the
divergentist approach will be framed in purely B-theoretical terms. Thus, any possible
world, as well as anything that exists at a moment atensionally exists. This is not to say
that indeterminism requires a B-theoretic conception of reality. It is just that the debate
concerning A- and B-theories is not the debate concerning indeterminism. And the B-
theoretic approach, moreover, is particularly comfortable when it comes to account for
indeterminism.
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rejected on a branching view. Thus, even if both divergence and branching
can reject the Aristotelian and the Master arguments, they represent two
alternative accounts of indeterminism. In what follows, I argue that the
branching conception of time has some virtues that divergence lacks. In
particular, the branching view is better suited than the divergentist one
when it comes to explain what does it mean that there are many ways
things can turn out in the future. Furthermore, the two main arguments
agains branching – those elaborated by David Lewis (1986a) – are far from
being compelling. Thus, it is reasonable to reject the fatalistic arguments
we encountered in the first chapter by adopting a branching conception of
indeterminism.
2.1 Divergence
The divergentist approach is oneway to refine of our intuitive, pre-analytic
definition of objective indeterminism. Divergentist theorists analyse ob-
jective indeterminism in terms of physically possible worlds, where a phys-
ical possible world is a temporally complete course of events compatible
with a given set of physical laws. Hence, whether a world is possible, it is
so relative to a given set of laws. Divergentists assume – quite plausibly –
that it is sensible to talk about the state that a physical world has at a time:
thus, sentences of the form “World w is such-and-such at time t” are taken
as perfectly meaningful. For the sake of simplicity, the state of a world at a
time can be thought of as a spatially complete, temporally instantaneous
slice of that world. Furthermore, the divergentist approach consists in two
main thesis:
No-Overlap: Physically possible worlds do not overlap.
Duplicate: Physically possible worlds bear significant similarity relations
to one another.
The No-overlap condition can be explained as follows: given a set W of
physically possible worlds, if w,w′ ∈W are numerically distinct at a time,
they are numerically distinct at any time. Equivalently, if w and w′ are
identical at a time, they are identical at any time (that is, w and w′ are the
very same world). There are, as we shall see in the next sections, several
arguments that philosophers have used to motivate the No-overlap condi-
tion. But for the time being, I shall confine myself to saying that, according
to the No-overlap condition, distinct possible worlds are taken to be both
spatiotemporally separated and causally inert to one another.
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The second main feature of divergentism is the Duplicate principle, ac-
cording to which worlds may bear interesting similarity relations to one
another. But what kind of relation(s) do they have to bear to one another
to be similar in the relevant way? John Earman answers as follows:
[...] agreement [viz. similarity] of worlds at a time means agree-
ment at that time of all relevant physical properties. (Earman
1986: 13)
According to Earman, to say that two worlds are similar at a time is to
say that the two worlds are indiscernibile with respect to to the physical
properties they instantiate at that time. This view seems to share with
that of Lewis the idea that similarity means indistinguishability of natural
properties.
According to Lewis, (perfect) natural properties are instinct properties
that fundamental physical entities locally instantiate.
Maybe [there are] points of spacetime itself, maybe point-sized
bits of matter or aether or fields, maybe both. And at those
points we have local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic prop-
erties which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be
instantiated. For short: we have an arrangement of qualities.
And that is all. (Lewis 1986b: ix-x)
Physics – at least in its ideally, ultimate formulation – discovers (perfect)
natural properties. These properties, in turn, help to specify when two
physically possible worlds are indiscernible, or, as Lewis calls them, when
two worlds are duplicates.
Physics is relevant because it aspires to give an inventory of
natural properties – not a complete inventory, perhaps, but a
complete enough inventory to account for duplication among
actual things. If physics succeeds in this, then duplication within
our world amounts to sameness of physical description. But the
natural properties themselves are what matter, not the theory
that tells us what they are. (Lewis 1983a: 356-357)
Lewis then considers two entities, say x and y, as duplicates just in case
(i) x and y have exactly the same perfect natural properties, and (ii) their
parts can be put into correspondence in such a way that corresponding
parts have exactly the same perfect natural properties, and stand in the
same perfectly natural relations.2
2See Lewis (1983a: 360).
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As long as the relevant similarity relations obtain between two worlds,
they do not diverge. As soon as the similarity relations fail to hold between
two worlds, each of them diverge relative to the other. As Lewis notices,
I shall say that two possible worlds diverge iff they are not du-
plicates but they do have duplicate initial temporal segments.
Thus our world and another might match perfectly up through
the year 1945, and go their separate ways thereafter. (Lewis
1983a: 359)
For instance, imagine two worlds, say w and w′, where any particle
in w has a copy in w′ and vice versa. Up to a time t, any particle in w
has exactly the same mass, velocity and position of its copy (assuming
that these properties are natural). Thus, up to t, the two worlds have two
indiscernible, temporal evolutions, and they look as if they were the same
world. But suppose that, at time t′, a particle in w changes its velocity,
where no particle in w′ changes in the same way. Then, the two worlds
cease to look perfectly alike, and they are said to diverge. The two worlds,
however, are governed by the very same laws at any time.
2.1.1 Kamp Frames and Ockhamism
The No-Overlap and the Duplicate principles find a natural, formal repre-
sentation in what are been called Kamp frames.3 Kamp frames, as we shall
see, have two roles: first, they allow to define objective indeterminism in
terms of similarities among possible worlds. Secondly, they may be used to
interpret a temporal language, and thus to define a temporal logic. In turn,
the temporal logic based on a Kamp frame should give precise answers to
the two questions of the previous chaprer, (Q1) and (Q2).
Definition 2.1.1 (Kamp Frames). A Kamp frame K is a triple (W,T ,≈) such
that
(a) W is a non empty set of worlds,
(b) T a function assigning to any w ∈W an irreflexive, linear order T (w) =
(Mw,<w),
(c) ≈ is a relation on {(t,w,w′ ) : w,w′ ∈W and t ∈Mw ∩Mw′ } such that
(c.1) for all t, ≈t is an equivalence relation and if w ≈t w
′, then {t′ : t′ ∈
Mw and t
′ <w t} = {t
′ ; t′ ∈Mw′ and t
′ <w′ t},
(c.2) if w ≈t w
′ and t′ <w t, then w ≈t′ w
′ .
3See Thomason (1984: 147), Zanardo (2006: 386).
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Condition (b) associates any world with its timeline: any world w has
its own ‘clock’, where Mw is the set of the times of w, and <w is the later
than relation. Hence, t0 <w t1 means that time t1 is later than t0 relative to
the timeline of world w. As clear from above, timelines have two roles. On
the one hand, they track the‘passage of time’ taking place at each world.
On the other hand, they signal for how long two worlds remain indistin-
guishable. From a metaphysical viewpoint, however, one is free to adopt a
substantialist view – and, thus, conceive times as primitive, metaphysical
entities – or a relationalist view – according to which times are reducible
to the relations obtaining between worlds and the objects existing at them.
Clause (c) defines the similarity relation between worlds. (c.1) guaran-
tees that, if w is similar to w′ at time t (w ≈t w
′), the two worlds share the
same timeline up to t. (c.2) says that, when w is similar to w′ at time t, the
two worlds continue to be similar at any earlier time. This latter clause re-
flects Lewis’ suggestion, according to which two divergent worlds match
together for an initial segment. The clause also entails that, whenever two
worlds stop to match, they cannot match once again in the future. Thus,
we can take w ≈t w
′ to mean that w and w′ do not diverge, but are similar,
at time t. Other equivalent readings are
• At time t,w andw′ are indiscernible with respect to the natural prop-
erties they instantiate.
• At time t, w and w′ are duplicates of one another.
w4w3w2w1
t3
t2
t1
t0 ≈t0 ≈t0 ≈t0
≈t1 ≈t1
≈t2
Once we have Kamp frames, we can define Objective Indeterminism in
the way suggested by Earman (1986: 13):
Definition 2.1.2 (Divergence Objective Indeterminism (DOI)). Given a set of
(physically) possible worldsW – that is, a collection of worlds which satisfy the
same physical laws – a world w ∈W is objectively indeterministic iff there is a
w′ ∈W and two times t, t′ ∈Mw such that t <w t
′ , w ≈t w
′ but w !t′ w
′.
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The figure above represents a Kamp framewith divergent worlds.w1,...,
w4 are taken as physically possible worlds, where t0, ..., t3 form the time-
line of w1. World w1 is ≈-related to w2,w3, and w4 at t0, but it diverges
from w4 after t0, from w3 after t1, and from w2 after t2. Hence, there is a
‘starting time’, t0, at which all the worlds are indiscernible from one an-
other. As time goes by, w1 evolves in such a way that it differentiates itself
from the other possible worlds, and becomes qualitatively different from
any other world at time t3. Thus, by DOI, w1 is indeterministic.
4
Kamp frames allows to define what may be called the KampOckhamist
semantics, i.e. a semantics for a modal temporal language such as LT . As
we shall see, the Kamp Ockhamist semantics is useful to answer the two
questions raised in the previous section, that is:
(Q1) Are we to drop indeterminism, bivalence, or neither?
(Q2) Are we to drop indeterminism, PR, or PNP?
First, recall that LT is a propositional, temporal modal language, whose
set of wffs is obtained by this rule.
LT ::= p | ¬A | A∨B | F(n)A | P(n)A | !A
Now, both F(n) and P(n) aremetric tense operator, for they can convey how
far in the future (past) an event takes place. Accordingly, we need a metric
that tells us the temporal distance between, say, two events with different
temporal locations. A duration function will do the job.5
Definition 2.1.3. (K-duration function) Given a Kamp frame K = (W,T ,≈),
for any w ∈ W , dK maps couples of times in Mw to the set Y − {0}, where Y
is a set of positive numbers whose cardinality is no more than continuous. In
addition, dK fulfils the following conditions.
(a) dK(t, t
′) =↑ just in case t = t′. This conditions avoids n > 0 as the value
of the distance between an arbitrary time and itself, for any n ∈ Y − {0}.
Moreover, it ensures that dK is definite for any two times in the same
timeline.
(b) If t " t′ , then dK(t, t
′) = dK(t
′, t). The value of the distance between t and
t′ is the same as the value of the distance between t′ and t.
4One may attempt to extend the definition of divergence objective indeterminism to
laws, and say that a set of laws is indeterministic iff – given the set of possible worlds
compatible with them – there is (at least) an indeterministic world in that set.
5If dK(t, t
′) =↑, function dK is undefined for (t, t
′).
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(c) If t ∈ Mw, there exists at most one t
′ ∈ Mw such that dK(t, t
′) = n and
t <w t
′ (t′ <w t). This condition ensures that there can be at most just one
time t′ in the timeline of world w which has n as the value of its distance
from another time t in that timeline, and that is later (eralier) than t.
(d) If dK(t, t
′) = n, dK(t, t
′′) = m and t <w t
′ <w t
′′, then n < m. This con-
dition states that dK preserves the order among times and the values of
their distances.
Intuitively, if dK(t, t
′) = n and t <w t
′(t′ <w t), n is the number of time
units at which t′ lies in the future (past) of t along the timeline associated
to world w.
Now that we have a duration function, the Kamp Ockhamist semantics
(KO) can be defined by evaluating formulas at time-world pairs (w,t) of K,
where the time t of such a point of evaluation is one of the timeline asso-
ciated with world w (that is, t ∈Mw). This strategy leads to the following
definition.
Definition 2.1.4 (KO-model). AKO-model forLT is a tupleMKO = (K,dK, I ),
where:
(a) K = (W,T ,≈) is a kamp frame,
(b) dK is a K-duration function,
(c) I is an interpretation function from the atoms of LT to the set {(t,w) :
w ∈W and t ∈Mw}, and it satisfies
(c.1) If (t,w) ∈ I(p), then, for any w′ s.t. w ≈t w
′ , (t,w′) ∈ I(p).
Intuitively, (t,w) ∈ I(p) means that the atom p holds at time t in world
w. Moreover, condition (c.1) captures the idea that, whenever two worlds
are duplicates of one another at a time, the propositional language cannot
distinguish them for what happens at them at that time. For instance, if
there is a sea battle at time t in w, and w′ is a duplicate of w at t, then there
must be an indistinguishable sea battle at t in w′ as well. This, obviously,
does not prevent the propositional language to be able to tell apart w from
w′ in virtue of what will happen at each world at times later than t.
Then, it is easy to give recursive clauses for any wff of LT (symbols
“#KO” and “!KO” denotes KO-truth and KO-falisty, respectively).
Definition 2.1.5 (KO-semantics). Given a KO-model MKO for LT ,
(KO1) (t,w) #KO p⇔ (t,w) ∈ I(p)
(KO2) (t,w) #KO ¬A⇔ not (t,w) #KO A⇔ (t,w) !KO A
(KO3) (t,w) #KO A∨B⇔ either (t,w) #KO A or (t,w) #KO B
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(KO4) (t,w) #KO F(n)A⇔∃t
′(t′ ∈Mw & t <w t & dK(t, t
′) = n & (t′,w) #KO A)
(KO5) (t,w) #KO P(n)A⇔ ∃t
′(t′ ∈Mw & t
′ <w t & d(t, t
′)K = n & (t
′ ,w) #KO
A)
(KO6) (t,w) #KO !A⇔∀w
′(w′ ∈W & w ≈t w
′ ⇒ (t,w′) #KO A)
What is interesting about KO is the way in which it defines the truth
conditions for modal and tensed statements. Intuitively, KO evaluates a
sentence of the form F(n)A as true at (t,w) iff A is true at the time that
lies n time units in the future of t along world w (the truth conditions for
statements of the form P(n)A are symmetric, since they require to move n
time units backward from t along w). Moreover, a sentence of the form !A
is true at (t,w) iff A is true at any world which is ≈t-related to wt – that is,
which is a duplicate of w a time t. Historical necessity at (t,w) is captured
in terms of truth at any duplicate of w at time t.
KO allows to give precise answers to the questions (Q1)-(Q2). As for
the answer the first question, (Q1), it is easy to see that KO is perfectly
classical and bivalent, in the sense that:
KO-bivalence: For any wff A of LT and any point (t,w), either (t,w) #KO A
or (t,w) !KO A.
Notice, moreover, that KO-truth (#KO) and KO-falsity (!KO) are mutually
exclusive but jointly exhaustive. Thus, it is perfectly consistent to stick to
the notion of indeterminism (as it is defined by DOI) and subscribe to the
KO-bivalence.
As far as the second question is concerned, (Q2), it is easy to check that
there are countermodels in which PNP (P(n)A → !P(n)A) fails. See, for
instance, the following partial representation of a MKO-model.
w2w1
t3 Assume that p is
KO-true at (t2,w1) but
KO-false at (t3,w2).
t2
t1
t0 ≈t0
≈t1
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If p is KO-true at (t2,w1) but KO-false at (t3,w2), and dK(t0, t1) = dK(t1, t2) =
dK(t1, t3) = 1, an instance of PNP such as P(1)F(2)p → !P(1)F(2)p is KO-
false at (t1,w1). Thus, the Master argument can be contested within a di-
vergentist approach, since the KO-semantics does not validate one of its
premises.
In conclusion, divergence offers a way to define indeterminism in terms
of duplicate possible worlds. Furthermore, it is possible to define a suit-
able semantics which is KO-bivalent and which refutes the Master argu-
ment. In the next section, the main indeterminist rival framework to di-
vergence, that is, the branching approach, will be analysed.
2.2 Branching
The branching time approach is the main rival of the divergentist strat-
egy in order to account for Objective Indeterminism. As the divergentists,
branching theorists take possible worlds as temporally complete courses
of events, but they stick to the following two main tenets.
Overlap: Any two physically possible worlds do overlap with one another.
Branching: Physically possible worlds branch towards the future only.
The Overlap condition can be explained by contrast to the divergentist
approach. Recall one of the examples given above, according to which, up
to a time t, any temporal slice of w has an exact copy in another world
w′. According to the divergentist approach, w and w′ are indiscernible up
to t, even though they are numerically distinct. Branching theorists are
happy to accept that, up to t, any slice of w has an exact copy in world w′.
But contrary to divergentists, they hold that any slice of w up to t and its
copy (at that time) cannot be conceived as two distinct entities: they are
numerically the very same slice. This allows branching theorists to explain
the divergentist claim that, up to t, w and w′ look as if they were the same
world by saying that, up to that moment, they are indeed the same world.
Equivalently, there are no two initial segments of w and w′ up to t, but
there is just one initial segment of both w and w′ up to that time. Suppose,
for instance, that it is possible for Peter to turn left, but it is also possible
for him to turn right. According to a branching theorist, there are two
worlds (histories), and
[...] each of the two histories literally contains Peter’s indeci-
sion, and everything that led up to it. A mental or linguistic
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theory would make these pasts “similar” instead of straightfor-
wardly identical. But that is wrong. We began by contemplat-
ing that there were for Peter two possibilities, left and right,
just as I have two shoes, say L and R. And just as it is unhelp-
ful to say that L’s owner is only “similar” to R’s owner, but not
identical, so it is unhelpful to say that the indecision in the past
of Peter’s possible left turn is only “similar,” but not identical,
to the indecision lying in the past of Peter’s possible right turn.
(Belnap 2002: 6)
Thus, possible world are not spatiotemporally separated, for they share
instantaneous but maximally extended slices.
The Overlap principle does not only say that possible worlds overlap,
but that any possible world overlap with any other. This means that, for
any stage that a possible world may achieve, not matter how remotely far
in the future, that stage has an instantaneous slice which is its historical
ancestor, and which is common to any possible world. Nuel Belnap calls
this feature “Historical connection”. In his view, it has a relevant meta-
physical import:
[...] every possible history, h, has a definite causal relation to the
very moment in which we converse, since h must share with
it a common past. Historical connection is the postulate that
endows the theory with a sense of robust reality. (Belnap et al.
2001: 188)
The idea here is that anything that is possible in the future has a common
root in the past. This should give to the branching approach a “sense of
robust reality”, for the common root that possible worlds share partially
explains why they are possible future evolutions of the very same past.
What has happened up to now can be viewed as a causal chain for the fu-
ture possibilities which are now available. Obviously, this means that the
notion of cause, given a branching setting, does not necessitate its effects.6
The branching view also states that physically possible worlds branch
towards the future only (this is the Branching condition). Suppose that
a divergentist says that there is a time later than t at which a particle a
in w changes its velocity, but a’s counterpart in w′ does not change its
velocity after t. According to the divergentist approach, the two worlds
diverge after t. Branching theorists, on the other hand, would assess this
description as inadequate. They would say that, up to t, a inhabits both
6See Belnap (2005) and Placek (2000: Ch. 1).
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world w and w′, but the two worlds split at t. Particle a has a possible
future in w where it changes its velocity. But the very same particle has
also another possible future in w′, where its velocity does not change. As
Lewis puts it,
[In a branching setting] there is one initial spatiotemporal seg-
ment; it is continued by two different futures – different both
numerically and qualitatively – and so there are two overlap-
ping worlds. One world consists of the initial segment plus one
of its future; the other world consists of the identical initial
segment plus the other future. (Lewis 1986a: 206)
Thus, not only worlds do overlap, but an entity’s having more than one
possible future is explained in terms of forward branching.
Notice that the Branching condition prohibits worlds to branch towards
the past. This prohibition reflects the idea that the past is settled or unique.
If it was sunny yesterday, it is now inevitable that it was sunny. However, it
may well be that it is possible that tomorrow it will be sunny, but it is also
possible that tomorrow it will be rainy. Contingency is only available for
future events. Hence, the Branching principle posits a modal asymmetry
between the past and the future. In turn, this asymmetry is often justified
by making reference to the so-called “arrow of time”, which appears to be
implicit within some aspects of modern physics.
[...] the use of probabilities in statistical mechanics and quan-
tum theory is necessarily always forward directed since the
past is factual and the future open. If irreversibility is intro-
duced on a fundamental level as proposed then the coinci-
dence of the different ”arrows of time” (psychological, thermo-
dynamic, cosmological...) is immediate and in particular disso-
ciated from any cosmological model. (Haag 1990: 250)
It is not usually explicitly stated, but it is obvious that these
transition chances which standard quantum mechanics pre-
scribes are forwards transition chances, standard quantumme-
chanics does not prescribe any backwards transition chances.
Thus quantum mechanics implies that there is an objective ar-
row of time. (Arntzenius 1995: 77)7
7According to McCall (1976, 1994), the branching structure that physical possibilities
may display account for an objective notion of time flow.
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Both the Overlap and the Brancing principles are useful to highlight
some crucial differences between branching and divergence. In a branch-
ing setting, if an entity x exists at a worldw and hasmore than one possible
future after t, then x literally inhabits more than one world at t. Indeed, x
is located at any world that overlaps at t and branches afterwards. Thus,
the branching view is incompatible with the following, Lewisian thesis.
World-boundness: Nothing is in two worlds. (Lewis 1968: 114)
The WorlWorldd-boundness principle, on the other hand, is perfectly con-
sistent with a divergentist framework. A divergentist can claim that the
World-boundness principle is compatible with an entity’s having more than
one possible future. Indeed, one can say that x – existing only in world w
– has more than one possible future after t iff it has a duplicate y in w′ at
t, but there is a time t′ later than t such that y fails to be a duplicate of x
at t′ . As we shall see, the assessment of the World-boundness thesis will be
relevant to compare divergence against branching.
2.2.1 Trees and Ockhamism
Now, let us see how to formalise the branching approach through the so-
called branching time frames.
Definition 2.2.1. (Branching time frames) A branching time frame is a couple
T = (M,<), where M is a non-empty set of moments and < is a strict partial
order onM satisfying the following conditions.
(a) ∀m,m′ ,m′′(m′ < m∧m′′ < m⇒m′ =m′′ ∨m′ < m′′ ∨m′′ < m′),
(b) ∀m,m′(m "m′ ∧m ≮m′ ∧m′ ≮m⇒∃m′′(m′′ < m∧m′′ < m′)).
The strict partial order < mimics the later than relation between mo-
ments in time. Thus, if m < m′, m′ is later than m or, alterntively, m′ is a
possible future moment for m. Notice that moments are generally taken
to be instantaneous, temporally complete world-slices. Intuitively, each
moment conveys an information analogous to that encoded in a world-
time couple (w,t) of a Kamp frame. A relevant logical difference, however,
is that branching frames take moments as primitive entities, and possi-
ble worlds (viz. histories) are constructed out of them. On the other hand,
Kamp frames take both worlds and times as primitives, and instantaneous
world-slices – such as (w,t) – are constructed out of those primitives.
Clause (a) is often called the no backward branching condition, and it
reflects the idea that the past of any moment is settled or unique. In other
terms, (a) guarantees that, given any moment m, there are no alternative
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<-unrelated moments in the past of m. Condition (b), instead, says that if
there are two moments that are not <-related, there is (at least) one mo-
ment in their past. This clause expresses that any two possible moments
share at least a common past moment. Clause (b) corresponds to the “His-
torical connection” condition discussed above.
In a branching time setting, possible worlds are called histories, which
are maximally <-chains of T .
Definition 2.2.2 (Histories). A history h is a subset of T such that
(a) ∀m,m′(m,m′ ∈ h⇒m <m′ ∨m′ < m∨m =m′),
(b) No subset g of T which satisfies condition (a) is such that h ⊂ g .
Any history, again, represents a possible, temporally complete courses
of events specified by T . Each history, thus, is a path reality might take in
its evolution (if any) from the past towards the future. The set of histories
obtainable from a branchin frame T will be denoted as H(T ). Histories h
and h′ overlap at m if m ∈ h and m ∈ h′. Moreover, h and h′ are undivided
at m if there is a moment m′ at which they overlap and which is later than
m.
Branching time frames can be used to obtain the following definition
of objective indeterminism:
Definition 2.2.3. (Branching Objective Indeterminism (BOI)) Given a set of
physically possible histories (worlds) H(T ), a history h ∈ H(T ) is objectively
indeterministic iff there is a momentm and a history h′ ∈H(T ) such thatm ∈ h,
m ∈ h′ and h " h′.
As Zanardo (2006: 380) notices, the second-order, left-hand side of the
biconditional is equivalent to the following, first-oder clause:
∃m,m′ ,m′′(m <m′ & m <m′′ & m′ "m′′ & m′ ≮m′′ & m′′ ≮m′).
h4h3h2h1
m7m6m5m4
m3m2
m1
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The tree-like graph above is a representation of a branching time frame.
History h1 passes through moments m1,m2 and m4. Histories h1 and h2
overlap at m1 and m2, are undivided at m1, but they branch at m2. It is
worth noting that there aremoments in the tree which do not bear the later
than relation to one another. For instance, m2 and m3 are not <-related:
they are two alternative moments belonging to histories that have already
branched at an earlier moment. Thus, by BOI, histories h1,h2,h3 and h4
are indeterministic.
Branching frames are usually coupled with a semantics – which it will
be called Branching Ockhamist semantics, BO – which is analogous to KO,
and which allows to give a straightforward interpretation to the modal
temporal language LT . In turn, with the BO at hand, a branching indeter-
minist can attempt to answers to both (Q1) and (Q2).
Recall, once again, that LT has two metric temporal operators, P(n) and
F(n). Thus, one needs a duration function analogous to dT .
Definition 2.2.4 (T -duration function.). Given a tree T , dT is a T -duration
function which maps couples of <-related moments to elements of Y−{0}, where
Y is a set of positive numbers whose cardinality is no more than continuous. In
addition, dT fulfils the following conditions.
(a) dT (m,m
′) =↑ just in case m = m′. This conditions avoids n > 0 as the
value of the distance between an arbitrary time and itself, for any n ∈
Y − {0}. Moreover, it ensures that dT is defined for any two <-related
moments.
(b) Ifm "m′ , then dT (m,m
′) = dT (m
′,m). The value of the distance between
m and m′ is the same as the value of the distance between m′ and m.
(c) For any m ∈ h, there exists at most one m′ ∈ h such that dT (m,m
′) = n
and m < m′ (m′ < m). This condition ensures that, for each history h to
which m belongs, there can be at most just one moment m′ in the same h
which has n as the value of its distance from m, and that is later (earlier)
than m.
(d) If dT (m,m
′) = n, dT (m,m
′′) = n′ andm <m′ < m′′, then n < n′. This con-
dition states that dT preserves the order among moments and the values
of their distances.
The Branching Ockhamist semantics, BO, can be defined by evaluating
formulas at moment-history pairs (m,h) of T , where the history of the pair
passes trough themoment of the pair (i.e.,m ∈ h;m/h abbreviates moment-
history pairs that satisfy such a condition).
Definition 2.2.5 (BO-model). A BO-model forLT is a tupleMBO = (T ,dT , I ),
where:
2.2. BRANCHING 35
(a) T = (M,<) is a tree,
(b) dT is a T -duration function,
(c) I is an interpretation function from the atoms of LT to the the set of
moment history pairs m/h, and it satisfies
(c.1) If m/h ∈ I(p), then, for any h′ s.t. m ∈ h′, m/h′ ∈ I(p).
If m/h ∈ I(p), then p is BO-true at moment m, along history h. Further-
more, condition (c.1) ensures that the truth-values of present tensed sen-
tences – i.e., the truth values of the atoms of LT – are history-independent.
This, in turn, mirrors that if it is true that there is a sea battle, it is (now)
inevitably so. In a sense, the present cannot be modified, it is settled. Let
us go on, and define the recurses clauses of BO as follows (again, “#BO”
and “!BO” denotes BO-truth and BO-falisty, respectively).
Definition 2.2.6 (BO-semantics). Given a BO-model MBO for LT ,
(BO1) m/h #BO p⇔m/h ∈ I(p)
(BO2) m/h #BO ¬A⇔ not m/h #BO A⇔m/h !BO A
(BO3) m/h #BO A∨B⇔ either m/h #BO A or m/h #BO B
(BO4) m/h #BO F(n)A⇔∃m
′(m′ ∈ h&m < m′ & dT (m,m
′) = n&m′/h #BO A)
(BO5) m/h #BO P(n)A⇔ ∃m
′(m′ ∈ h & m′ < m & dT (m,m
′) = n & m′/h #BO
A)
(KO6) m/h #BO !A⇔∀h
′(m ∈ h′ ⇒m/h′ #BO A)
BO evaluates a sentence of the form F(n)A as true atm/h iffA is true at
the moment that lies n time units in the future ofm, along history h (again,
the truth conditions for statements of the form P(n)A are symmetric). His-
torical necessity at a moment-history pair, on the other hand, means truth
at any history passing through that moment.
It is easy to see that BO satisfy the following notion of bivalence,
BO-bivalence: For any wffA of LT and any point m/h, either m/h #BO A or
m/h !BO A,
where, as for the KO semantics, BO-truth (#BO) and BO-falsity (!BO) are
mutually exclusive but jointly exhaustive. Thus, branching indeterminism
– as it is defined by BOI – is perfectly compatible with the BO-bivalence.
And this seems to answer (Q1).
On the other hand, BO refutes the principle PNP (i.e., P(n)A→ !P(n)A),
and the Master argument turns out to be unsound if its premises are in-
terpreted with the BO-semantics. Here’s a countermodel to PNP.
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h2h1
m1
m2 : p m3 : ¬p
m0
In this countermodel it is assumed that p is BO-true atm2 but BO-false
at m3. Moreover, dT (m0,m2) =T (m0,m3) = 2, and dT (m0,m1) = 1. It is easy
to check that P(1)F(2)p→ !P(1)F(2)p is BO-false at m1/h1.
To sum up, the branching approach seems to be as good as the diver-
gentist view in answering (Q1)-(Q2). Each strategy allows to define inde-
terminism in terms of possible worlds, and a semantics which satisfies (a
specific kind of) bivalence but fails to validate one premise of the Master
argument, namely, the principle of the necessitation of the past (PNP). As
already noticed, however, the two frameworks are at odds with each other,
for a branching theorist is happy to accept theOverlap condition, while an
advocate of a divergentist view explicitly rejects it. This dialectical situa-
tion leads to a comparison between the two frameworks.
2.3 Divergence and Branching at work
In what follows, I consider two objections against divergence which may
constitute some motivations for the adoption of the branching view. On
the other hand, several objections that philosophers have raised against
the branching conception will be explored. All of these objections point to
several, alleged difficulties that branching frames should have in meeting
some physical and metaphysical desiderata. It will be argued that these
objections are far from being convincing, and they do not represent good
reasons to reject the branching approach. Therefore, I conclude that the
branching strategy is better suited than the divergentist one in accounting
for objective indeterminism.
2.3.1 Perfect natural properties and collapsing towers.
Several philosophers assess divergentism as inadequate: as Belot (1995: 188)
and Placek (2000: 31) have stressed, the notion of duplicate may fail to ac-
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count for some specific indeterministic phenomena.
Let us start by assuming the relation of being-a-duplicate-of, as it is de-
fined by Lewis:
[T]wo things are duplicates iff (1) they have exactly the same
perfectly natural properties, and (2) their parts can be put into
correspondence in such a way that corresponding parts have
exactly the same perfectly natural properties, and stand in the
same perfectly natural relations. (Lewis 1986a: 61)
Belot (1995: 189) notices that, among divergentist theorists, part-whole
relations and spatiotemporal relations are usually taken to be two kinds
of natural properties.8 Thus, sameness of natural properties entails same-
ness of part-whole and saptiotemporal relations among counterparts. Ac-
cordingly, if a is a duplicate of c, and b is a duplicate of d, then an object
composed of a and b is a duplicate of an object composed of c and d just
in case the spatiotemporal relations between a and b are the same as those
between c and d. Notice that the notion of duplicate can be used to ac-
count for that of similarity between worlds at a time. Let f a one-to-one
map from the entities existing at (t,w) to those existing at (t′,w′), and let
us denote with D(t,w) the set of entities existing at (t,w). A function f is
a duplication just in case, for any entity x in world w at time t, there is
another possible world w′ such that t ∈Mw′ and f (x) is a duplicate in w
′,
at time t, of x (that is, f conserves spatiotemporal relations and perfectly
natural properties of spacetime points and temporal stages of particles).
Thus, let us say that w and w′ are duplicates at a time t (w ≈t w
′) just
in case there is a duplication f : D(t,w) −→ D(t,w′).9 Now, let us use the
notion of duplication to refine the definition of indeterminism provided
by divergentists.
Definition 2.3.1 (Divergence Objective Indeterminism* (DOI*)). Given a set
of physically possible worlds W , world w ∈W is objectively indeterministic iff
there is a w′ ∈W and two times t, t′ ∈Mw such that t <w t
′, f is a duplication
f : D(t,w) −→ D(t,w′), but there is no duplication g from (t′,w) to (t′ ,w′)
whose restriction to D(t,w) is f .
8See also Lewis (1986a: Ch.1.6).
9In order to conserve the intuition that, if two worlds are duplicates of one another at
a time, they are duplicates at any earlier time, one should impose that
If there is a duplication f : D(t,w) −→ D(t,w′), then, for any t′ such that t′ <w t,
there exists a duplication g :D(t′ ,w) −→D(t′ ,w′), where g is the restriction of f to
D(t′ ,w).
38 CHAPTER 2. TWO FRAMEWORKS FOR INDETERMINISM
This latter definition is more fine-grained than that of DOI, since the
similarity relation is now based on indistinguishability of perfect natural
properties among counterparts. Nevertheless, DOI* seems to yield coun-
terintuitive results. There are cases in which a world appears to be inde-
terministic, even if, according to DOI*, it should count as deterministic.10
Take a world w1 such that only newtonian laws of motion hold in it.
Furthermore, assume that w1 has only three objects: (i) a large, homoge-
neous, perfectly spherical planet; (ii) a relatively small perfectly cylindri-
cal column resting on the planet so that its axis of symmetry is normal
to the planet at the point of contact; (iii) a cone which, at t1, hits with
its aphex the center of the column’s top surface, causing the column to
buckle.11 Now, the (newtonian) laws of motion governing the three ob-
jects in w1 determines the shape of the collapsing column, but they do not
say anything about the direction of the buckling. As Wilson (1993) puts it,
At a critical value of the weight [...] the column suddenly sags.
But this collapse is not unique; although the shape of the buck-
ling is the same, the column is free to bulge in any 360◦ direc-
tion. (Wilson 1993: 216)
This latter feature suggests that the buckling should be classified as an
indeterministic phenomena, and therefore w1 should count as an indeter-
ministic world.12
However, Belot (1995) has shown that, if there is there exists a world
w2 satisfying the newtonian laws, and if there is a duplication f such that
f : D(t1,w1) −→ D(t1,w1), then there must be an extension g of f from
D(t′,w1) to D(t
′ ,w2) that is itself a duplication, for any t
′ s.t. t1 <w1 t
′. This
kind of situation is pictured in the figure below.
10Obviously, if there is no w′ that is physically possible with respect to w, then, by
DOI*, w is indeterministic. However, this is nothing but a vacuous way to fulfil DOI*,
and it will be ignored.
11The counterexample is due to Wilson (1993), and it is presented both in Belot 1995
and in Placek 2000.
12If the column argument is correct, it would show that, contrary to a common belief,
even newtonian laws are indeterministic, given particular initial conditions. For a similar
conclusion, see Earman 1986: 45, Norton 2008 and Echeverria et al. 1991.
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The column in world w1 – at the time of the buckling, t1 – has two parti-
cles, a and b. The column which exists at t1 in the other world w2 has two
particles as well, c and d. Moreover, at t1, particle a is the duplicate of c
(i.e., f (a) = c) and b is the duplicate of d (f (b) = d). At a time which imme-
diately follows that of the buckling, t2, the two towers start to collapse in
different directions. However, there exists a duplication g which extends f
at time t2, and which ensures that both a and b continue to be duplicates of
c (g(a) = c) and d (g(b) = d) even after the buckling. By DOI*,w1 andw2 are
deterministic. But this contradicts the intuition that world w1 (w2) should
be indeterministic, for the direction of the tower’s collapse is not deter-
mined by the physical laws governing that world. As Wilson (1993: 216)
concludes, in a universe consisting of such a column, the definition of in-
determinism provided by DOI* would identify the differences among w1
and w2, “contrary to the conventional mathematical opinion that the gov-
erning theory dose not determine unique solutions”. As a consequence, a
statement such as
• It was possible that the tower would have collapsed in a different
direction,
seems to be true at world w1 (w2) at t2. But its truth cannot be traced back
to a difference of natural properties between w1 and w2.
The counterexample, however, is far from being uncontroversial, given
the key role that the spatial symmetries play in it. As Gordon Belot ex-
plains,
[...] the laws have been chosen so that the only ambiguity in
the evolution of the worlds is in the direction of collapse; but
because of the symmetries of the worlds, it is always possible
to give identical descriptions for them. (Belot 1995: 191)
Carolyn Brighouse (1997: 476) agrees with Belot in that the indiscernibil-
ity of the two worlds depends on the symmetries of the objects in w1, but
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she holds that different spherically symmetrically tower collapses should
be taken as physically equivalent phenomena. Indeed, according to Brig-
house (1997), a divergentist may assess w1 (w2) as indeterministic only by
individuating space-time points across possible worlds independently of
their qualitative properties – that is, independently of whether they are
occupied by matter, or fields, or what have you.
[I]n the one world the outside of the elbow of collapse ends up
lying at point p, and the inside of the elbow ends up lying at
point q, while in the otherworld it is the other round inside lies
on while the outside lies on way (the p’ (p’s counterpart), q’).
We want to know the physical respect in which the futures dif-
fer. What is the property that p’ has in the second world that
guarantees that it’s the counterpart of p in the first world? Since
we have given up the hope of appealing to the qualitative prop-
erties of the points to determine counterparthood it is hard to
see why we should favour p’ as the counterpart of p over any
other point in this second world, unless of course we think that
p and p’ have some non-qualitative property in common. (Brig-
house 1997: 476)
The quotation suggests that, if a divergentist wants to assess w1 as inde-
terministic, she has to say that spatial points exemplify haecceities, that
is, non-qualitative properties that are responsible for their identity. More-
over, the duplicate link should be based on some relation among haec-
ceities. This latter relation, however, cannot be that of sameness. Indeed,
haecceity is the property in virtue of which a thing is what it is. Hence,
if duplicate space points were to share the same haecceity, they would be
the same identical point. This means that, if one takes Belot’s argument
as a genuine case for indeterminism, the identification of the counterparts
of an object (at a time) requires a stronger principle that that of sameness
of natural properties. And that’s why an advocate of divergentism such as
Brighouse (1997) wants to say that, at the end of the day, w1 and w2 are
both deterministic, whatever one’s intuitions may be.
A branching theorist would be happy to accept that the identification
of the counterparts needs a stronger principle that that of sameness of nat-
ural properties. For in a branching perspective the only relation respon-
sible for the identification of the counterparts of an object (at a time) is
that of numerical identity. Moreover, a branching theorist can account for
the intuition that w1 and w2 should count as indeterministic. A branch-
ing theorist may say that, at t1, the very same tower inhabits both w1 and
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w2. These two worlds branch at t2, and the continuation of the tower at
t2 in world w1 is thus numerically distinct from its continuation at time
t2 in world w2. Then, classical possible worlds can be framed in the way
suggested by John Earman (1986: 24), according to which each classical
world is a triple w = (Ma,G,P), where Ma is the space-time manifold R4,
G is a set of geometric object fields on Ma characterising the structure
of space-time (including, for example, three dimensional planes of simul-
taneity), and P the set of geometric object fields characterising the physical
contents of space-time. Then, a branching theorist may say that in w1 the
plane of simultaneity at t2 has a distribution of space-time content that
differs from that of w2 at that time. In other terms, matter at w1 (at t2) has
different locations than those occupied in w2 (at t2).
This does not show that the tower’s collapse case is sufficient to favour
branching over divergence. It only points out that, if one assumes the
tower’s collapse as a genuine indeterministic phenomena, a branching
theorist would be advantaged over a divergentist one. Under a branch-
ing perspective, the tower’s collapse can be viewed as indeterministic. But
this characterisation doesn’t force the branching theorist to change any of
her fundamental tenets (such as the No-overlap condition or the Branching
principle). A divergentist theorist, on the other hand, can characterise the
tower’s collapse as indeterministic, but she needs to identify counterparts
with a principle that is stronger than that of sameness of natural proper-
ties.
2.3.2 The expressive adequacy argument and the dupli-
cate talk
Thomason (1984) and Belnap et al. (2001) argue that Kamp frames have
an alleged, expressive adequacy problem. It has to do with the satisfiabil-
ity of two (apparently) contradictory formulas, whose conjunction can be
satisfied in some Kamp frame. I will argue that the expressive adequacy
problem is question-begging, for it argues against divergence by implic-
itly assuming a branching conception of future possibilities. This assump-
tion, however, is only natural, and it helps to highlight an intuitive feature
about modality and reference that makes the branching approach prefer-
able to the divergentist one.
First, let us see how Kamp frames can be structurally compared to
branching time frames. As Zanardo (2006: 387) notices, Kamp frames
can be seen as hiding a tree-like representation of time, and (almost) any
Kamp frame corresponds to a branching time frame. Recall that, in a branch-
42 CHAPTER 2. TWO FRAMEWORKS FOR INDETERMINISM
ing time frame T = (M,<), the moments in M are instantaneous world-
slices, where an instantaneous world-slice of a Kamp frame K = (W,T ,≈)
is a couple (w,t). Accordingly, one might take (classes of) world-time pairs
(w,t) as moments of a tree. Furthermore, any world w in K can be read as
a history of a branching frame, for branching possible worlds are maximal
<-chains of moments. Moreover, when a divergentist says that two worlds
are indiscernible at a time (say w ≈t w
′), a branching theorist replies that
the two worlds should be conceived as overlapping. Accordingly, ≈ can be
interpreted as an overlapping relation.
Technically, these analogies can be formalised as follows. Given a Kamp
frame K, let us consider any element in
(i) [(w,t)] = {(w′, t) : w ≈t w
′}
as a moment, and
(ii) MK = {[(w,t)] : w ∈W and t ∈Mw}
as the set of moments obtained from K. Let us define a binary relation <K
onMK in the following way: given (w
′′, t′′) ∈ [(w,t)] and (w′′′, t′′′) ∈ [(w′ , t′)],
(iii) [(w,t)] <K [(w
′ , t′)]⇔ w′′ ≈t′ w
′′′ and t <w′′ t
′.
<K is transitive, since both ≈w and <w are transitive; <K is irreflexive, for
<w is irreflexive. It is partial, given that whenever w !t w
′ and w !t′ w
′ ,
neither [(w,t)] <K [(w
′ , t′)] nor [(w′ , t′)] <K [(w,t)]. <K is left-linear, given
conditions (c.1)-(c.2) of Definition 1.2.1. Moreover, if it is the case that
(iv) For each world w specified by K, there exists a w′ and a time t in K
such that w ≈t w
′ ,
whenever [(w,t)] and [(w′ , t′)] are <K-unrelated, they have a common <K-
ancestor. Hence, if (iv) is the case, <K satisfies the properties of Definition
1.2.3, and TK = (MK,<K) is a branching time frame.
One can go the other way round, and obtain a Kamp frame out of a tree.
Given a tree T = (M,<), the correspondent Kamp frame KT = (W,T ,≈) is
such that
(v) W =H(T ),
(vi) T is a map such that T (h) = ({m :m ∈ h},<),
(vii) h ≈m h⇔m ∈ h∩ h
′.
As Zanardo (2006: 388) has shown, conditions (i)–(iv) and (v)–(vii) can be
used to define two functions, K 2→ TK and T 2→ KT . The function K 2→ TK
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yields the tree TK which corresponds to the Kamp frame K, while T 2→ KT
the Kamp frame KT corresponding to the tree T .
One important feature of these functions is that T and TKT are al-
ways isomorphic structures, where it may be that K and KTK fail to be
isomorphic. To see why, take a Kamp frame K1 = (W,T ,≈) which has de-
numerably many worlds. One can enumerate these worlds simply by using
naturals, w0,w1, etc. Suppose that T is such that, for any World wn ∈ W ,
T (wn) = {N,<N}, where <N is the usual order among natural numbers.
Assume that wn ≈t wm just in case t $N min(n,m). Thus, for instance,
w0 ≈0 w1 but w0 !1 w1. Analogously, w1 ≈0 w2, w1 ≈1 w2, but w1 !2 w2. A
partial representation of K1 is given in Figure A below.
Conditions (i)-(iv) allow to generate the correspondent tree TK1 , and
any world of K1 will correspond to a history in TK1 . But there is a history
in TK1 which does not correspond to any world of the original Kamp frame
K1 (see Figure B below). This history is the chain
hω = {[(w0,0)], [(w1,1)], [(w2,2)], ...}.
Hence, if one applies conditions (v)-(vii) and generates a Kamp frameKTK1
from TK1 , it turns out that KTK1
has more worlds than the original frame
K1. The structures thus obtained cannot be isomorphic.
In general, a tree TK has emerging histories that do not correspond to
anyworld inK, and this feature is responsible for the descriptive adequacy
problem that Belnap et al. (2001) and Thomason (1984) attribute to Kamp
frames. Let’s run their expressive adequacy argument.
w4w3w2w1w0
....
....
....
....
....
....
3
2
1
0 ≈0 ≈0 ≈0 ≈0
≈1≈1 ≈1
≈2≈2
≈3
Figure A.
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hωh4h3h2h1h0
....
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- - - - - -
[(w0,0)]
[(w1,1)]
[(w2,2)]
[(w3,3)]
[(w4,4)]
Figure B.
Suppose that any history in a tree is isomorphic to the reals, and has a
clock that ticks at those moments which correspond to natural numbers.
Assume that the following statement is true at the starting moment:
(1) As long as atom a has not yet decayed,
(i) a might decay before the next tick, and
(ii) a might not decay before the next tick.
The situation just described is pictured in Figure C, where p means “atom
a has not yet decayed”, and any node (viz. moment) in the three is a tick.
hωh4h3h2h1h0
....
....
....
....
....
...
- - - - - -
¬p
¬p
¬p
¬p
¬p
¬p
¬p
¬p
¬p
¬p
¬p
¬p
¬p
¬p
¬p
¬p
¬p ¬p
p
p
p
p
p
Figure C.
Statement (1), in turn, entails that
(2) Every no-decay chain of ticks of length n can be extended to a no-
decay chain of length n+1.
Notice that the truth values of (1)-(2) do not depend on the existence of
hω. On the contrary, the truth of
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(3) At the starting moment, it is inevitable that a will decay after a finite
number of ticks,
depends on whether hω is admitted or not. If it is admitted, (3) cannot be
true, for hω is an infinite no-decay chain. If, on the other hand, history hω
is excluded, (3) is true, since any possible course of events is such that a
decays after a finite number of ticks on that course.
Belnap et al. (2001) and Thomason (1984) argue that (2)–(3) are contra-
dictory claims, and that any adequate structure should falsify their con-
junction. Nonetheless, the tree in Figure C can be seen as obtained by a
Kamp frame whose missing history is hω. This Kamp frame would be anal-
ogous to that of Figure A. Just think of the ≈-related world-time pairs in
Figure A as points at which p holds, where any pair which has no ≈-access
to other pairs satisfies ¬p. It is easy to see that such a structure makes both
(2) and (3) true. Indeed, any no-decay chain of thicks of length n can be
extended to a no-decay chain of length n + 1, even if at any chain, a de-
cays after a finite number of ticks. According to Belnap et al. (2001) and
Thomason (1984), this fact makes Kamp frames expressively inadequate.
This conclusion seems too hasty, and a particularly insightful reading
of the expressive adequacy argument is given by Zanardo (2006):
In private correspondence with Nuel Belnap, I suggested that
the conviction that (2) and (3) contradict each other might de-
pend on the implicit presupposition that time has a tree-like
aspect (and not, for instance, a Kamp frame aspect). We feel
that it is possible that atom a will never decay because the his-
tory hω is in some sense already there in our (tree-like) rep-
resentation of time; we cannot pretend not to see hω. [...] This
does not happen if, instead, we think of time in term of Kamp
[...] frames. (Zanardo 2006: 394)
I think that Zanardo is right. The expressive adequacy argument is
question-begging, for it presupposes a branching picture of time. There
is no way to decide whether (2) and (3) are contradictory, unless a struc-
ture to interpret them is given.
There are further reasons that lead to reject the expressive adequacy
argument. First, if (2) and (3) are jointly satisfiable – viz. they have a di-
vergentist model – it is hard to see them as contradictory claims.
Secondly, the construction of the tree with the no-decay history, even
if perfectly legitimate from a technical viewpoint, can be metaphysically
suspicious. A divergentist may claim that the original Kamp frame is an
exhaustive account of physically possible worlds. In other terms, that Kamp
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frame does not miss to specify any physically possible world. Thus, an ad-
vocate of the divergentist strategy may argue that hw is physically impos-
sible, and that the transition from a Kamp frame to a correspondent tree is
wrongheaded. This reasoning allows the divergentist to say that, in a situ-
ation such as that of Figure A, (3) must be true, since it comes out false just
in case hω is an admissible possible course of events. In turn, the appar-
ent incompatibility between (2) and (3) can be explained away by saying
that it rests on the wrong presupposition that the original Kamp frame is
somehow incomplete. This supposition mistakenly suggests to implement
the original Kamp frame with the emerging history hω, obtaining a tree
similar to that of Figure C.
To sum up, the expressive adequacy argument is unsound, for it pre-
supposes a branching representation of time. This illicit assumption, how-
ever, is only natural. When it comes to think about future possibilities, as-
suming a branching time structure is the most natural approach to adopt,
for it is the one that best fits our intuitions about time, modality and ref-
erence. The intuitiveness that characterises the branching framework, in
turn, makes it preferable to the divergentist approach. Let us see why.
The adequacy descriptive argument may hyde the different views that
divergentists and branching theorists have about reference. Recall (1),
(1) As long as atom a has not yet decayed,
(i) a might decay before the next tick, and
(ii) a might not decay before the next tick.
Under a divergentist perspective, the truth of (1) at (w,t) entails that there
is (at least) one duplicate of a, say b, which inhabits a world w′ that spa-
tiotemporally unrelated to w. Hence, if (1) is true at (w,t), it commits both
to the existence of (at least) one duplicate of a, and to (at least) a possi-
ble world w′ that is spatiotemporally unrelated to w. This means, further-
more, that there must be a possible world, other thanw, at which “a” refers
to b. On the other hand, a branching theorist doesn’t want to say anything
like that. The truth of (1) just means that the very same temporal part, say a–
at–m, has access to two possible, future evolutions.In one of them, there is
a decayed, temporal evolution of a–at–m, while in the other there is a sta-
ble, temporal evolution of a–at–m. But “a”, even if refers to two distinct,
temporal parts in the future of a–at–m, picks out two possible evolutions
that the very same entity has after m. The latter interpretation is by far
the closest one to what is intuitively conveyed by using modal statements.
When someone says “It is possible that tomorrow it will be rainy”, the in-
formation thus expressed is that there is a possible continuation of today
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in which it is rainy. In other terms, there is no evidence that one is talk-
ing about a spatiotemporal, causally unrelated world in which it will be
rainy. Thus, the divergentist approach is recalcitrant to accept the most
natural reading of the information conveyed by modal-tensed statements.
As Kripke famously argued,
[In a divergentist setting,] if we say ‘Humphrey might have
won the election (if only he had done such-and-such), we are
not talking about something that might have happened to Humphrey
but to someone else, a “counterpart”.’ Probably, however, Humphrey
could not care less whether someone else, no matter how much
resembling him, would have been victorious in another possi-
ble world. Thus, Lewis’s view [viz. the divergentist approach]
seems to me even more bizarre than the usual notions of trans-
world identification that it replaces. (Kripke 1980: 45, fn. 13)
Similarly, Thomas Placek argues that
[...] about an hour ago I was nearly struck by a car. Hence I say,
“I could have been run over, but fortunately I dodged out of the
way”. Am I really rejoicing because in another possible world
my twin was run over, but in this one I was saved? Clearly not.
(Placek 2012: 27)
If Kripke and Placek are right, the World-boundness thesis – i.e., noth-
ing exists in two worlds – is at odds with a natural account of what we
do when we talk about possible scenarios. If the World-boundness were
true, “Humphrey” would refer to Humphrey in the actual world (assum-
ing that Humphrey actually exists), but the same name would refer to one
of his counterpart at a counterfactual world (assuming that Humphrey’s
counterpart exists at that counterfactual world). A divergentist is happy
to accept this latter claim, and this makes divergence itself quite weird.
But a branching theorist can obviously avoid this bizarreness, for in a tree
temporal parts have several possible continuations, and any of them stem
from a common source.
Surely, one can claim that the modal aspects related to indeterminism
are theoretical notions, and pre-theoretical, linguistic intuitions are of no
help in assessing the branching account against the divergentist one. But
this reply is wrong, for it forgets that
[...] the folk theory of time that is fossilized in the structure
of our language does help to single out what the philosophy
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of time is talking about. We want an account of what we call
time and we cannot reject too much of the folk theory without
changing the topic. (Meyer 2013: 5)
When one does metaphysics, intuitions may be useful to isolate the very
topic one is talking about. When one tries to figure out the subject matter
of the future possibilities talk, the “folk theory” fossilized in our language
clearly matters. Sure, intuitions might be dropped when there is sufficient
evidence to do so. But when there is no such evidence, it is unreasonable
to reject them. This methodological criterion appears to be shared even by
David Lewis (1986a: Ch. 4), the leading advocate of divergence. Indeed,
in adopting divergence, he feels the need of justifying his departure from
intuitions by the overall theoretical role that counterparts play in a broad,
metaphysical picture. As far as indeterminism is concerned, does one need
to undertake the departure suggested by Lewis? More specifically, is there
any reason to discharge branching in favour of divergence?
In the next section some arguments against branching will be explored.
I will argue that these arguments are far from being convincing. Hence
they do not collect any evidence to reject the most intuitive view among
the two main rival frameworks that are relevant for indeterminism.
2.3.3 Lewis against the Overlap condition: demarcation of
worlds.
David Lewis elaborates three arguments to motivate the No-overlap con-
dition. Since this condition is assumed by divergentists but rejected by
branching theorists, Lewis’ arguments are meant to favour the former ap-
proach agains the latter.
According to his view, whoever is committed to overlapping worlds has
to face a problem related to the demarcation of possible worlds. In Lewis’
words,
[...] overlap of worlds interferes with the most salient principle
of demarcation for worlds, viz. that two possible individuals
are part of the same world iff they are linked by some chain
of external relations, e.g. of spatiotemporal relations. (Lewis
1983b: 360)
First, Lewis stresses that the external relations he’s talking about are spa-
tiotemporal. These relations have a pivotal metaphysical role, for they
unify possible worlds. When it comes to assess whether two possible indi-
viduals, say x and y, exist at the same world w, one has to check whether
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there is some spatiotemporal relation obtaining between x and y. If x is
a possible entity, but it doesn’t bear any spatiotemporal relation with an-
other possible entity y, x and y must exist at two different worlds, say w
and w′ respectively. Let “xw” refer to an entity x, existing at a possible
world w. Given two distinct entities xw " yw′ , Lewis’ criterion for the iden-
tification of worlds is
(4) ∀xw,yw′∃R(R(xw,yw′ )⇒ w = w
′),
where R is an external, spatiotemporal relation between possible individ-
uals.
But why the Overlap condition should be in tension with (4)?
What unifies a world, I suggested, is that its parts stand in suit-
able external relations, preferably spatiotemporal. But if we
have overlap, we have spatiotemporal relations between the
parts of different worlds. For instance, let P be the common
part – say, a shared initial segment – of the two worlds W1 and
W2, let R1 be the remainder of W1, and let R2 be the remainder
of W2. Then the appropriate unifying relations obtain between
parts of two different worlds: between P , which is inter alia a
part of the world W1, and R2, which is part of the different
world W2. Of course, it is also true that P and R2 are parts of a
single world W2. So at least, there is some world they are both
parts of, even if they may be parts of other worlds besides. Or
can we say even that? In a sense, even R1 and R2 are related, in
a stepwise back-and-forth way, via P. For instance, R1 and R2
might stand to one another in the complex temporal relation:
successor–of–a–predecessor–of. (Lewis 1986a: 208)
A crucial premise that Lewis endorses is that, if world w and world w′
overlap, any two individuals, existing at w and w′ respectively, bear some
spatiotemporal link. This assumption can be written as
(5) If w and w′ overlap, ∀xw,yw′∃R(R(xw,yw′ ))
It is easy to see that (4) and (5) entail
(6) If w and w′ overlap, w = w′.
By (4)–(5), the plurality of possible courses of events that the branching
approach predicts is a fake, for it collapses to one single, possible world.
As Lewis comments,
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If we stay with the simple account of how worlds are defined
[that is, if (4) holds], we will conclude that where there is this
branching, there is one single world composed of all the branches.
That would not be branching of worlds, but branching within
worlds; and so the overlap of branches would not be the over-
lap of worlds. (Lewis 1986a: 209)
The collapse over one single possible world has several shortcomings. Ac-
cording to Lewis (1986a: 209), such a world cannot be the one in which we
live, for otherwise we would be constantly deceived in thinking about ‘the
future’; in a single, branching possible world, its inhabitants would have
many futures, not just one (more on this below).
If any branching frame represents just one single world, one could
identify that world with an individual, relativistic spacetime manifold.
This manifold, in turn, has an ‘internal’ branching structure, in the sense
that it has a trunk that bifurcates in two legs, creating a “trousers uni-
verse” similar to that of the figure below.
According to Lewis’ objection, there cannot be a branching universe
that is not also a trousers universe. In a trousers universe, spacetime lit-
erally rips off, yielding two separate, spatiotemporal regions. As Earman
(2008) has argued at length, this kind of structure involves a change in
the spatial topology, and it contradicts several no-go results for topology
change. Thus, such models are inconsistent with the laws that, as far as we
know, govern the world we live in.
Furthermore, if Lewis’ objection is on the right track, the branching
approach cannot represent indeterminism. If any branching frame spec-
ifies a singular trousers universe, things may split in two copies in the
future, but it would not be possible for them to do not split. If there were
such a possibility, there would have been another possible world in which
things do not split. Lewis’ objection entails that any branching frame is
deterministic, for it identifies just one possible way in which things can
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evolve.13
The force of Lewis’ objection, if any, relies on the notion of spatiotem-
poral relation occurring in (5). The relation Lewis has in mind is being–a–
successor–of–a–predecessor–of. For the sake of simplicity, call that relation
R∗, and assume that it has moments as its relata. Then, for any two mo-
ments m,m′ in a tree T ,
R ∗ (m,m′) ≡df ∃m
′′(m′′ < m∧m′′ < m′)
By condition (b) of Definition 2.2.1, any two moments that are not <-
related must be R∗-related. And if T is past-unbounded (i.e., there is no
initial moment), any two moments of T are R∗-related. Let us focus only
on those trees which satisfy this latter condition.
Given that Lewis takes R∗ to be spatiotemporal, one may ask whether
that relation is indeed of the kind requested. At a first sight, it appears to
be so. After all, R∗ is defined on <, which has an obvious temporal mean-
ing. Furthermore, < is often interpreted as a relation of causal connected-
ness.14 If m < m′, what occurs at m′ is a (possible) effect of what occurs at
m. Given two spatially separated events e and e′, e can have a causal influ-
ence on e′ only if a signal can cover the spatial distance between the two.
Hence, < can sometimes take a spatial meaning as well.15 One may then
claim something like: “Look, R∗ is defined on <, which has both spatial
and temporal characters. Thus, R∗ must have a spatiotemporal character
as well”. But this is wrong.
The problem is that < encodes both spatiotemporal and modal infor-
mation: if < does not hold between two moments, these two moments are
modally inconsistent. Indeed, any two moments lying on different branches
can be assimilated to alternative world states.16 This means that two <-
unrelated moments are modal alternatives of the very same past, pre-
cisely beacuse they are not compossible. They are two futures of the same
past, but they are two modal alternatives of that past. Accordingly, if two
moments are not compossible, they simply cannot be part of the same
possible world. Recall that possible worlds are taken to be physical possi-
ble worlds. Hence, two compossible moments must identify two different
13For a similar conclusion, see Rosenkranz 2013.
14See, for instance, Belnap (1992), Belnap & Green (1994).
15This is particularly clear for the branching space-time structures elaborated in Bel-
nap (1992). These structures take into account the frame-relativity of simultaneity re-
quired by the special theory of relativity. Mathematical details aside, in a branching
space-time frame the < relation occurs between point events, and if e < e′, then e′ is
in one of the possible future light-cones of e. Thus, e′’s spatial location can indeed be
reached by a signal which starts moving form e’s spatial location.
16 See Bonomi & Del Prete (2008: 11).
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spatiotemporal regions of the very same possible world. By parity of rea-
soning, two moments that fail to be compossible should be part of two
different possible worlds. Thus, whenever R∗ holds among two modally
inconsistent moments, it cannot be taken to be a spatiotemporal relation
between them, for otherwise the two moment would be compossible. If
R∗ holds among two modally inconsistent moments, it conveys the infor-
mation that these moments are two future alternatives for a third, past
moment: this latter moment is in the past of each of its future alterna-
tives, but future alternatives do not bear any spatiotemporal relation to
one another.
To sum up, the relation Lewis uses in (5) is R∗, the relation of being–a-
successor–of–a–predecessor–of. Lewis takes R∗ to be spatiotemporal, and con-
cludes via (4) that the Overlap condition entails the existence of a single,
branching possible world. As we have seen, however, Lewis ignores that
R∗ may fail to be a relation of the kind required, since it can occur be-
tween modally inconsistent moments. Whenever R∗ holds between two
alternative possible moments, then R∗ does not identify a spatiotemporal
link between them. Hence, R∗ cannot be used in (4) to conclude that any
branching frame isolates a single possible world.
So far so good. Even Lewis recognises that his objection – based on
the demarcation of possible worlds – cannot be taken as a knock down
argument against branching. According to his view, however, branching
yields a farmore serious problem, involving the notion of individual taken
as a structured entity and made out of temporal parts.
2.3.4 Lewis against the Overlap condition: contradictory
individuals.
Branching theorists claim that the very same temporal part – such as the
atom a atmomentm – inhabits several, overlapping possible worlds (histo-
ries). These worlds branch towards the future, and so they specify different
possible ways the future of a temporal part can turn out. For instance, a–
at–m has both possible decay continuations and possible no-decay contin-
uations. According to Lewis, this way of conceiving indeterminism leads
to contradiction.
[...] Humphrey, who is part of this world and here has five fin-
gers on the left hand, is also part of some other world and there
has six fingers on his left hand. Qua part of this world he has
five fingers, qua part of that world he has six. He himself – one
and the same altogether self-identical – has five fingers on the
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left hand, and he has not five but six. How can this be done?
(Lewis 1986a: 200)
The objection is clear. Given a branching conception of indeterminism,
individuals – which are taken to be complex entities, made up of several,
temporal parts – have contradictory properties. In the example, Humphrey
has several parts, distributed in distinct possible worlds. In some of them
his left hand has six fingers, in others five. Thus, Humphrey’s left hand
has both five and six fingers. Contradiction.
This objection has an obvious rejoinder. In order to avoid the contra-
diction, one can simply relativize the identity of individuals (conceived as
structured entities made of temporal parts) to possible worlds (histories).
For instance, one may say that the individual Humphrey–on–h1 has a left
hand with six fingers, while another individual, Humphrey–on–h2, has a
left handwith just five fingers. Histories h1 and h2 overlap up to amoment,
and thus Humphrey–on–h1 shares some temporal parts with Humphrey–
on–h2. But h1 and h2 splits after a segment, representing two alternative,
possible courses of events. Since any history is taken to be entirely con-
sistent (that is, it is never the case that Humphrey–on–h1 (Humphrey–on–
h2) has both exactly five and six fingers on his left hand), no contradiction
arises. Thomas Placek seems to have flirted with this line of thought:
The two histories contain different continuations of Humphrey
in stage S, one continuation with five fingers on the left hand,
and the other with six fingers on the left hand. [...] Thus, the
two contradicting properties, of having five fingers and having
six fingers on the left hand, refer to two different individuals
that share some initial segment [...]. Hence, no contradiction
ensues. (Placek 2001: 488-489)17
This solution, even if appealing, has one important shortcoming. One of
the advantages that branching has over divergence is that the former, but
not the latter, does justice to our tensed-modal talk. This means that, un-
der a branching approach, it is plausible to take each of the following
claims
(7) It is possible that Humphrey will have (exactly) five fingers on his
left hand,
(8) It is possible that Humphrey will have six fingeres on his left hand,
as talking about two possible, but mutually incompatible future continua-
tions of the very same individual. But the solution to Lewis’ objection just
17Placek, however, seems to have changed his mind. See, for instance, Placek (2012).
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outlined suggests that the two statements should talk about two numeri-
cally distinct individuals. Hence, one looses one reason to prefer branch-
ing over divergence.
However, this is not the whole story. There is another rejoinder to
Lewis’ objection which doesn’t give up the idea that both (7)-(8) talk about
the very same Humphrey. This solution has to provide a suitable interpre-
tation for a modal, temporal language that mirrors that, when one uses
(7) (or, for that matter, (8)), one is talking about just one possible, entirely
consistent future continuation of Humphrey. Furthermore, the interpreta-
tion overcomes Lewis objection only if it avoids statements such as
(9) Humphrey has both (exactly) five and six finger on his left hand,
(10) Humphrey will have both (exactly) five and six finger on his left
hand,
(11) It is possible that Humphrey will have both (exactly) five and six
finger on his left hand,
to be true at any point of evaluation.
It is easy to yield the interpretation required by adopting adopting the
so-called quantified Ockhamist semantics (QO). QO is definable by in-
troducing a language LT−Pred and a QO-model MQO. Language LT−Pred
is the standard language for predicate logic, equipped with a set of indi-
vidual constants (c1, c2, etc.), a set of n-ary predicates (P1,P2, etc.), a set of
individual variables (x,y, etc.), the boolean connectives (¬,∧), the univer-
sal quantifier (∀), and the sentential operators P(n),F(n),!. The formation
rules for the wffs of LT−Pred are the usual ones. A QO-model for LT−Pred is
defined as follows.
Definition 2.3.2 (Q-model). AQO-model forL is a tupleMQ = (T ,dmt ,Domain,G,I ),
where
(a) T is a tree,
(b) dT is a T -duration function,
(c) Domain is a non-empty set of individuals,
(d) G is the set of assignments, where each g ∈ G is a function mapping each
variable of L to an element of Domain,
(e) I is an interpretation function which maps each non-logical constant α of
L to an intension, ∥α∥, where an intension is a map from moment-history
pairs, m/h, to extensions, ∥α∥m/h.
18 If α is an individual constant, ∥α∥
is constant and ∥α∥m/h ∈ Domain. If α is a n-ary predicate, ∥α∥m/h ∈
Domainn.
18m/h means that m ∈ h, or that h passes through m.
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Notice that, by condition (d), the existence of individuals is moment-
history independent: if something exists atm/h, it exists at anym′/h′. How-
ever, one may want to say that individuals can fail to exist at some m/h.
This can be done by introducing a null-object λ in MQ s.t. λ # Domain.
Furthermore, one could modify condition (d) as follows.
(d’) If α is an individual constant, either ∥α∥m/h = λ, or, for anym/h,m
′/h′
s.t. ∥α∥m/h " λ and ∥α∥m′/h′ " λ, ∥α∥m/h = ∥α∥m′/h′ ∈ Domain. If α is a
n-ary predicate, ∥α∥m/h ∈Domain
n.
Intuitively, whenever the extension of an individual constant c is λ at a
point m/h, constant c fails to refer to any individual that exists at that
point. In other terms, if ∥c∥m/h = Humphrey and ∥c∥m′/h′ = λ, Humphrey
exists at m/h but not at m′/h′. However, if c denotes something that exists
(say Humphrey) at a point m/h, whenever it denotes something that ex-
ists at another point m′/h′, c refers to the same individual denoted at m/h
(Humphrey). In order to answer Lewis’ objection, however, one is free to
adopt either condition (d) or (d’).
Now let us define the quantified Ockhamist semantics.
Definition 2.3.3 (Quantified Ockhamist Semantics (QO)). Given a model
MQ for L,
(QO1) g,m/h #QO P(c1, ..., cn)⇔ (∥c1∥m/h, ...,∥cn∥m/h) ∈ ∥P∥m/h
(QO2) g,m/h #QO ¬A⇔ not g,m/h #QO A
(QO3) g,m/h #QO A∧B⇔ g,m/h #QO A and g,m/h #QO B
(QO4) g,m/h #QO ∀A(x) ⇔ for any g
′,g ′,m/h #QO A(g
′(x)), where g ′ is such
that, for any variable y in L other than x, g ′(y) = g(x).
(QO5) g,m/h #QO F(n)A⇔ there is a m
′ s.t. dT (m,m
′) = n, m < m′,m′ ∈ h and
g,m/h #Q A
(QO6) g,m/h #QO P(n)A⇔ there is a m
′ s.t. dT (m,m
′) = n, m′ < m,m′ ∈ h and
g,m/h #Q A
(QO7) g,m/h #QO $A⇔ there is a h
′ s.t. m ∈ h′ and g,m/h′ #QO A
It is straightforward to see that none of (9)-(11) – if correctly translated
in LT−Pred – comes out true at any point of evaluation admitted by QO. In
other words, for claims such as
Pc∧¬Pc (the formal counterpart of (9))
F(n)(Pc∧¬Pc) (the formal counterpart of (10))
$F(n)(Pc∧¬Pc) (the formal counterpart of (11))19
19Obviously, $ is the dual of !.
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there is no point of evaluation at which any of them is satisfied. The reason
is pretty simple: the quantified Ockhamist semantics cannot satisfy con-
tradictions. Moreover, if c denotes something at g,m/h, it denotes the very
same individual at any point g,m′/h′ at which that individual exists, and
the null object λ, at any g,m′′/h′′ at which that very same individual fails
to exist. Thus, the QO-semantics is apt to avoid Lewis’ objection, given
that
(i) an individual can exist at several, modally inconsistent moments. In-
deed, there is nothing in Definitions 1.2.7–1.2.8 that prevents ∃x(x =
c) to be satisfied at points g,m/h and g,m′/h′, wherem # h′ andm′ # h,
(ii) point (i) does not entail that individuals are contradictory entities.
Indeed, Definitions 1.2.7–1.2.8 prevents that there is a point g,m/h
s.t. g,m/h #QO Pc and g,m/h #QO ¬Pc.
What point (i) clarifies is that the solution to Lewis’ objection doesn’t
relativize the identity of individuals to histories. The proposal, however,
relativizes the properties that individuals may have to moment-history
pairs. Formally, this is reflected by the fact that – by definition 1.2.7 – if
i ∈Domain and Q and Q′ are two unary predicates denoting incompatible
properties, no m/h is s.t. i ∈ ∥Q∥m/h and i ∈ ∥Q
′∥m/h (∥Q
′∥m/h can be viewed
as the set-theoretic complement of ∥Q∥m/h). Hence, Lewis’ objection – ac-
cording to which the branching view entails the existence of contradictory
individuals – doesn’t cut much philosophical ice.
2.4 Some conclusions and a problem.
Both divergentism and branching enable to define indeterminism in terms
of possible worlds. They have rigorous translations in mathematical terms
(Kamp frames and trees), and are apt to interpret modal temporal lan-
guages in a precise, non-ambiguous way. The Ockhamist semantics de-
fined on Kamp frames (KO), as well as its branching version (BO), are,
respectively, KO- and BO-bivalent. These two semantics allow to answer
the Aristotelian question (Q1) in a similar way. The divergentist variant
of indeterminism, DOI, is compatible with KO-bivalence. The branching
reading of indeterminism, BOI, is compatible with BO-bivalence. More-
over, both semantics enable to answer (Q2) by refuting the principle of
the necessity of the past (PNP), and, therefore, they are apt to reject the
fatalist conclusion of the Master argument.
Divergence and branching, however, are at odds with each other, since
the former explicitly denies one main tenet of the latter. Under a divergen-
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tist view, possible worlds do not overlap. On a branching perspective, each
history has at least a common part (i.e., it shares at least a moment) with
any other history. Thus, an indeterminist must make a choice between the
two theories. It has been argued that the branching conception of indeter-
minism has some advantages over its rival. An advocate of the branching
perspective can characterise the tower’s collapse cases as indeterminis-
tic, without giving up any fundamental tenets of her view. A divergentist
theorist, on the other hand, can conceive the very same cases as indeter-
ministic only by adopting a principle that is stronger than the one she
is supposed to assume, that is, a principle for counterparts identification
that is stronger than that of sameness of natural properties. Furthermore,
the information that is conveyed by modal tensed statements – when they
are interpreted within a branching approach – is muchmore intuitive than
the one that is delivered by the divergentist view. Last but not least, two
of the main objections that divergentists have raised against branching
(those concerning the demarcation of worlds and the commitment to con-
tradictory individuals) can be consistently overcome. Thus, the branching
perspective appears to be preferable to divergence.
Is everything fine? Not really. One may rightly object that the Aris-
totelian question (Q1) wasn’t properly answered by any semantics given
so far. Recall that the branching Ockhamist semantics, BO, satisfies the
following principle:
BO-bivalence: For any wffA of LT and any point m/h, either m/h #BO A or
m/h !BO A.
The BO-bivalence is relative to both a moment and a history, and it is not the
kind of bivalence which can be used to answer (Q1). Indeed, the notion
of bivalence which occurs in Aristotle’s reasoning is much more simpler,
being relative to moments only:
(B) Either A is true at a moment m, or A is false at m.
Accordingly, an indeterminist has to say something about the historical
parameter occurring within the definition of BO-bivalence and, more gen-
erally, within any BO-point of evaluation.20 There are different attitudes
one may have towards that parameter.
Revisionary Strategy. A first reaction might be that the points of evalua-
tion of BO are somewhat too complicated. This complexity, in turn,
20Adopting a KO semantics won’t help, for the KO-bivalence is relative to a time and a
world.
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just mirrors that there is something fundamentally wrong in BO. Ac-
cordingly, one can either reject BO and make up a new semantics for
tensed modal language (as the Peircean approach does), or can use
BO as a technical tool useful to define a notion of truth at a moment
(as the supervaluationists and the relativists).
Conservative Strategy. A second possible reaction is this: Aristotle’s argu-
ment is ill conceived. It rises a question, (Q1), which is too much
demanding. If we are to accept indeterminism, and if we accept to
frame it in terms of possible worlds (histories), then we have to live
with a notion of truth and bivalence that are bound to be relative to
moment-history pairs. Under this view, the branching conception of
indeterminism entails that any evaluation of tensed formulas makes
sense only with respect to a couple of parameters (i.e., a moment
of utterance and a history). This strategy, as we shall see, is the one
adopted by Belnap et al. (2001).
Next chapters analyse both strategies.
Chapter 3
The revisionary strategy.
In general, a branching frame allows many histories to pass through a mo-
ment m. But BO-truth (BO-falsity) is defined relative to moment-history
pairs, so that one can choose any h passing through m to compute the BO-
truth value of a statement at m/h. From a formal perspective this is per-
fectly fine. However, these somewhat complicated points of evaluations
yield a notion of bivalence (i.e., the BO-bivalence) which does not per-
mit to answer the Aristotelian question, (Q1). According to what I have
called the Conservative Strategy, this result is only natural once we accept
to frame indeterminism in terms of branching possible worlds (histories).
Under the Revisionary Strategy, however, the BO-semantics must be modi-
fied, since it does not reflect some fundamental features that an adequate
indeterministic semantics should capture.
Next sections explore the reasons one may have to adopt the revi-
sionary strategy. However, the three, revisionist semantic accounts – i.e.,
Peirceanism, supervaluationism and relativism – have several, significant
flaws. Therefore, they will be assessed as inadequate.
3.1 Peirceanism
The approach known as Peirceanism was first introduced by Arthur Prior
(1968a), and it is inspired by Charles Sander Peirce’s philosophy of time.1
Peirceanism sticks to the revisionary strategy, for it amounts to define a
modal, temporal logic that is alternative to BO.2 Peirceanism assesses the
1See Øhrstrøm & Hasle (1995: Ch. 2.2.) for a detailed analysis of Peirce’s position
about time and modality.
2Actually, Rumberg (2016) shows that there is a semantic machinery – what she calls
the transition semantics – which generalises both Peirceanism and the BO semantics. This
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branching Ockhamist semantics as inadequate, and the fact that the no-
tion of BO-truth (as well as that of BO-bivalence) is moment-history rela-
tive reflects its inadequacy. The evaluations of future contingents cannot
be relative to moment-history pairs, for the meaning conveyed by predic-
tions is a necessary one. Under a Peircean perspective, saying that il will
be the case that A amounts to say that, inevitably, it will be the case that
A.
Wemay introduce somemotivations for Peirceanism by reporting Prior
(1957: 85)’s “cliff paradox”.
Suppose A and B are being pushed towards the edge of a cliff,
and there will be no stopping this process until there is only
room for one of them. Then we may be able to say truly that it
will definitely be the case that A or B will fall over, even though
we cannot say truly either that A will definitely fall over or that
B will definitely fall over. (Prior 1957: 85)
In the circumstances described by the example, we can say that (1) is def-
initely true, while we must say that (2) and (3) are not.
(1) It will be the case that either A or B fall over.
(2) It will be the case that A falls over.
(3) It will be the case that B falls over.
Then, the cliff paradox asks how onemay define a semantics that evaluates
(1)-(3) in the way just suggested.
The Peircean theorist answers that “It will be the case that A ” is true
at a moment m if and only if there are facts at m that make the truth of
A at a future moment already settled at m. Since there are no facts that
presently determine which one among A and B will fall over, but present
facts determine that exactly one of them will fall over, then we are enti-
tled to assess statement (1) – but not (2) and (3) – as presently true. (1) is
presently true because now it is inevitably so: the future may take one way
or another, but in any case one among A and B will fall over the cliff. On
the other hand, (2) and (3) can’t be presently true, for they predict con-
tingent events. More generally, the Peircean view holds that one can truly
predict something just in case the event predicted is inevitable, for “[...]
nothing can be said truly ‘going-to-happen’ (futurum) until it is ‘present
in its causes’ as to be beyond stopping” (Prior 1968a: 38).
result is surely interesting from a technical perspective. However, I doubt that it may
have a philosophical relevance when one tries to solve the problem of indeterminism
and future contingents.
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It is easy to model these ideas into a rigorous semantics (PE). PE trans-
lates the future tense in terms of its primitive future operator Fp(n). Intu-
itively, Fp(n) is equivalent to the necessitation of the future operator pro-
vided by BO – that is, Fp(n) corresponds to !F(n). The Peircean (proposi-
tional) temporal language, LPE , differs from that adopted by BO, LT , since
(i) its primitive future operator is Fp(n), and (ii) LPE does not contain the
necessity operator !. Thus, the wffs for a Peircean propositional temporal
language are isolated by the following rule:
LPE ::= p | ¬A |A∨B | P(n)A | Fp(n)A
A model for LPE is identical to a model for the propositional version
of the branching Ockhamist semantics. In other terms, such a model is
MPE = (T ,dT , I ), where T is a tree, dT is a duration function, and I an
interpretation from atoms of LPE to set of moments of T .The semantic
clauses for the Peircean semantics are defined in the following manner.
Definition 3.1.1 (PE-semantics). Given a PE-model MPE for LPE ,
(PE1) m #PE p⇔m ∈ I(p)
(PE2) m #PE ¬A⇔ not m #PE A⇔m !PE A
(PE3) m #PE A∨B⇔ either m #PE A or m #PE B
(PE4) m #PE Fp(n)A ⇔ ∀h(m ∈ h ⇒ ∃m
′(m′ ∈ h & m < m′ & dT (m,m
′) =
n & m′ #PE A))
(PE5) m #PE P(n)A⇔∃m
′(m′ < m & dT (m,m
′) = n & m′ #PE A)
It is worth saying that the semantic clause for the (primitive) future
operator, (PE4), reflects the modal force that Peirceanism attributes to the
future tense “Will”. Indeed, Fp(n) acts as a universal quantification over
the histories that pass through the moment of evaluation. In particular,
(PE4) asks to check whether the sentence embedded by Fp(n) is true at n
time units in the future on any history which passes through the moment
of evaluation. It follows that if one translates “Tomorrow it will be the
case that A” as Fp(1)A, such a statement is PE-true at m just in case it is
inevitable at m. Therefore, any future contingent comes out PE-false. For
instance, let us focus on the model pictured below, and let us assume that
dT (m1,m2) = dT (m1,m3) = 1. Then, Fp(1)p is a future contingent at m1. By
(PE4), it follows that Fp(1)p is PE-false atm1, since p is PE-false atm3, that
is, at one of the moments one time unit in the future of m1.
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h2h1
m1
m2 : p m3 : ¬p
m0
Even if Fp(n) expresses future inevitability, the Peircean theorist has a way
to talk about possible future events that may fail to be inevitable. First,
one may define an operator which is the dual of Fp(n),
fp(n)A ≡df ¬Fp(n)¬A
Given (PE2) and (PE4), the truth conditions for a sentence of the form
fp(n)A must be given by the following equivalences.
m #PE ¬Fp(n)¬A⇔
¬∀h(m ∈ h⇒∃m′(m′ ∈ h∧m <m′ ∧ dT (m,m
′) = n∧m′ !PE A))⇔
∃h¬(m ∈ h⇒∃m′(m′ ∈ h∧m <m′ ∧ dT (m,m
′) = n∧m′ !PE A))⇔
∃h(m ∈ h∧¬∃m′(m′ ∈ h∧m < m′ ∧ dT (m,m
′) = n∧m′ !PE A))⇔
∃h(m ∈ h∧∀m′¬(m′ ∈ h∧m < m′ ∧ dT (m,m
′) = n∧m′ !PE A))⇔
∃h(m ∈ h∧∀m′(m′ ∈ h∧m <m′ ∧ dT (m,m
′) = n⇒m′ #PE A))
Accordingly, fp(n)A has the following truth conditions.
(PE6) m #PE fp(n)A ⇔ ∃h(m ∈ h∧∀m
′(m′ ∈ h∧m < m′ ∧ dT (m,m
′) = n ⇒
m′ #PE A))
Intuitively, fP(n)A reads “It is possible that, in n time units, it will be the
case that A”. As an example, both fp(1)p and fp(1)¬p are true at m1 in the
previous model.
PE has another, relevant characteristic. The history parameter does not
occur in its points of evaluation, and any statement is evaluated only rel-
ative to moments. Moreover, it is perfectly bivalent, in the sense that it
satisfies the following principle:
PE-bivalence: For any wff A of LPE and any moment m, either m #PE A or
m !PE A.
As for BO, PE-truth (#PE) and PE-falsity (!PE) are jointly exhaustive
and mutually exclusive. Now that the main formal features of PE are clar-
ified, let us see how a Peircean theorist may react to the Aristotelian and
the Master argument.
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3.1.1 Peirceanism, the Aristotelian argument and theMas-
ter argument
Notice that PE-bivalence is relative tomoments only. Therefore, the Peircean
semantics is apt to give a precise answer the Aristotelian question (Q1).
The Peircean semantics accepts premise (Pa), but rejects (Pb).
(P)(a) If A is true at a moment m, then ‘Necessarily A’ is true at m.
(P)(b) If A is false at a moment m, then ‘Possibly A’ is false at m.
Under a Peircean reading, if something is true atm, it is inevitably so atm.
Thus, premise (Pa) is perfectly consistent with PE. But it may be the case
that “In n time units, it will be the case that A” (i.e., Fp(n)A) turns out to
be PE-false at m, even though “Possibly, in n time units it will be the case
thatA” – viz., fp(n)A – is true at the very same momentm. Hence, premise
(Pb) does not hold. This means that Peircean theorists can consistently
stick to a branching conception of indeterminism (BOI) without giving up
(PE-)bivalence. Indeed, they reject the Aristotelian argument by refuting
premise (Pb).
As for the second question, (Q2), PE rejects the principle of retrogra-
dation (PR): the Peircean perspective does not guarantee that what now is
the case has always been going to be the case.
PR F(m)A→ P(n)F(n+m)A
It is easy to yield a countermodel for PR. Take the graph pictured be-
low, and assume that, if m < m′ and there is no m′′ between them, then
dT (m,m
′) = 1.
h3h2h1
m2
m6: ¬pm5: p
m3
m4: p
m1
By (PE4)-(PE5), it follows that Fp(1)p is PE-true at m2, given that p holds
at m4 and m5. But P(1)Fp(2)p is PE-false at the very same moment, for p is
false at m6.
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To sum up, the Peircean view conserves bivalence (relative to moments
only), rejects the Aristotelian argument by refuting premise (Pb), and in-
validates the Master argument by denying the validity of the principle of
retrogradation. Even if PE behaves better than BO in answering (Q1), there
are several features that make the Peircean approach questionable.
3.1.2 Against the Peircean view
Objection 1. The “plain future” collapses over what is presently settled.
Belnap et al. (2001: 160) point out that the expressive power of PE is
actually very poor, and it does not allow to reflect some basic intuitions
about what we mean when we utter predictions about future contingent
events. Under a Peircean view,
(4) I bet that A will fall over,
really means
(5) I bet that present circumstances determine that A will fall over.
But these two latter statements surely express different contents. Indeed,
whoever utters (4) wins the bet if and only if A will actually fall over the
cliff. An agent who utters (5), however, can lose even when A will actually
fall over. If, at the time of the utterance, it was possible for A to do not fall,
then the bettor on (5) loses. This fact highlights an interesting feature of
the “cliff’s paradox”, according to which (1) is definitely true, but (2) and
(3) – being future contingents – cannot be said to be definitely true.
(1) It will be the case that either A or B fall over.
(2) It will be the case that A falls over.
(3) It will be the case that B falls over.
Now, it is natural to assume that whoever utters (2) (or (3)), as well as a
bettor on (4), does commit herself to say something about what will actu-
ally be the case. But saying something about how things will actually turn
out does not necessarily mean to say something about what is presently
settled. Hence, the fact that (2) and (3) cannot be said to be definitely true
does not suffice to assess them as false. PE cannot distinguish between
predictions regarding what we may call the “plain” future, and predic-
tions about what is determined by the present circumstances. Therefore,
the Peircean view cannot capture one crucial aspect of our modal tensed
talk.
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Sure, a Peircean may frame indeterminism in such a way that any ref-
erence to what will actually be the case has to be assessed as misleading.3
Thus, a Peircean may insist that, if indeterminism holds, then there is no
such thing as the “plain” future: if we want to talk about the future, we
must talk about what inevitably will be the case. As we shall see, this re-
joinder is wrong. On the other hand, there are sensible ways to express,
given indeterminism, what actually will be the case. On the other, it is a
basic requirement on the notion of inevitable futurity that it entails (sim-
ple) futurity: if something inevitably will be the case, then it will be the
case. And again, the Peircean theorist does not have the resources to say
anything like this.
Objection 2. The failure of the future excluded middle.
PE does not validate a tensed logical schema that many authors, rightly
in our mind, take as a tautology within an indeterministic setting.4 This
schema is known as the future excluded middle, and it says that
(FEM) Either it will be the case that A, or it will be the case that not A.
If one translates (FEM) in LPE , one obtains
(6) Fp(n)A∨ Fp(n)¬A,
which may fail to be PE-true. Indeed, an instance of (6) such as Fp(2)p ∨
Fp(2)¬p is PE-false if evaluated at moment m1 in the model pictured just
above. Thus, PE fails to validate what seems to be a valid schema.
Objection 3. Negation and scope ambiguities.
MacFarlane (2014: 216) rightly points out that there is no difference in
asserting one of the two following statements.
(7) Tomorrow it won’t be sunny,
(8) It is not the case that tomorrow it will be sunny.
Accordingly, an adequate semantics should make (7) and (8) equivalent.
Notice, moreover, that the two statements differ only with respect to the
scope of the negation: in (7), “will” takes wide scope over the negation,
while in (8) it is the other way round. Now, if one translates both sentences
in LPE , (7) becomes
3As we shall see in the next chapter, however, saying that actuality plays no legitimate
role within an indeterministic setting is simply wrong.
4See, for instance, Thomason (1970: 267) and MacFarlane (2014: 217)
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(9) Fp(n)¬A,
while (8) is
(10) ¬Fp(n)A.
These latter two statements are not equivalent in PE, for an instance of (9)
as Fp(1)¬p is PE-false at m1 in the model pictured above, but an instance
of (10) as ¬Fp(1)p is PE-true at the very same point. And this is bad.
Objection 4. Retrospective truth judgments.
MacFarlane (2014) highlights that the Peircean approach is affected by an-
other flaw. This time, Peirceanism doesn’t capture some intuitive truth as-
criptions which are relative to predictions made in the past.
Suppose that today is Tuesday, and it is actually sunny. Assume that
someone, say Jake, asserted on Monday that it would be sunny the next
day. On the basis of this data, it is only natural to conclude, on Tuesday,
that what Jake has predicted on Monday was true. And this conclusion
seems to be independent of whether Tuesday’s weather is contingent from
Monday’s perspective. In a nutshell, if yesterday someone asserted that A
would be the case the next day, and the next day it is the case that A, what
was predicted yesterday was true.
Jake’s example generalises. From awider perspective, an adequacy con-
dition for a branching time semantics is to define a truth operator and a
notion of logical consequence which make the following pattern sound.
(11) A ⊢ P(n)T rueF(n)A
A logically entails that (n time units ago) it was true that (in n time
units) A would be the case.5
Schema (11) is not sound within PE, at least if the future operator in the
schema is treated as the primitive, Peircean future operator Fp(n). To see
why, let us us enrich LPE with a the sentential operator which expresses
PE-truth.6
(12) m #PE TpA⇔m #PE A
Then, let us define the Peircean notion of logical consequence.
5Clearly, the pattern should be sound only at moments that are at least later than n
time units from the first moment (if any).
6For the sake of simplicity, we shall ignore the problems related to liar paradoxes and
the like.
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Definition 3.1.2 (Peircean logical consequence). Given two sets of wffs Γ,∆
of LPE ∪ {Tp}, ∆ is a Peircean logical consequence of Γ (in symbols. Γ ⊢PE ∆)
just in case, for any MPE and any moment m in it, if m #PE A for any A ∈ Γ,
then there is a B ∈ ∆ such that m #PE B.
Accordingly, (11) finds its natural Peircean translation in
(13) A ⊢PE P(n)TpFp(n)A.
An inferential pattern such as p ⊢PE P(1)TpFp(1)p, which is an instance of
(13), has a countermodel depicted in the following picture.
h2h1
m1: ¬TpFp(1)p
m2: ¬p m3: p
If dT (m1,m2) = dT (m1,m3) = 1, and if p is PE-true atm3 but PE-false at m2,
then TpFp(1)p is PE-false at m1, and hence P(1)TpFp(1)p is PE-false at m3.
Accordingly, p ⊢PE P(1)TpFp(1)p does not hold, for the PE-true truth of its
premise does not guarantee the PE-truth of the consequent. Peirceanism
does not capture retrospective truth judgments.
The reason why schema (13) is not sound is related to the way in which
a Peircean theorist rejects the Master argument. First, let us notice that, by
(12), the Peircean truth operator is redundant, and thus (13) is equivalent
to
(14) A ⊢PE P(n)Fp(n)A.
Now, notice that the following deductive rule,
Deduction Theorem Γ,A ⊢ B⇒ Γ ⊢A→ B
does hold within the Peircean semantics. Thus, if A ⊢PE P(n)Fp(n)A were
sound, Deduction Theorem would guarantee the PE-validity of the follow-
ing schema.
(15) A→ P(n)Fp(n)A
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But recall that Peirceanism rejects the Master argument because the prin-
ciple of retrogradation,
PR Fp(m)A→ P(n)Fp(m+n)A,
is not PE-valid. The reason of the failure is that, if it is presently settled
that A would occur, it does not follow that it was settled that A would
occur. Thus, from a Peircean perspective, the Master argument doesn’t go
through in virtue of the strong modal reading that PE attributes to its
primitive future operator. But PR, which is not PE-valid, is an instance
of (15), which, in turn, is equivalent to A → P(n)TpFp(n)A. Thus, A →
P(n)TpFp(n)A cannot be PE-valid as well, and by the Deciction Theorem, it
follows that (13) (A ⊢PE P(n)TpFp(n)A) cannot be PE-sound. The Peircean
rejection of the principle of retrogradation entails that PE doesn’t capture
retrospective truth judgments. And, as we have seen, the principle of ret-
rogradation is not a PE-validity given the strong modal reading of Fp(n).
Hence, that reading allows PE to reject the Master argument, but it doesn’t
permit to account for retrospective truth judgments.
Objection 5. A problem with propositions.
The problems related with retrospective truth judgments help to high-
light a tension between the Peircean semantics and some intuitive reading
of what tensed statements are in general taken to mean. Thus, let us first
clarify what a proposition may be taken to be. There are several, incompat-
ible accounts which spell out the nature of propositions. In what follows,
I will try to remain as neutral as possible about substantial issues on the
nature of propositions. I would not say anything about whether proposi-
tions are structured entities, or if the fregean account fares better than the
russellian one.
What I’ll assume, however, is a Kaplanian-like approach.7 As Kaplan
(1989b: 502) suggests, let us call circumstances of evaluation those situa-
tions in which it is appropriate to ask for the extension of a given well-
formed expression. For instance, it is sensible to ask whether “red” has
an empty extension only with respect to a state of the world at a time.
According to the Kaplanian view, “Something is red” expresses a content
(i.e., a proposition) that is evaluable only with respect to a world and a
time. And it is natural to hold that a sentence such as “Something is red”
expresses a true proposition only relative to those circumstances in which
there is at least one red thing. Under this view one may say that sentences
7A similar take on propositions is that of David Lewis (1980) and Robert Stalnaker
(1999, 2014).
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expresses propositions, and any proposition determines an intension. The
intension of a proposition is a map from circumstances of evaluations to
truth values.8
Accordingly, one may know if two sentences do not express the same
proposition (at a context) by checking whether they have the same inten-
sion (at that context). If two sentences, as used at a given context, have
different intensions, they express two distinct propositions.
But recall that Peirceanism evaluates sentences at moments of use.
Thus, if one wants to know whether PE predicts that the intension of a
sentenceA differs from that of B at a context, one should be able to draw a
link between moments in which A and B may be used – that is, moments
at which A and B are associated with semantic values – and the intension
associated toA and to B as used at those moments. Here’s the link Kaplan
brings into the scene.
If c is a context, then an occurrence of A in c is true iff the con-
tent expressed byA in this context is true when evaluated with
respect to the circumstance of the context. (Kaplan 1989b: 522)9
What is important is that a context of use – which in our case is just a
moment – determines those circumstances of evaluation that, when com-
bined with the intension of a sentence, yield a truth value. Accordingly, to
identify the intension of the proposition expressed by A, used at a given
context, one has to apply a two-step strategy.
• First, the intension of a statement A, used at m, should have as its
value the truth status that a given semantics attributes to A used at
m. For instance, ifA is a future contingent atm, then the Peircean se-
mantics predicts that, when one takes the circumstances determined
by m as arguments of A’s intension, A’s (Peircean) intension yields
the truth value false.
• Second, the kind of circumstances of evaluation which figure as the
argument of the intension of A (used at m), and which are provided
by a moment of use m, may reflect different philosophical views
about the nature of propositions. In the case of tensed sentences,
there are two main rivals.10
8Notice that we remain neutral as to whether propositions are intensions.
9Emphasis added.
10For a defence of the temporalist perspective, see Prior (1968b), Recanati (2007) and
Brogaard (2012). For a defence of the eternalist view, see Evans (1985: 343-363) and Cap-
pelen & Hawthorne (2009).
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The temporalist perspective. According to temporalists, the proposition ex-
pressed by a tensed statement does not vary with the moment of
utterance. For instance, “Tomorrow it will be rainy” says that tomor-
row it will be rainy independently of the day in which it is uttered.
And, intuitively, that tomorrow it will be rainy is true on Monday if
it is rainy on Tuesday, but it is false on Tuesday if it is sunny on
Wednesday. The point is that the proposition conveyed by a tensed
statement, uttered at a moment, does not specify the moment rel-
ative to which the proposition has to be evaluated. Therefore, the
circumstances determined by the context of use, being the param-
eters which determine the value of the intension (of a statement as
used at that context) must specify a moment parameter.
The eternalist perspective. Eternalists, on the contrary, think that the propo-
sition expressed by a statement used at a moment does vary rela-
tive to the moment of utterance. “Tomorrow it will be rainy”, for
instance, says different things if uttered in different days. It says that
Tuesday is rainy if uttered on Monday, but the very same sentence
means that Wednesday is rainy if uttered on Tuesday. Under an eter-
nalists perspective, the proposition conveyed by a tensed sentence
is not time-neutral, for it specifies the moment at which something
was, is or will be the case. Accordingly, the circumstances of eval-
uation provided by the context of use, being the parameters which
determine the value of the intension (of a statement as used at that
context), do not specify a moment parameter.
As suggested by MacFarlane (2014: 207), one can implement these two
perspectives on Peirceanism as follows.
Definition 3.1.3. (Temporalist propositions and temporalist intensions.)
[A]Tm is the temporalist proposition expressed by A as used at m. The intension
of [A]Tm is the function ∥A∥T from moment-history pairs m/h to truth values
{1,0}, such that
• ∥A∥T (m/h) = 1⇔m #PE A,
• ∥A∥T (m/h) = 0⇔m !PE A.
Definition 3.1.4. (Eternalist propositions and eternalist intensions.) [A]Em
is the eternalist proposition expressed byA as used atm. The intension of [A]Em
is the function ∥A∥E from histories h to truth values {1,0}, such that
• ∥A∥E(h) = 1⇔m #PE A,
• ∥A∥E(h) = 0⇔m !PE A,
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where h is one of the histories passing through the moment of utterance.
According to the temporalist account of Definition 3.1.3, the circum-
stances of evaluation that a contextmust provide aremoment-history pairs,
m/h, wherem is the moment of use and h a history passing through it. One
may object that, in this case, a context should privilege a single history, and
this seems to be incompatible with the Peircean approach. This objection
doesn’t cut much ice, for any history h passing through the moment of use
m would do the same job as any other h′ ∋m. A sentenceA is PE-true (PE-
false) at m just in case A it is inevitable (impossible) at m, and thus the
history parameter is redundant when it comes to determine the Peircean
truth status of A at m. What is philosophically important in the temporal-
ist position is that A’s intension (at m) is function of the moment of use,
and thus A must express at m a temporalist content. Analogously, what
is important in the eternalist account of Definition 3.1.4 is that A’s inten-
sion (at m) is function of the possible worlds (histories) passing through
the moment of use. This trait, in turn, signals that A expresses an eternal-
ist content at m.
In my view, eternalism may be uncomfortable with Peirceanism. Sup-
pose that today is Tuesday. It should then be natural to argue as follows.
a. A yesterday’s utterance of “Tomorrow it will be sunny” means the
same thing as a today’s utterance of “Today it is sunny”.
b. If A uttered at m means the same thing as B uttered at m′, the value
of the intension of A at m is the same as that of the intension of B at
m′.
∴ The value of the intension of “Tomorrow it will be sunny”, as uttered
yesterday, is the same as the value of the intension of “Today it is
sunny”, as uttered today. 11
11It may be objected that the occurrence of “means” in premise a is ambiguous, for it
may either allude to the proposition expressed by a statement, uttered at a context (which
varies from context to context) or, alternatively, to the intension associated with a sen-
tence (which, being a function, does not vary with contexts). Under the former reading,
premise a is intuitively true, and an eternalist, as well as a temporalist, have essentially
no reason to reject it. Under the latter reading, premise a is clearly false, for the intu-
itive intensions of “Tomorrow" and “Today” are bluntly misunderstood. Thus, “means”
in premise a has to be understood in accordance with the former reading: premise a says
that the proposition expressed by a yesterday’s utterance of “Tomorrow it will be the
case” is the proposition expressed by a today’s utterance of “Today it is sunny”. Notice,
moreover, that premises a-b, when rightly understood, entail what I take to be a quite
plausible truth value link. Namely, that “Tomorrow there will be a sea battle” was true
as uttered yesterday iff “Today there is a sea battle” is true as used today. Both Dummett
(1978: 363) and Iacona (2013: 30-31) draw attention on it.
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It can be shown that the eternalist view of Definition 3.1.4 cannot vali-
date this argument. Indeed, suppose that we are dealing with the scenario
pictured in the figure below.
h2h1
Monday
Tuesday
Rainy Sunny
First, suppose that we stick to a temporalist account for propositions, and
assume that we are located at the sunny version of Tuesday. “Today is
sunny” is PE-true on that Tuesday version, and its temporalist intension,
say ∥Today it is sunny∥T (Tuesday/h2), has value 1. According to the Peircean
semantics, “Tomorrow it will be sunny”, uttered on Monday, is PE-true
just in case it is sunny on any possible version of tomorrow. But the graph
pictured above tells us that “Tomorrow it will be sunny” is a future con-
tingent on Monday, and thus it must be PE-false if uttered on that day. As
a consequence, the temporalist intension of “Tomorrow it will be sunny”
uttered yesterday, ∥Tomorrow it will be sunny∥T (Monday/h2), must have
value 0. Given that ∥Today it is sunny∥T takes value 1 at (Tuesday/h2), and
∥Tomorrow it will be sunny∥T takes value 0 at (Monday/h2), this doesn’t
suffice to show that the two intensions are different, for the arguments we
just plugged in to the two maps differ.
But suppose that one adopts an eternalist view. Again, then the inten-
sion of the proposition expressed by “Today it is sunny” uttered on the
sunny version of Tuesday, say ∥Today it is sunny∥E(h2), must take value
1. And the intension of the proposition expressed by “Tomorrow it will
be sunny”uttered yesterday, ∥Tomorrow it will be sunny∥E(h2), must have
value 0. An eternalist who sticks to Peirceanism cannot accept the con-
clusion of the above argument, according to which “Tomorrow it will be
sunny”, as uttered yesterday, has the same intension of “Today is sunny”,
as uttered today. Otherwise she would have to subscribe to a contradiction:
∥Tomorrow it will be sunny∥E(h2) = ∥Today it is sunny∥E(h2) = 0 = 1.
A Peircean eternalist must reject premise a of the argument, and say
that “Tomorrow it will be sunny”, as uttered yesterday, means something
different than “Today is sunny”, as uttered today. I take for granted that
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any eternalist would hardly subscribe to something like that. The rejec-
tion of premise a, therefore, is a bad result, for it makes Peirceanism an
attractive semantics only for the temporalist view.
It is time to recap the pros and cons of the Peircean semantics.
3.1.3 Assessing Peirceanism
To sum up, PE is apt to adequately answer (Q1)-(Q2). Indeed,
✓ PE refutes the Aristotelian argument and provides a bivalent notion
of truth at a moment.
✓ PE refutes the Master argument by rejecting the retrogradation prin-
ciple, RP.
The Peircean approach, however, has five significant flaws.
✗ PE equates “plain will” with “inevitably will”.
✗ PE does not validate the future excluded middle.
✗ PE introduces a semantic distinction between Fp(n)¬A and ¬Fp(n)A.
✗ PE does not account for retrospective truth judgments.
✗ PE yields a notion of intension which is at odds with an eternalist
understanding of the meaning of tensed statements.
I take these result as evidence that Peirceanism cannot be assessed as ade-
quate. Can one do better?
3.2 Thomason’s first interpretation
Recall that the main problem with the BO semantics was that it does not
provide a notion of bivalence which is relative to moments only. This is
due to the fact that BO-points of evaluations are moment history pairs,
m/h. Prior (1967: 126) called the historical parameter in m/h a prima facie
assignment of a future to m. However, it isn’t clear what does it mean for a
history to be a prima facie assignment. According to Thomason, prima facie
assignments represent a serious, philosophical problem.
[Ockhamism] is not above criticism. It says that more is needed
to assign a truth-value to a formula at time m than a model
structure and assignment to formulas not involving tense op-
erators. Besides these a possible future formmust be specified,
for on this view statements in the future tense do not in general
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take a truth-value at m unless a possible future is specified.12
(Thomason 1970: 270)
Then, he goes on explaining why the historical parameter is problematic.
He argues that the prima facie assignments can have two interpretations,
each of which makes the Ockhamist semantics philosophically suspicious.
According to the first interpretation we [evaluate predicitons]
by provisionally positing a possible future for m, because a pre-
diction made at m can only be true or false relative to such a
future. [...] Since we may often be in situations in which we
have made no suppositions concerning which of a variety of
possible futures will come about, it should be often the case
that certain statements in the future are neither true nor false.
(Thomason 1970: 270–271)
Thomason’s quotation suggests that uttering a future-tensed statement
carries a supposition relative to which possible future (history) will come
about. Thus, a prima facie assigment h, which occurs within a point of eval-
uation of a statement uttered at m, is the history the speaker takes to hap-
pen in the future. But since speakers fail to have these suppositions most
of the time, we need to abandon the Ockhamist semantics. In particular,
we need a semantic machinery which reflects these failures, making cer-
tain statements about the future neither true nor false.13
Notice that it is crucial for this interpretation that the two following
thesis hold.
Supposition Uttering a future-tensed statement carries a supposition rela-
tive to which possible future (history) will come about,
Failure Agents fail to have these suppositions most of the time.
I shall argue that the Supposition principle has two readings. Under
its de re interpretation, the principle is false. Under the second, de dicto
reading, the Supposition principle is true but the Failure thesis is false.
Thus, Thomason’s first interpretation does not provide neither a rationale
to abandon the Ockhamist semantics, nor a reason to drop bivalence.
12Notation changed.
13Thomason here has in mind some sort of semantic presupposition failure, probably
the one Strawson 1952 talks about.
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3.2.1 De re suppositions
The Supposition principle can be red in two ways. An agent’s utterance of
a future-tensed sentence may involve a de re supposition about a specific
history h, that is, the specific h that an agent supposes to contain the fu-
ture that will come about. On the other hand, an agent’s utterance can
carry a de dicto supposition, according to which the speaker supposes that
there exists an h whose future will be actualised. Let us disentangle the
Supposition thesis with respect to its two de re/de dicto readings.
De re Supposition If a uttersA atm,A has to be evaluated w.r.t.m/h, where
h is the history of which a, at m, supposes that will come about. If a
utters A at m,∃h(a supposes at m that h will come about ∧ m/h #A)
Malpass & Wawer (2012: 122) noticed that the de re reading is also sug-
gested by John P. Burgess. Indeed, he comments on the Ockhamist points
of evaluations by saying that
The [Ockhamist] truth-value of a future tense statement de-
pends on which branch we think of as representing the course
of events which is actually going to turn out to happen. (Burgess
1979: 575)
Be as it may, utterances of future-tended statements may carry another,
the de dicto supposition as well.
De dicto Supposition If a utters A at m, a supposes at m that there is a
unique h that will come about, and that A has to be evaluated w.r.t.
m/h.If a utters A at m, a supposes at m that ∃h(h will come about
∧ m/h #A)
One challenge these two readings have to face is whether they make
sense of the way we ordinarily talk. Each of them should make sense of
it, since both of them take agents – that is, ordinary speakers – as doing
suppositions about what possible future will obtain.
It is easy to see that the de re reading yields counterintuitive results
with respect to ordinary linguistic phenomena. For imagine that Alice
takes h1 as the history whose future will come about, where Bob supposes
that another history, say h2, is the one that will happen. Furthermore, as-
sume that (1) is OC-true at m1/h1 but OC-false at m1/h2. Now, let us focus
on the following dialogue (taking place at m1):
Alice : Tomorrow there will be a sea battle.
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Bob : That’s false! There won’t be any battle at all!
Intuitively, Bob is saying that Alice is wrong. But suppose that the de re
account holds, and that the history a speaker takes to come about is part of
the content expressed. Then, the de re account predicts that Bob is simply
misunderstanding Alice. Indeed, Bob mistakenly takes Alice to refer to
the same history he is referring to. This is not only intuitively wrong. It
leaves open the absurd hypothesis that speakers may commit systematic
errors when they try to understand each others.
On the other hand, if the history a speaker refers to is not part of the
content expressed, Bob and Alice are contradicting each other. Each of
them, however, is right from his/her own perspective. Alice is expressing
a true content, relative to the history she takes to come, and the same
holds for Bob. But again, this sort of faultless disagreement is misleading.
As Stalnaker points out,
[...] we don’t get, from this particular kind of relativism, a fea-
ture that seems to be characteristic of some of the other appli-
cations: disagreement where neither party to the disagreement
are making a mistake. If I predict (at m 1) the bombing the
next day, and you predict (at that moment) that there will be
no bombing the next day, [...] we will also agree that both of our
statements should be assessed only tomorrow, and that at that
time, one of us will be shown to have made a mistake. (Stal-
naker 2014: 438)
Hence, the de re account is at odds with our ordinary way of speaking
about the future.
One may object that, in these cases, either Alice or Bob fails to suppose
what future will come about. But why one should say so? This objection
is completely ad hoc, for it prevents speakers to fulfil what the De re Sup-
position principle requires in any situation similar to that of the dialogue.
Therefore, the De re Supposition thesis cannot account for the way we use
tensed statements, and it has to be rejected.
3.2.2 De dicto suppositions
On the other hand, the de dicto reading appears to be much more in ac-
cordance with the common talk. Take the first dialogue between Alice and
Bob. Given that Alice utters “tomorrow there will be a sea battle” at m1,
Alice believes that there is an h that will come about, and that m1/h satis-
fies “tomorrow there will be a sea battle”. Similarly, Bob believes that there
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is an h that will come about, and thatm1/h satisfies “tomorrow there won’t
be any sea battle”. If they also share – as plausibly any ordinary speaker
do – the belief that there is a single history that will be actualised, and
since no h is such that m1/h satisfies both “tomorrow there will be a sea
battle” and its negation, Alice and Bob must disagree with each other. In
particular, they disagree whether the unique future that will be actualised
has a sea battle in it. This result, in turn, is intuitively right.
Recall that I am assuming that both Alice and Bob suppose that only
one future (history) will be actualised. This assumption is deeply rooted
in the way we conceive how things will turn out. As a piece of evidence,
there is a telling quotation by David Lewis.
The trouble with branching exactly is that it conflicts with our
ordinary presupposition that we have a single future. If two
futures are equally mine, one with a sea fight tomorrow and
one without, it is nonsense to wonder which way it will be [...]
and yet I do wonder. (Lewis 1986a: 207-208)
Interestingly, Lewis argues against a branching conception of time, for he
takes it to be incompatible with “our ordinary presupposition that we
have a single future”. It is easy to see that Lewis’ worries vanish if we
drop the hypothesis that “two futures are equally mine”, while admitting
that there is a single, privileged future. This move permits to make sense
of the “presupposition that we have a single future” even in a branching
time framework. Surely, several philosophers are not disposed to reject
that all possible futures are on a par with one another. As a matter of fact,
who endorses this view struggles with some version of the so-called “as-
sertion problem”: if there is no privileged future, one has to explain why
it seems that we talk about it all the time.14 The fact that those who re-
ject a privileged future see the assertion problem as a problem is far from
being an idle feature. Quite to the contrary, it shows that the “presuppo-
sition that we have a single future” is very intuitive, and can hardly be
contested. But if it is so, it is contradictory to stick to the Failure thesis, ac-
cording to which speakers fail to presuppose that they have a single future
most of the time. This shows that Thomason’s first interpretation does not
motivate any departure neither from the Ockhamist semantics, nor from
bivalence.
There is one point that has to be stressed. If an agent a believes at m
that a history h will come about, it doesn’t follow that there is a specific
14The two main versions of the assertion problem can be found in Belnap & Green
(1994), Belnap et al. (2001) and MacFarlane (2014).
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history of which a believes (atm) that it will come about. According to the
De dicto Supposition principle, the reference to the history that will come
about is, in an important sense, a generic one. A spatial analogy may be
illuminating.
In many action movies, there is a scene in which the good guy
and the bad guy are in different rooms of the same house, each
of them slowly walking without making noise in order to kill
the other without being killed. [...] [Al] senses that a man is
standing behind a door in front of him. He points his gun to-
wards the centre of the door, fires off, and hits Bob. Since Al
can’t see Bob from his position, Al’s intention is generically di-
rected toward the man behind the door. It is not an intention
to hit a specific man. (Iacona 2013: 38-39)
Andrea Iacona rightly points out that Al’s intention to shoot the men be-
hind the door is not an intention to shoot a specific man. Analogously, an
agent’s supposition that the history that will come about would satisfy a
given formula is not a supposition towards a particular history. As for the
spatial example, however,
[...] once the gun fires off, the bullet is able to go through the
door and hit Bob without further assistance. (Iacona 2013: 38-
39)
Thus, even if Al’s act is guided by a generic intention, its effects go beyond
the generic nature of the intention. Indeed, the bullet hits Bob, the par-
ticular man standing behind the door. Similarly, when Al utters a future-
tensed statement – leaded by a de dicto supposition – his speech act has
semantic effects that go beyond the de dicto supposition which guides it.
In particular, the speech act would be true just in case it predicts some-
thing that obtains at the particular future that will be actualised. Even if a
de dicto supposition refers to the actual future generically, only a specific
future, the one that will be actualised, is relevant for the truth value of a
(future directed) utterance guided by that supposition.
As I said, it is pretty easy to make sense of the de dicto suppositions
once that the possible futures are not on a par with one another. If there is
one privileged possible future, any de dicto supposition would just reflect
a metaphysical feature of reality. However, several philosophers reject the
existence of such a privileged future, and their denial is related to the
second interpretation that Thomason gives for the historical parameter.
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3.3 Thomason’s second interpretation
It used to be said of the British Empire that it was maintained by a thin red
line of soldiers in service to the Queen. Analogously, some philosophers
claim that, among the several branches of the tree, there is a history that is
marked in red – that is, there is a distinguished, privileged history. As the
thin red line of soldiers, the privileged history may be unknown. However,
it is real as the Queen’s soldiers were.
Under these assumptions, it is natural to hold that a BO-point of eval-
uation such as m/h is legitimate, and thus it can occur within a definition
of truth for LT , only if the historical parameter refers to the actual his-
tory. This is what Thomason calls the second interpretation the historical
parameter. According to his view, however, the second interpretation is
incompatible with the branching conception of indeterminism defined as
BOI.
According to the second interpretation, just one of the futures
of m is the right one – the one that will be actualised.This sec-
ond view does not square very well with the whole project of
indeterministic tense logic. For if a time m can only have one
“real” future, times located in others alternative futures cannot
really bear a temporal relation tom. They can bear an epistemic
relation, being futures for a situation which for all we know
is the actual one m, but strictly speaking this is not a tempo-
ral interpretation. Thus, indeterministic tense logic collapses
to deterministic tense logic. (Thomason 1970: 270-271)
First, Thomason seems to endorse the following principle.
Second Interpretation: Moment-history pairsm/h can legitimately occur within
a definition of truth for LT only if h refers to the unique actual his-
tory.
But Thomason remarks that if there is only one actual future of m, any
future moment of m which falls outside that privileged future can only
represent an epistemic possibility. This means that only one history (pass-
ing through m) collects what it is objectively possible after m. Hence,
Unique Possible History: If there is a unique actual history, there is only
one history that collects what is objectively possible.15
15This principle is shared by many branching theorists, such as Belnap & Green (1994),
Belnap et al. (2001), MacFarlane (2003, 2008, 2014) and Todd (2015).
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If the latter principle holds, there couldn’t be two alternative, objective
futures for m, and indeterminism would be contradicted. Thus, from the
Unique Possible History principle it follows that
∴ If there is a unique actual history, branching indeterminism (BOI) is
false.
Accordingly, by Second Interpretation one infers that
∴ If branching indeterminism (BOI) is true, moment-history pairs m/h
can’t legitimately occur within a definition of truth for LT .
In my view, the Second Interpretation principle is quite intuitive; it is
sensible to evaluate a future contingent at m/h only if h contains what
will actually happen afterm. What is perplexing in Thomason’s argument,
however, is the Unique Possible History principle. It equates the number
of actual histories with the number of objectively possible histories. And
this equation has no intuitive appeal: if I say that there is a unique actual
world, it hardly follows that no other objectively possible world exists.
The Unique Possible History principle is supported by the kind of actu-
ality that many branching theorists have often adopted, andwhich Thoma-
son summarises as follows.
To the thoroughgoing indeterminist, the choice of a branch b
through t has to be entirely prima facie; there is no special branch
that deserves to be called the “actual” future through t. Con-
sider two different branches, b1 and b2, through t, with t <
t1 ∈ b1 and t < t2 ∈ b2. From the standpoint of t1, b1 is actual
(at least, up to t1). From the standpoint of t2, b2 is actual (at
least up to t2). And neither standpoint is correct in any abso-
lute sense. (Thomason 1984: 145)
First, the quotation speaks about the actuality of a history up to a moment.
In particular, it suggests that a set of moments b can be said to be actual
relative to a moment m just in case, for any m′ ∈ b, m′ ≤m. Thus, actuality
seems to be a property of sets of moments, and these sets may be proper
subsets of histories. Secondly, the notion of actuality that Thomason has
in mind is relational or perspectival: any set of moments can only be actual
from the perspective of a given moment. No “standpoint is correct in any
absolute sense.” This reading of actuality is similar to that of Lewis:
The inhabitants of other worlds may truly call their own world
actual if they mean by ‘actual’ what we do; for the meaning we
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give to ’actual’ is such that it refers at any world i to that world i
itself. ‘Actual’ is indexical, like ‘I’ or ‘here’ or ‘now’: it depends
for its reference on the circumstances of utterance, to wit, the
world where the utterance is located. (Lewis 1973a: 85-86)
Both Lewis and Thomason subscribe to the semantical thesis that “actual”
can only denote a relational property. Both Thomason and Lewis, however,
holds that the relational analysis cannot be separated from the metaphys-
ical thesis that the actuality of a branch (or, for that matter, of a world) is
nothing over and above a relational property.16
I suggest that “actual” and its cognates should be analyzed as
indexical terms: terms whose reference varies, depending on
relevant features of the context of utterance. The relevant fea-
ture of context, for the term “actual”, is the world at which a
given utterance occurs. According to the indexical analysis I
propose, “actual” (in its primary sense) refers at any world w
to the world w. “Actual” is analogous to “present”, an indexical
term whose reference varies depending on a different feature
of context: “present” refers at any time t to the time t. (Lewis
1983b: 17)
See D. Lewis (1983b) and substitute “the actual future” for “the
actual world” in what he says. That is the view of the through-
going indeterminist. (Thomason 1984: 160)
Notice, however, that in Lewis’ favourite modal framework – that is, in a
divergentist framework – worlds do not overlap. Hence, if one substitutes
“the actual future” for “the actual world” in what he says, and takes “the
actual future”, as used at t, to mean the future of time t in the world of the
utterance, the definite description “the actual future”, evaluated at t, turns
out to be proper. However, if one adopts a branching conception of reality,
worlds overlap and branch. Hence, if one utters “the actual future” at a
moment m, and takes “the actual future” to mean the future path of m in
the history of the utterance, the description “the actual future” turns out
to be improper most of the time. As Belnap & Green (1994) summarise,
For a world to be actual is for it to be the world we inhabit. For
a history to be actual would be for it to be the history to which
the moment we inhabit belongs. [...] It is not [...] in general the
16For a similar diagnosis of David Lewis’ position about actuality, see Stalnaker
(1976: 69).
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case that the expression ‘the history to which the moment we
inhabit belongs’ secures a referent, since uniqueness fails in
the face of indeterminism. One does on the other hand always
succeed in referring with the expression, ‘the set of histories
to which the moment we in- habit belongs’, for which an al-
ternative description might be, ‘the actual situation’.(Belnap &
Green 1994: 381)
What Belnap seems to suggest is that a history h is actual relative to a
moment m just in case h is the only history passing through m. And if
one takes “@1” to denote this reading of actuality, both Belnap’s quotation
refer to the following principle:
Moment-History Actuality @1(h,m)⇔ h is the history h
′ such that (m ∈ h′).
Notice, however, that @1(h,m) is false most of the time. I my viw, this is
the reason that explains why Thomason holds that what what a branching
indeterminism can say (at best) is that, whenever I claim “b is actual” at
m, I am claiming that any moment in b is either earlier than or equal to
the moment of my utterance. Hence, if we take a branch b to be a set of
moments, we may define a notion of Branch-Moment Actuality as follows:
Branch-Moment Actuality @2(m,b)⇔∀m
′ ∈ b(m′ ≤m)
Given the Branch-Moment Actuality, it is plausible to define a further no-
tion of actuality which involves moments only:
Moment-Moment Actuality @3(m,m
′)⇔m′ ≤m
Notice, one again, that these notions of actuality are relational or perspec-
tival: any set of moments (or any moment) can only be ‘seen’ as actual
from the perspective of a given moment. Again, no “standpoint is correct
in any absolute sense.”
Once that theMoment-History Actuality principle is at its place, one can
understand why a branching theorist may be tempted to accept theUnique
Possible History principle.
Suppose that one wants to say that there is a history that is ‘seen’ as
actual from any possible perspective – that is, there is a history which is
actual from any possible moment. If one expresses this belief by using
Moment-History Actuality, one has to be committed to the following prin-
ciple.
Unique Actuality: ∀m∃!h(@1(h,m)).
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The Unique Actuality principle amounts to ∀m∃!h(m ∈ h). It is immediate
to see that this latter statement says that there exists exactly one possible
history, and no other course of events can possibly exist.
On the one hand, if there were no histories at all, Unique Actuality
would be contradicted. On the other hand, assume that there are two
different histories, say h1 and h2. By condition (b) of Definition 2.2.1,
there must be a moment, say m1, that h1 shares with h2, (i.e., m1 ∈ h1
and m1 ∈ h2). But Unique Actuality says that there is only one history at
which m1 must belong. By reductio, Unique Actuality entails that exactly
one history does exist.
Thus, Unique Actuality directly contradicts the branching conception
of objective indeterminism, for BOI says there must exist at least two his-
tories:
BOI: ∃m,h,h′(m ∈ h∧m ∈ h′ ∧ h " h′).
Moreover, by assuming Moment-History Actuality and Unique Actuality,
the Unique Possible History principle follows: if there is a unique actual
history, there is only one objectively possible history.17
To sum up, Thomason’s Second Interpretation of the historical param-
eter says that it would be legitimate to adopt moment-history couples
m/h as truth-parameters only if the history (world) in the couple, h, were
the actual history passing through the moment of the couple, m. And the
Unique Possible History principle expresses an incompatibility between the
branching conception of indeterminism and the commitment to a unique
actual history. Therefore, if indeterminism is true, then moment-history
couples cannot be taken as legitimate truth-parameters, for no history
which passes trough a moment can be said to be the actual history, that
is, the only history passing through that moment. And if one aims at a
definition of truth-at-a-context, no history passing through the moment of
the context can be said to be the history of the context. This conclusion is
shared among many branching theorists. As MacFarlane puts it,
[W]hat is it for such a proposition to be true at a context? [...]
In frameworks without branching, these questions have a stan-
dard answer. A sentence S is true at a context c just in case
wc, tc # S, where wc and tc are the world and time of c. [...]
17Clearly, there might be several reactions to this argument. One may say, for instance,
that the perspectival notions of actuality are misleading. An advocate of a single, actual
history can invoke a substantial notion of actuality. Thus, one can refute the relational
principles we have seen above, for they fail to express the non-indexical character that
such a position may attribute to actuality.
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However, these simple answers aren’t available on the branch-
ing picture. For they all assume that it makes sense to talk of
“the world of the context of use.” And
NondeterminationThesis. In frameworks with branching worlds,
a context of use does not, in general, determine a unique “world of
the context of use,” but at most a class of worlds that overlap at the
context. (MacFarlane 2014: 208)18
An analogous remark is made by Belnap et al. (2001),
The history-of-evaluation parameter is not initialized by the
context of use: Given indeterminism, there is no such thing as
“the history of use”. [...] The happening of an assertion that per-
chance uses “The coin will land heads” as its vehicle no more
determines one of these histories than any other. A speech act
determines “the moment of its occurrence”, but not “the his-
tory of its occurrence”. So since there is no “history of the con-
text”, the history-of-evaluation parameter cannot be initialized
by context. (Belnap et al. 2001: 151)
Accordingly, whoever subscribes to both a branching conception of inde-
terminism (BOI) and to the Unique Possible History has to tell a story about
how to handle the historical parameter. Such a branching theorist , in-
deed, should give an a account of truth that does not privilege any history
among those passing through the moment of use. The supervaluationist
semantics, as we shall see, is designed to satisfy such a requirement.
3.4 Supervaluationism
The supervaluationist view was originally proposed by Mehlberg (1958)
for dealing with vagueness, and later was developed and formalised by
Van Fraassen (1966). Thomason (1970) was the first logician who applied
supervaluationism to the problem of future contingents.
As we have have just seen, Thomason aims at a notion of truth for wffs
of LT that does not attribute any privileged status to any history passing
through a moment (of use). Moreover, he explicitly rejects the Peircean
approach, for it preserves bivalence at a cost that appears to be too high:
Peirceanism does not validate neither the principle of retrogradation, nor
the future excluded middle.19
18Notation changed.
19See Thomason (1970: 268).
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Recall that the BO semantics BO evaluates a statement A at moment-
history pairsm/h. However, in several cases the historical parameter turns
out to be redundant, sinceAmay have the same BO-truth value in any his-
tory h passing through m. When that happens, supervaluationist assigns a
truth value atA relative tom – naturally, he/she assigns toA the BO-truth
value that the statement has at m/h, for any h passing through m. When
it does not happen – viz., when A’s BO-truth value is sensible to the his-
torical parameter – the supervaluationist does not assign a truth value to
A at m. This is so because it is not possible to identify the actual history
among those passing through m: anyone of them is on a par with the oth-
ers.20 Accordingly, the evaluation of a statement at a moment m does not
depend on a specific history passing through that moment, but is relative
to any of that histories.
These ideas can be captured as follows.21
Definition 3.4.1 (Supervaluationism). Given a BO-modelMBO = (T ,dT , I ),
the correspondent supervaluationist model is MSU = (T ,dT ,ST ,SF), where
ST (supertruth) and SF (superfalsity) are supervaluationist evaluation func-
tions from wffs of LT to sets of moments, such that
(a) m ∈ ST (A)⇔∀h(m ∈ h⇒m/h #BO A)
(b) m ∈ SF(A)⇔∀h(m ∈ h⇒m/h !BO A)
We can denote supertruth (at a moment) and superfalsity (at a mo-
ment) by using #SU and !SU , respectively. These two relations are defined
in an obvious manner: given a supervaluationist model MSU and a wff A
of LT ,
(SU1) m #SU A⇔m ∈ ST (A)
(SU2) m !SU A⇔m ∈ SF(A)
Notice that the supervaluationist semantics is perfectly compatible with
MacFarlane (2014: 208)’s Nondetermination thesis, according to which a
context of use does not, in general, determine a single world (history), but
at most a class of worlds that overlap at the moment of the context. In-
deed, a supervaluationist context of use can be identified with a moment,
and a moment, in general, fails to be associate with a unique history which
passes through it.
Furthermore, SU-truth and SU-falsity are relative to moments only,
and thus an advocate of supervaluationism can answer the Aristotelian
20See Thomason 1970: 270 and Thomason 1984: 145.
21For an analogous definition, see Ciuni & Proietti 2013: 27-28.
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question, (Q1), in an appropriate way. First, let us notice that, under a su-
pervaluationist view, the premises (Pa)-(Pb) of the Aristotelian argument
must hold.
(P)(a) If A is true at a moment m, then ‘Necessarily A’ is true at m.
(P)(b) If A is false at a moment m, then ‘Possibly A’ is false at m.
As for (Pa), whenever A is SU-truth at m, then it is BO-true on any history
passing through m. But if it is BO-true on any history passing through
m, !A must be BO-true at m, for any h ∋ m. By (SU1), it follows that !A
is SU-true at m. Therefore, if A is true at a moment m, then ‘Necessarily
A’ is true at m, and thus premise (Pa) holds. As for the second premise,
(Pb), whenever A is SU-false at m, there is no h such that A is BO-true at
m/h. This means that $A is BO-false at m. Hence, $A must me SU-false
at m. But then (Pb) follows: whenever A is SU-false at a moment m, then
‘Possibly A’ is SU-false at m.
What supervaluationists do not accept is bivalence relative tomoments,
that is, premise (B) of the Aristotelian argument.
(B) Either A is true at m, or A is false at m.
As well known, SU-truth and SU-falsity are mutually exclusive but not
jointly exhaustive. There is no statement of LT that is both SU-true and
SU-false at m. Nevertheless, there are statements that are neither SU-true
nor SU-false at their moment of use – namely, future contingents. For
example, take the model pictures below, and assume that dT (m1,m2) =
dT (m1,m3) = 1. F(1)p is a future contingent at m1, being BO-true at m1/h1
but BO-false at m1/h2. By (SU1)-(SU2), F(1)p is neither SU-true nor SU-
false at m1.
h2h1
m1
m2 : p m3 : ¬p
m0
Accordingly, the supervaluationist answers (Q1) by saying that one can be
a branching indeterminist only if one gives up bivalence (while conserving
a notion of truth (falsity) that is relative to moments only).
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Interestingly, the supervaluationist semantics is apt to reject theMaster
argument – an, thus, it can be used to answer (Q2) – given the particular
relation it entertains with the BO semantics. SU-truth (SU-falsity) is rela-
tive to moments only, but it is defined in terms of the Ockhamist notion of
truth (falsity) at a moment on a history. In particular, given the notion of
SU-truth it is easy to see that A is BO-valid just in case A is SU-valid. This
simple fact is proved below.
Definition 3.4.2 (BO-validity). For any wff A of LT ,
A is BO-valid (in symbols: #BO A) ⇔ m/h #BO A, for any m/h in any BO-
model MBO.
Definition 3.4.3 (SU-validity). For any wff A of LT ,
A is SU-valid (in symbols: #SU A) ⇔ m #SU A, for any m in any SU-model
MSU .
Fact 1. For any wff A of LT , #SU A⇔ #BO A.
Proof. (⇒) If #SU A, m #SU A, for any m in any SU-model MSU . By (SU1),
it is the case that ∀h(m ∈ h⇒ m/h #BO A), for any MBO corresponding to
MSU . But then #BO A follows. (⇐) If #BO A, thenm/h #BO A for anym/h in
anyMBO. Hence,m/h #BO A for any h ∋m in anyMBO. By (SU1),m #SU A,
for any MSU correspondent to MBO. But then #SU A follows.
The equivalence between BO-validity and SU-validity explains why the
advocates of supervaluationism reject the Master argument. Since one of
the premise of the argument – the principle of the necessity of the past,
P(n)A→ !P(n)A – is not BO-valid, then it cannot be SU-valid. Therefore,
a supervaluationist answers to (Q2) by saying that the Master argument is
unsound.
Notice that if F(n)¬A is SU-true at m, ¬F(n)A is SU-true at m. Super-
valuationism does not introduce any ambiguities among the scope of the
negation and that of the future operator. Under this respect, supervalua-
tionism fares batter than Peirceanism.
An interesting feature of supervaluationism is that disjunctions (as
well as conjunctions) are not truth-functional.22
To see why, let us evaluate evaluate an instance of the excluded middle,
F(1)p ∨ ¬F(1)p, by using (SU1)-(SU2) with respect to moment m1 in the
22Jan Łukasiewicz (1968), as well as Craig Bourne (2004), deny bivalence without re-
jecting the truth-functionality of logical connectives. Their trivalent semantics, however,
have been highly criticised by many authors (see Placek 2000, Prior 1953, MacFarlane
2003, 2014), and thus seen as a premature attempt to solve the semantical problems
raised by future contingents.
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model pictured just above. The disjunction is SU-true at m1, since it is
BO-true at both m1/h1 and m1/h2. However, each of its disjuncts is neither
SU-true nor SU-false at m1. This simple example shows that knowing the
SU-truth value (if any) of A and B at m may be not sufficient to compute
the SU-truth value (if any) of their disjunction A∨B at m (the same goes
for conjunctions).
Another relevant characteristic is that future-tensed sentences of the
form F(n)A convey necessary contents, given that both (SU1) and (SU2)
universally quantify over the histories passing through themoment of use.
Under this respect, supervaluationism is similar to Peirceanism. Neverthe-
less, notice that the evaluations induced by clauses (SU1)-(SU2) involve
arbitray wffs of LT , whatever their logical structure may be. This latter
features is responsible for a crucial difference among supervaluationism,
on the one hand, and the Peircean semantics, on the other. Recall that the
Peircean does not validate the future excluded middle,
(FEM) Either it will be the case that A, or it will be the case that ¬A.
The Peircean semantics translates (FEM) as Fp(n)A ∨ Fp(n)¬A, which is
PE-true at m just in case it is either inevitable that, in n time units in the
future, it is the case that A, or it is impossible that, in n time units in the
future, it is the case that A. Thus, the Peircean translation of (FEM) comes
out PE-false when Fp(n)A (Fp(n)¬A) is a future contingent at m.
Under a supervaluationist semantics, things are radically different. SU
translates (FEM) as F(n)A ∨ F(n)¬A, and since (SU1)-(SU2) evaluate any
A at any history passing through a moment m, then F(n)A∨ F(n)¬A just
needs to be BO-true (BO-false) at any singular h ∋m in order to be SU-true
(SU-false) at m. And it is easy to see that F(n)A∨F(n)¬A is an BO-validity.
Hence, supervaluationism validates (FEM), even if it is a semantics that
ascribes necessary contents to stand-alone, future-tensed statements.
Supervaluationism has also another advantage over Peirceanism. Re-
call that this latter semantics introduces a distinction between “Tomor-
row it won’t be rainy” and “It is not the case that Tomorrow it will be
rainy”. Supervaluationism, on the contrary, does not predict any semantic
distinction between F(n)¬A (“Tomorrow it won’t be rainy”) and ¬F(n)A
(“It is not the case that Tomorrow it will be rainy”). It is easy to check
that F(n)¬A↔ ¬F(n)A is a SU-validity, and F(n)¬A is SU-true just in case
¬F(n)A is.
As we shall see, however, supervaluationism has several flaws.
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3.4.1 Against the Supervaluationist view.
Objection 1. Problems with Logical Consequence and Disquotational Truth
Usually, logical consequence is defined as truth preservation from premises
to conclusions. Since supervaluationism identifies truth with super-truth,
one may be tempted to define the notion of logical consequence in terms
of super-truth preservation.
Definition 3.4.4 (Global logical consequence). Given two sets of wffs Γ,∆ of
LT , ∆ is a global logical consequence of Γ (in symbols. Γ ⊢G ∆) just in case, for
any MSU and any moment m in it, if m #SU A for any A ∈ Γ, then there is a
B ∈ ∆ such that m #SU B.
As Williamson (2002: 151-152) has shown, ⊢G forces to reject some
deductive rules which are classically sound. For instance, A ⊢G !A holds,
for whenever A is SU-true at m, it is true at any h ∋ m, and therefore !A
must also be true at any h ∋ m. Accordingly, !A must be SU-true at m as
well. If m #SU ¬!A, it follows that m #SU $¬A, which entails that, for any
h ∋ m, there is a h′ ∋ m s.t. m/h′ #BO ¬A. But this does not suffice to rule
out that there might be a h′′ ∋m s.t. m/h′′ #BO A. In which case, ¬A would
be neither SU-true, nor SU-false at m. Hence, A ⊢G !A but ¬!A #G ¬A.
And this means that
Fact 2. Contraposition fails: fromA ⊢G !A it does not follow that¬!A ⊢G ¬A.
There are other classical rules which do not preserve super-truth (in
what follows, ⊢C is classical entailment, and Γ a set of auxiliary hypothe-
sis).23
Deduction Theorem: Γ,A ⊢C B⇒ Γ ⊢C A→ B
Fact 3. The deduction theorem fails: from A ⊢G !A it does not follow that
⊢G A→ !A.
Proof.We already shown thatA ⊢G !A. It is easy to see that, if there is anm
s.tm ∈ h andm ∈ h′, andm/h #BO A butm/h
′ !BO A, thenm/h !BO A→ !A.
Hence, A→ !A would be neither SU-true nor SU-false at m, and A ⊢G !A
but #G A→ !A.
Argument by Cases: Γ,A ⊢C C and Γ,B ⊢C C⇒ Γ,A∨B ⊢C C
23Notice that each rule fails to be globally sound only in the presence of the ! operator.
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Fact 4. Argument by cases fails: from
[
A ⊢G !A∨!¬A and¬A ⊢G !A∨!¬A
]
it does not follow that
[
A∨¬A ⊢G !A∨!¬A
]
.
Proof. Given that A ⊢G !A holds, and given that the clause in BO for dis-
junction is classical (i.e., if a disjunct is true at m/h, then the disjunction is
BO-true at m/h), then A ⊢G !A∨!¬A and ¬A ⊢G !A∨!¬A must hold as
well. Now, take a moment m s.t. A∨¬A is SU-true (clearly, the principle
of the excluded middle is a BO-validiy, and, therefore, it is a SU-validity
too). It is easy to see that it might be the case that both !A and !¬A can
fail to be BO-true at m/h; indeed, A might be a future contingent at m/h.
In which case !A ∨ !¬A would be SU-false at m, and the failure of the
argument by cases simply follows.
Reductio ad Absurdum: Γ,A ⊢C B and Γ,A ⊢C ¬B⇒ Γ ⊢C ¬A
Fact 5. Reduction ad absurdum fails: from
[
A∧¬!A ⊢G !A andA∧¬!A ⊢G
¬!A
]
it does not follow that
[
⊢G ¬(A∧¬!A)
]
.
Proof.A∧¬!A ⊢G !A holds, for there is nom that makesA∧¬!A SU-true.
Accordingly, the left-hand side of the biconditional in the definition of ⊢G
is vacously satisfied. The same holds forA∧¬!A ⊢G ¬!A. But ¬(A∧¬!A)
is not a SU-validity: if m/h #BO A but m/h
′ !BO A, then ¬(A ∧ ¬!A) is
neither SU-true nor SU-false at m.
How one should react to these failures? According to Timothy Willamson,
[c]onditional proof, argument by cases and reductio ad absur-
dum play a vital role in systems of natural deduction, the for-
mal systems closest to our informal deductions. They are the
rules by which premises are discharged, i.e. by which categori-
cal conclusions can be drawn on the basis of hypothetical rea-
soning. Contraposition is another very natural deductive move.
Thus supervaluations invalidate our natural mode of deductive
thinking. (Williamson 2002: 152)
Williamson’s reaction can be encoded in the following argument.
Uniformity: SU-logical consequence should be defined in terms of SU-
truth preservation from premises to conclusions.
Naturalness: Contraposition, the Deduction theorem, Conditional proof,
Argument by cases and Reductio ad absurdum are natural inferen-
tial rules, and they should be sound in any adequate logic.
∴ Given that global logical consequence does not make sound these
rules, SU semantics yields an inadequate logic.
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If Williamson’s argument is sound, the failures we have just seen can lead
to a rejection of supervaluationism. But such a conclusion is tenable only
if both Uniformity and Naturalness are. As far as I know, supervaluation-
ists try to overcome Williamson’s objections in two ways. On the one hand,
some supervaluationist endorses Uniformity and rejects Naturalness. Some
other advocate of supervaluationism denies Uniformity but sticks to Natu-
ralness. In what follows, I argue that supervaluationism has troubles either
way.
What if one rejects Naturalness but conserves Uniformity?
If one rejects the Naturalness premise only, one may say that, at least in
the case of future contingents, deference to classical logic is misguided.
Indeed, supervaluationists embrace the Aristotelian argument, which ap-
pears to show that classical bivalence is at odds with indeterminism. And
if one agrees that indeterminism requires the rejection of bivalence, some
feature of classical logic must fail somewhere in the correspondent logic.
As we shall see in the next chapter, there is no reason to take seriously
the Aristotelian argument, and thus there is no evidence at all that inde-
terminism and bivalence should be at odds with each other. But for the
time being, let us notice that who drops Naturalness but retains Unifromity
has to face a problem related to Unifromity itself. This principle yields a
sound inferential pattern that licences to reason in a very counterintuitive
way. As Tweedale (2004) suggests, Uniformity entails the following fact.
Fact 6. A,$B ⊢G $(A∧B)
Proof. If A and $B are both SU-true at m, then, for any h ∋ m, m/h #BO A
and m/h #BO $B. Thus, there must be a history h
′ ∋ m such that m/h′ #BO
A∧ B, which entails m/h′ #BO $(A∧ B). But then, for any history h ∋ m,
m/h #BO $(A∧B), which means that $(A∧B) is SU-true at m.
Now, if one substitutes A with F(n)A and $B with $¬F(n)A in the pat-
tern A,$B ⊢G $(A∧B), one obtains that the formulas in {F(n)A,$¬F(n)A}
globally entail $(F(n)A∧¬F(n)A). But this seems to be wrong: intuitively,
from the premise that “Tomorrow there will be a sea battle, even if it is
not inevitable” one shouldn’t be licensed to infer that “It is possible that
tomorrow there will be a sea battle and there won’t be any sea battle”.
Sure, a supervaluationist may say that the formulas in {F(n)A,$¬F(n)A}
cannot be both SU-true at any moment m, and thus the inference from
{F(n)A,$¬F(n)A} to $(F(n)A ∧ ¬F(n)A) is vacuously sound. But this fact
doesn’t avoid the flaw we have just noticed, i.e., that the inference pattern
itself – A,$B ⊢G $(A∧B) – has instances that seems to be suspect.
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Uniformity yields other shortcomings. Let us enrich LT with a senten-
tial operator for expressing SU-truth.
(1) m/h #BO TA⇔∀h
′(m ∈ h′ ⇒m/h′ #BO A)
Then the following pattern is globally sound.
(2) A↔ TA,¬A↔ T¬A ⊢G TA∨T¬A
Thus, a supervaluationist should say that if truth were disquotational, biva-
lence would hold. And, as Williamson (2002: 162) has stressed, supervalu-
ationists usually deny bivalence by rejecting the disquotational property
of truth. Indeed, it is easy to see that
(3) ⊢G TA→A
but
(4) #G A→ TA.
It is very odd to deny that if it is the case that A, it is true that A. And,
in my view, saying that A→ TA fails when A is a future contingent is of
no help. In assessing a material conditional, one takes what the antecedent
says to be the case, and checks whether it is sufficient for the truth of the
consequent. Thus, when one assesses a conditional such as “If tomorrow
there will be a sea brattle, then it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea
battle”, it seems rather obvious that the truth of the antecedent – even if it
is a future contingent – is indeed sufficient for the truth of the consequent.
One can object that the antecedent’s truth is not sufficient for its super-
truth – i.e., it is not sufficient for its necessitation. Indeed, it it easy to
see that T behaves as !, and thus there is no surprise that ⊢G A → TA
fails, given that ⊢G A→ !A fails as well (see the failure of the Deduction
theorem). But this reply just highlights that super-truth is not what we
mean when we speak about truth: when we assess a statement as true, or
entertain the hypothesis that it is true, we do not want necessarily to say
(or hypothesise) that it is inevitable.
Notice that A ⊣⊢ TA holds when the supervaluationist logical conse-
quence is global. Accordingly, one should accept that A logically entails
TA and vice versa, even if, via (4), one should hold that the material im-
plication from A to TAmay fail. I take this as a bad result.24
24This diagnosis is, however, very controversial. For an opposite view on supervalua-
tionism, disquotational truth and logical entailment, see Keefe (2000), McGee (1989) and
Varzi (2007).
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Accordingly, rejecting Naturalness and conserving Uniformity does not
seem to be a promising strategy. Indeed, global logical consequence makes
sound a bad inferential pattern, A,$B ⊢G $(A∧B). Moreover, it prohibits
the material inference from A to TA to be valid, even if A ⊣⊢ TA does
globally hold.
What if one rejects Uniformity but conserves Naturalness?
Many supervaluationists have contested Williamson’s Uniformity prin-
ciple, according to which the supervaluationist notion of logical conse-
quence should be defined in terms of SU-truth preservation. For instance,
Varzi (2007) adopts supervaluationism to deal with semantic vagueness,
and comments on Williamson’s Uniformity requirement as follows.
For one thing, when we are dealing with a vague language, it
seems perfectly reasonable to suppose that wemay want to rea-
son from premises that lack a definite truth-value, in which
case super-truth cannot be our guidance. Indeed, one might
suggest that it is precisely by reasoning according to [a notion
of logical entailment alternative to the global one] that a su-
pervaluationist finds it natural to accept so called principles of
penumbral connection: ‘Look, I’m not sure what ‘small’ exactly
means, so I am not sure whether x is truly small. But I certainly
know this: Assuming x is small, since y’s height is less than x’s,
y must be small, too.’(Varzi 2007: 643-644)
Varzi suggests that, whenever a supervaluationist reasons about sentences
which lack truth values, she usually applies inferential rules that wouldn’t
be sound if logical conseqeunce were global. Thus, super-truth preserva-
tion cannot be a reasonable candidate to isolate those patterns that are
usually taken to be sound even by supervaluationists’ own lights. Analo-
gously, whenever a supervaluationist wants to reason about future contin-
gencies, super-truth preservation cannot be apt to isolate sound inferential
patterns.
Thus, one can reject the notion of global logical consequence, and adopt
what Williamson (2002) calls ‘local validity’. In the case of branching time
structures, the supervaluationist form of ‘local validity’ simply holds that
BO-logical entailment is the ‘right’ supervaluationist notion of logical con-
sequence.
Definition 3.4.5. (Local logical consequence) Given two sets of wffs Γ,∆ of
LT , ∆ is a local logical logical consequence of Γ (in symbols. Γ ⊢L ∆) just in
case, for any MSU and any moment-history pair m/h in it, if m/h #BO A for
any A ∈ Γ, then there is a B ∈ ∆ such that m/h #BO B.
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It is easy to see that ⊢L violates the Uniformity principle, for SU-truth
does not play any role in the definiens of local logical consequence. And
once that local logical consequence is taken to be the right notion of logi-
cal consequence, a supervaluationist can easily restore the inferential rules
that we have seen before. Contraposition, the Deduction theorem, Condi-
tional proof, Argument by cases and Reductio ad absurdum turn out to be
sound under the local reading of logical consequence. Furthermore, the
problematic inferential pattern of Fact 6 – A,$B ⊢ $(A ∧ B) – does not
locally hold anymore (to see why, just suppose that {h : h ∈ m/h∧m/h #BO
A}∩ {h : h ∈m/h∧m/h #BO B} = ∅).
Varzi (2007: 665) highlights that settling on ⊢L does not amount to ne-
glect its global variant, ⊢G. The local logical consequence can recast the
global one as a defined notion. One can define ⊢G in terms of ⊢L and T.
(5) Γ ⊢G ∆⇔ {TA :A ∈ Γ} ⊢L TB, where B ∈ ∆.
Thus, even if an advocate of SU may deny Uniformity, she can always de-
fine the global logical consequence in terms of ⊢L, properly combined with
T.
In my view, even if this strategy may seem promising, it just highlights
other difficulties that the supervaluationist can, in a sense, just swallow.
First, notice that truth fails to be disquotational. Again, the conditional
from A to TA fails to be a local validity.
(6) #L A→ TA
On top of that, TA is not a local logical conseqeunce of A.
(7) A #L TA
A supervaluationist who assumes Naturalness but rejects Uniformity in-
habits a strange world: she takes some classical inferential rules as “natu-
ral”, but she is forced to attribute very counterintuitive properties to her
favourite notion of truth. In particular, the tarskian intuitions appears to
be incompatible with her approach.
A supervaluationist may object that there is no reason to require that
the object language truth-operator must express super-truth. After all,
once that the relevant notion of truth for logical entailment ceases to be
that of super-truth, one seems to be entitled to give up an object language
device that expresses super-truth as well. I think that this view is very
unsatisfying, but let us see how far it can go.
Both Thomason (1970: 279), MacFarlane (2008: 96) and MacFarlane
(2014: 223) define the supervaluationist truth operator as follows.
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(8) m/h #BO VA⇔m/h #BO A
If V is adopted, the following patterns hold both locally and globally, and
the disquotational properties of truth are restored.
(9) A ⊣⊢ VA
(10) ⊢A↔ VA
Hence, it seems that a supervaluationist who takes V seriously can re-
cast the disquotational property of truth ((9)-(10)). Unfortunately, these
virtues are only apparent.
First, recall that supervaluationists accept the Aristotelian premises
(Pa)–(Pb), and thus they are forced to say that any indeterminist has to
deny bivalence (relative tomoments). But supervaluationists are also bound
to accept the following validity, independently of their favourite notion of
logical consequence.
(11) ⊢ (VA∨V¬A)∧¬(VA∧V¬A)
Thus, if a supervaluationist could be happy to use only V in her object
language, she should subscribe to something that is really similar to biva-
lence. And, as we have already noticed, supervaluationism gives up biva-
lence at the metalanguage. Therefore, not only supervaluationists couldn’t
express one of their peculiar thesis within their object language, but they
would be forced to subscribe to a principle, (11), which is prima facie in-
compatible with their fundamental beliefs. They should affirm bivalence
in the object language, but they should also deny it at the metalanguage. I
think that this is double-thinking.
To see how strange it would be for a supervaluationist to pick V as her
favourite object language truth operator, one may form a formula that, in-
tuitively, should be unsatisfiable, and which can indeed be satisfied within
a supervaluationist framework.25 Let us abbreviate the formula$A∧$¬A
as follows.
(12) ContA ≡df $A∧$¬A
The Cont operator signals that the formula it embeds is a future contin-
gent, and if ContA is BO-true at m/h, it must be SU-true at m. Notice
moreover that ContA is BO-true at m/h just in case Cont¬A is BO-true
at the very same point. Thus, whenever ContA is SU-true at a moment,
Cont¬A is SU-true at that moment.
Now let us define a satisfiability operator, which isolates those object
language formulas that can be SU-true.
25It will provided a formula that is similar to that of Graff Fara (2010) and Malpass
(2013, 2016).
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(13) m/h #BO $SatA⇔ there is a model MSU and a moment m
′ in it s.t.
m′ #SU A.
According to (13), $SatA is BO-true at a moment history pair just in case
there is a supervaluationist model MSU and a moment m
′ in it, such that
A comes out super-true at that moment of that model. Hence $Sat can
identify those formulas that can be super true, since they can be SU-true
in at least a moment of at least an SU-model.
With these two new operators at hand, one can form the following
statement.
(14) V(ContA∧A)∨V(ContA∧¬A)∧¬$Sat(ContA∧A)∧¬$Sat(ContA∧
¬A)
Statement (14) says that either it is true that A is contingent and A is the
case, or it is true that A is contingent and ¬A is the case, but no model
(and no moment) satisfies neither (a future contingent such as) A, nor its
negation.
Intuitively, (14) should be unsatisfiable, for whenever the disjunction
occurring in it is satisfied – V(ContA∧A)∨V(ContA∧¬A) – it should fol-
low that one amongA and¬A is satisfiable. But the conjunction ¬$Sat(ContA∧
A)∧ ¬$Sat(ContA∧ ¬A) denies that. In other terms, if (14) were satisfi-
able, an obvious relation among truth (as it is expressed within the object
language) and satisfiability would fail to obtain. Being true would be com-
patible with being unsatisfiable. Unfortunately, (14) is SU-satisfiable (i.e.,
if there is a model and a moment at which it is SU-true). Here’s the proof.
Fact 7. There is a moment m in aMSU s.t. m #SU (14).
Proof. Take a pointm/h s.t.m/h #BO ContA. By (12), it follows thatm/h
′
#BO
$A∧$¬A for any h′ ∋m. Notice that m/h′ #BO ContA∧A∨¬Amust hold
for any h′ ∋ m, for A∨¬A is a BO-validity. Thus m/h′ #BO (ContA∧A)∨
(ContA∨¬A) for any h′ ∋ m, given that ContA is true at any h′ ∋ m, and
each history passing throughm satisfies exactly one formula amongA and
¬A. By (8), m/h′ #BO V(ContA∧A)∨V(ContA∨¬A), for any h
′ ∋m. Now, it
is easy to see that ¬$Sat(ContA∧A)∧¬$Sat(ContA∧¬A) is a BO-validity,
for the two conjunctions $A∧$¬A∧A and $A∧$¬A∧ ¬A can be ei-
ther SU-false (when A is not a future contingent, and thus $A ∧ $¬A
fails to hold at any history passing through a moment), or neither SU-
true nor SU-false (when A is a future contingent). Accordingly, both $A∧
$¬A∧A and $A∧$¬A∧¬A cannot be SU-true. By (13) and the clause
for negation, it follows that ¬$Sat(ContA∧A)∧ ¬$Sat(ContA∧¬A) is a
BO-validity. But then the conjunction m/h #BO V(ContA∧A)∨V(ContA∧
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¬A)∧¬$Sat(ContA∧A)∧¬$Sat(ContA∧¬A) must be true at any h
′ ∋m,
for V(ContA∧A)∨ V(ContA ∧ ¬A) is BO-true at each of these histories,
and ¬$Sat(ContA∧A)∧¬$Sat(ContA∧¬A) is a BO-validity. Accordingly,
Fact 7 follows.
In my view, the weirdness highlighted by Fact 7 is a further clue which
suggests that taking V as the only object-language truth operator for su-
pervaluationism is a bad idea.26 And by looking at the semantic clause
for V given in (8), it is easy to see that V expresses the Ockhamist truth
at a point m/h, that is, that very notion of truth which a supervaluationist
takes to be wrong.
Furthermore, nothing prevents to define the T operator – i.e., the super
truth operator– in terms of ! and V.
(15) m/h #BO !VA⇔m/h #BO TA⇔∀h
′(m ∈ h′ ⇒m/h′ #BO A)
And, by (15), it turns out that T has none of the virtues of V that we have
noticed above. Again, A ⊣⊢ TA does not hold locally, for TA is not a local
logical consequence of A. The conditional A→ TA is not a local validity,
and therefore super-truth is not disquotational.
To sum up, rejecting Uniformity while conserving Naturalness doesn’t
solve some problems related to the disquotational properties of truth. In
particular, the material implication from A to TA is not locally valid, and
the logical entailment fromA to TA is not locally sound. Onemay attempt
to fix these shortcomings by using V instead of T. V seems to restore the
tarskian character of truth. Nonetheless, whoever uses V to express the
supervaluationist notion of truth is actually cheating.
Objection 2. Having been true, having been inevitable and retrospective truth
judgments.
According to Thomason (1970), supervaluationism allows to spell out the
difference between having been true and having been inevitable. This differ-
ence is encoded in the following pattern, which fails to hold both locally
and globally.
(16) P(n)VF(m)A ⊢ P(n)!F(m)A
The following tree falsifies (16).
26Notice, moreover, that if one substitutes in (14) the operator V with T – which in-
deed expresses super-truth – one obtains what is desirable, that is, an SU-unsatisfiable
formula:
T(ContA∧A)∨T(ContA∧¬A)∧¬$Sat(ContA∧A)∧¬$Sat(ContA∧¬A).
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h2h1
m1
m2 : p m3 : ¬p
If dT (m1,m2) = dT (m1,m3) = 1, then P(1)VF(1)p is BO-true at m2/h1, and
given that h1 is the only history passing through m2, P(1)VF(1)p is SU-true
at m2. But P(1)!F(1)p is BO-false at m2/h1, for F(1)p fails to be inevitable
at one unit in the past of m2 (indeed, m1/h2 #BO ¬F(1)p). And again, since
h1 is the unique history passing through m2, P(1)!F(1)p is SU-false at m2.
Accordingly, (16) is neither locally nor globally sound. Thomason com-
ments on this result by saying that
[o]ur theory thus allows (indeed, forces) us to say that hav-
ing been true is different from having been inevitable, as far as
future-tense statements go. The latter is not a [local or global]
consequence of the former, P(n)VF(m)A # P(n)!F(m)A, because
in an assertion that it was true that a thing would come about,
truth is relative to events up to the present, whereas an asser-
tion that it was inevitable that a thing would come about, in-
evitability is judged relative to some time in the past. (Thoma-
son 1970: 279)
In my view, Thomason’s diagnosis about having-been-inevitable statements
is right. Asserting that it was inevitable that a thing would come about
means that there is a moment m in the past at which the very same event
happens in any possible future of m.
But I disagree with his interpretation of having-been-true statements.
The truth of a prediction made in the past depends on whether reality has
evolved or will evolve in such a way that it satisfies, sooner or later, what
was predicted. Therefore, the truth of a past prediction does not neces-
sarily depends on what is presently settled. It may depend on what will
obtain in the future, and what will come about may well be contingent
relative to the present moment. If I say that what I’ve predicted yesterday,
namely that in two days it will be rainy, was true, I’m not committed to
say that now it is presently settled that tomorrow it will be rainy. I am
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committed to hold that tomorrow’s weather, being contingent or not, will
be as I have predicted. As we shall see, it is pretty easy to make sense of
this character of having-been-true statements once that a substantial no-
tion of actuality enters the scene. But for the time being, let us focus on
another flaw of Thomason’s analysis, which highlights a more general flow
of supervaluationism.
Is the difference between having-been-true statements and having-been-
inevitable claims expressible within supervaluationism? The answer, as I
shall argue, is negative.
Let us focus on (16) one again.
(16) P(n)VF(m)A ⊢ P(n)!F(m)A
The conclusion in (16) – P(n)!F(m)A – is a schema for having-been-inevitable
claims. P(n)!F(m)A is SU-true at m iff, for any h ∋ m, there is a m′ in n
time units in the past of m, and F(m)A is BO-true at any history h′ pass-
ing through that past moment m′ . On the other hand, the premise in (16),
P(n)VF(m)A, is a schema for having-been-true claims. Since VA is BO-true
at a point m/h iff A is BO-true at m/h, a statement such as P(n)VF(m)A
would be SU-true at the present moment iff F(m)A were BO-true at a mo-
ment lying at n time units in the past, at any history passing through
the present moment. Having been true, under this reading, means being
presently settled. But since the histories passing through the present mo-
ment are, in general, more than those passing through one of its past mo-
ments, what is presently settled may differ for what was settled. The de-
sired result thus follows: having-been-true statements do not entail their
having-been-inevitable counterparts.
The failure of (16) is surely desirable, but it doesn’t show that the
supervaluationist can tell apart having-been-true statements from having-
been-inevitable sentences. The entailment in (16) fails because the notion of
truth expressed by the having-been-true premise – P(n)VF(m)A – is encoded
by the V operator. But it does not express super-truth, for V expresses BO-
truth. And if one substitutes in (16) the V operator with the super truth
operator T, then supervaluationism – peace Thomason – cannot tell the
difference between having been true and having been inevitable. Indeed, a
pattern such as
(17) P(n)TF(m)A ⊢ P(n)!F(m)A
is equivalent to
(18) P(n)!VF(m)A ⊢ P(n)!F(m)A.
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Given that V is redundant, (18) amounts to
(19) P(n)!F(m)A ⊢ P(n)!F(m)A,
which holds both locally and globally. Thus, whenever it has been true that
A would come about, it logically follows, according to supervaluationism,
that it was inevitable that A would come about.
Under a supervaluationist semantics, have-been-true statements cannot
mean that what was predicted is presently settled. They must mean that
what was predicted was super-true, and something was super-true only
if it was inevitable. Hence, supervaluationist cannot tell apart what has
been true form what has been inevitable. And this – as Thomason himself
seems to suggest – is an unwelcome result.
The collapse of having-been-true statements over having-been-inevitable
counterparts helps to explain why SU cannot account for retrospective
truth judgments. A patterns such as
(20) A ⊢ P(n)T rueF(n)A
says thatA logically entails that, n time units ago, it was true thatAwould
come about after n time units. But when one equips (20) with the super-
valuationist truth operator T, one obtains
(21) A ⊢ P(n)TF(n)A,
which really means that A entails that, n time units ago it was inevitably
the case that A would come about after n time units. (21) is neither lo-
cally nor globally sound, for what is presently the case could have been a
future contingency. Indeed, whenever A is BO-true at m/h, but $F(n)¬A
is BO-true at m′/h′, where m′ is n time units in the past of m, it follows
that the BO-truth of the premise in (21) does not entail the BO-truth of
the consequent. Hence, (21) is neither locally nor globally sound, and su-
pervaluationism does not account for retrospective truth judgments.
Objection 3. The plain future collapses over what inevitably will be the case.
There is a weak spot that supervaluationism shares with Peircean se-
mantics. They both identify the notion of truth at a moment m with truth
at m on any history passing trough m. Thus, in both semantics truth at a
moment (of use) means inevitability at that moment. But the way in which
this identification is actually achieved differs between the two semantics.
Notice that the Peircean primitive future operator Fp(n) expresses fu-
ture inevitability at any moment that happens to be that of its evaluation.
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And if a sentence as Fp(n)A is embedded by – for instance – a past opera-
tor P(m), the moment of evaluation of Fp(n)A may differ from that of use
of the whole sentence. For instance, if P(2n)Fp(n)A is uttered at m, P(2n)
shifts the moment of use m to a moment of evaluation m′ that is 2n time
units in the past of m. Accordingly, P(2n)Fp(n)A is PE-true at m iff A is
PE-true at n time units in the future ofm′ , for any history passing through
the moment of evaluation m′ .
On the other hand, supervaluationism assesses a statement A as SU-
true (SU-false) at m iff it is BO-true (BO-false) at m, for any h ∋m, no mat-
ter which logical form A may have. This means that the histories that are
relevant for SU-truth (SU-falsity) at m may be only those passing through
m – and not those passing trough the moment of evaluation. For instance,
P(2n)F(n)A is SU-true as used at m iff it is BO-true at any history passing
through that moment. As in the Peircean case, P(2n) shifts the moment of
use m to a moment of evaluation m′ that is 2n time units in the past. But
P(2n)F(n)A is SU-true at m iff A is BO-true at n time units in the future of
m′, for any history passing through the moment of use m. In this case, the
histories that are relevant for the evaluation of P(2n)F(n)A are only those
that pass through the moment of use.
As a consequence, in SU a future tensed sentence, when embedded by
other operators, may fail to express future inevitability w.r.t. the moment
of its evaluation. On the other hand, in PE the primitive future operator,
when embedded by other operators, does always express future inevitabil-
ity w.r.t. the moment of its evaluation.
This difference is responsible of the fact that PE treats (22), (23) and
(24) as three equivalent statements, while supervaluationism can reject
the equivalence between (22) and (23).
(22) I bet that A will fall over.
(23) I bet that present circumstances determine that A will fall over.
(24) Present circumstances determine that I bet that A will fall over.
“I bet that” is a present tensed expression, and whatever its meaning may
be, it must describe how reality is like at the moment of utterance, inde-
pendently of which histories happen to pass through that moment.27 In
general, present tensed sentences receive their truth values at their mo-
ments of utterance independently of the histories passing trough those
moments. And if settledness at m is thought as truth at any history pass-
ing trough m, a present tensed sentence that is true (false) at m must be
27One may object that whenever “I bet that” is embedded by a tense operator, it can
fail to describe something that is happening at the moment of utterance. True. But now
let us consider just (22)-(24), where the expression takes wide scope over tense operators.
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settled true (false) at m. Accordingly, both PE and SU should take (22) –
that is, a sentence which describes what is presently the case – to be equiv-
alent with (24).
Moreover, since PE takes “will” to mean “inevitably will”, (22) must
be equivalent with (23). Thus, under a Peircean perspective (22), (23) and
(24) are three equivalent sentences. As we have already argued, this result
is bad, for (22) conveys an information which is intuitively different from
what is expressed by (23).
An advocate of supervaluationism, on the other hand, has to acknowl-
edge that if (22) is true at m, it is settled at m that I bet that A will fall
over (which is the content expressed by (24)). But she is not committed to
say that, if “I bet that A will fall over” is true at m, it is true at m that I
bet that, inevitably, A will fall over. Indeed, in SU the future operator may
not express future inevitability when embedded by other operators. Thus,
a supervaluationist may tell a story about the meaning of “I bet that” to
distinguish “I bet that: F(n)(A falls over)” from that of “I bet that: !F(n)(A
falls over)”. A supervaluationist, therefore, is not forced to say that (22)
and (23) mean the same thing.
The advantages that a supervaluationist has over a Peircean theorist in
telling apart (22) from (23) are, however, only apparent. Intuitively, (22)
(“I bet that A will fall over”) is equivalent to
(25) I bet that it is true that A will fall over.
But if one translates “it is true that” in (25) with the super truth operator
T, then (25) expresses the same content of (23), i.e. that I bet that A will
inevitably fall over. A supervaluationist has to say that (23) and (25) are
equivalent, for in (25) the super truth operator T embeds the future-tensed
sentence “A will fall over”. Since T behaves as a necessity operator, then
“it is true that A will fall over” means “inevitably, A will fall over”.
In this context, a supervaluationist has two options. The first one is to
say that (22) is not equivalent to (23). But if so, (22) is not equivalent to
(25), for (25) is indeed equivalent to (23). And this is bad. At the end of
the day, when I bet that A will fall over, I bet that it is true that A will fall
over. This objection may appear question begging, for stating that A is the
case, according to supervaluationism, is not equivalent to say that it is true
that A. In my view, I see no question begging here: at the end of the day,
to say that A is the case is to say that it is true that A, and any semantics
which fails to capture this fact does not mirror the way we actually speak
and reason.
Alternatively, a supervaluationist can hold that (22) is equivalent to
(25). But then she would be forced to say that (22) is equivalent to (23).
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This latter result restores a problem which affects Peirceanism, according
to which “I bet that A will fall over” is (wrongly) taken to mean that I bet
that it is inevitable that A will fall over. In both cases, supervaluationism
yields counterintuitive results.
Moreover, if F(n)A is a stand-alone sentence, and thus F(n) is the main
operator of the formula we are considering, then F(n)A, uttered atm, must
express inevitability at m. And this – as we have argued for the Peircean
case – is wrong, for the “plain” future does not have to collapse over what
is presently settled. This point is quite interesting, and deserves particu-
lar attention. First, notice that the collapse of the plain future over present
settledness clearly depends on SU-truth (SU-falsity), which is the metalin-
guistic conjunction of two converse conditionals.28
(26) ∀h(m ∈ h⇒m/h #BO A)⇒m #SU A
(27) m #SU A⇒∀h(m ∈ h⇒m/h #BO A)
The conditional in (26) says that if something is inevitable at m, it is true
at m. I take it as hardly contestable, for if A is true on any possible future,
A is going to be the case wathever possible future would come about. In-
evitability at m entails truth at m because what is inevitable takes place
at any possible history accessible from m, and thus it must take place also
on what is (or will become) the actual way things turn out to be. What is
inevitable must happen.
What is controversial about SU-truth, however, is (27), i.e. the condi-
tional from truth at a moment m to its inevitability at m. Intuitively, if I
predict that A would occur, I do not commit myself to hold that present
circumstances determine thatAwould occur. I commit myself to hold that
Awill occur in the future that would come about. And if it turns out that a
future contingent does rightly predict how things evolve, why should I say
that it is (or was) untrue at its moment of utterance? The idea that future
contingents should be considered untrue just because they are contingent
seems to be too strong.
Another objection to the conditional from truth to settledness is this.
Again, (27) says that the present truth of A requires its present inevitabil-
ity. Thus, one has to look to the present stage, and check whether it ne-
cessitates something to come about. But the present moment is the wrong
place to look at when it comes to evaluate a future tensed sentence. A
prediction such as “Tomorrow it will be sunny” says that the future stage
of reality would be sunny, but it does not say that the present stage has
the properties of necessitating what’s going to happen next. The present
28An analogous observation obviously holds for SU-falsity.
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stage can fail to be relevant in assessing the truth status of a prediction.
This point can be explained by saying that the truth of propositions which
happen to be expressed today can depend on future events.
We shall say that the truth of an empirical proposition super-
venes upon events in the sense of being wholly dependent upon
them, while at the same time events in no way supervene upon
truth. Thus the truth of the proposition that X is in Warsaw
town square at noon next Friday depends upon what happens
next Friday [...]. What is true today depends upon what happens
tomorrow, not the other way round. The set of true proposition in
no way determines what the future is like. Instead, what the future
is like determines the set of true propositions. (McCall 1994: 14)29
In a nutshell, the truth status of a future contingentA depends on whether
the actual future (i.e. the future that would come about) features what A
predicts.
Sure, a supervaluationist like Thomason can object that any history is
actual from the perspective of its moments. According to the Relational
Actuality principle, a history is actual for a moment just in case that his-
tory passes through that moment. And given that, in general, a moment
has more than one history passing through it, there would be more than
a single history that is actual relative to a moment. Thus, the definite de-
scription “the actual future of moment m” fails to pick out a unique ref-
erent, and thus it has to be assessed as improper.30 As we shall see in
the next section, this rejoinder is right only if the notion encoded in the
Relational Actuality principle is the only kind of actuality available to in-
determinists. And, as we shall see, not only branching indeterminism is
consistent with a notion of actuality that differs from the relational one,
but a non-relational notion of actuality is indeed needed to tell apart an in-
determinist reading of a tree from its deterministic interpretations. Be as
it may, supervaluationists have problems with intuitive connections one
may establish among propositions of tensed statements.
Objection 4. Problems with propositions.
As for the Peircean case, let us define the accounts for temporalist and eter-
nalist intensions that one may impose on the supervaluationist semantics.
29Emphasis added.
30Notice that this diagnosis is quite shared in the literature. MacFarlane (2003, 2008,
2014), Belnap & Green (1994), Belnap et al. (2001), Todd (2015), among others, agree
with Thomason’s treatment of actuality in the context of branching indeterminism.
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Definition 3.4.6. (Temporalist propositions and temporalist intensions.)
[A]Tm is the temporalist proposition expressed by A as used at m. The intension
of [A]Tm is the function ∥A∥T from moment-history pairs m/h to truth values
{1,0, i}, such that
• ∥A∥T (m/h) = 1⇔m #SU A,
• ∥A∥T (m/h) = 0⇔m !SU A.
• ∥A∥T (m/h) = i ⇔ neither m #SU A, nor m !SU A.
Definition 3.4.7. (Eternalist propositions and eternalist intensions.) [A]Em
is the eternalist proposition expressed byA as used atm. The intension of [A]Em
is the function ∥A∥E from histories h to truth values {1,0, i}, such that
• ∥A∥E(h) = 1⇔m #SU A,
• ∥A∥E(h) = 0⇔m !SU A,
• ∥A∥E(h) = i ⇔ neither m #SU A, nor m !SU A,
where h is one of the histories passing through the moment of utterance.
Again, an eternalist may be uncomfortable with supervaluationism. If
today it is Tuesday and it is sunny, but on Monday it was possible that
it would have been rainy on Tuesday, then an eternalist supervaluationist
couldn’t accept the following argument as valid.
a. A yesterday’s utterance of “Tomorrow it will be sunny” means the
same thing as a today’s utterance of “Today is sunny”.
b. If A uttered at m means the same thing as B uttered at m′ , A at m
and B at m′ have the same intension.
∴ “Tomorrow it will be sunny”, as uttered yesterday, has the same in-
tension of “Today is sunny”, as uttered today.
h2h1
Monday
Tuesday
Rainy Sunny
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Take the graph represented above, and suppose that we are located at the
sunny version of Tuesday. “Today it is sunny” is SU-true on that Tues-
day version. Thus, the eternalist intension of the proposition expressed
by “Today it is sunny”, ∥Today it is sunny∥E , takes value 1 at h2. But “To-
morrow it will be sunny”, uttered on Monday, is neither SU-true nor SU-
false. Accordingly, the intension of the correspondent eternalist proposi-
tion, ∥Today it is sunny∥E , must have value i at h2. An eternalist superval-
uationist must therefore deny that “Tomorrow it will be sunny”, as uttered
yesterday, has the same intension of “Today it is sunny”, as uttered today.
As Peirceanism, supervaluationism entails that premise a of the argument
is not valid. In the example just given, “Tomorrow it will be sunny”, as
uttered yesterday, means something different than “Today it is sunny”, as
uttered today. And this, once again, is a bad result.
Now it is time to recap the pros and cons of supervaluationism.
3.4.2 Assessing Supervaluationism
The application of supervaluations to future contingents aims at a notion
of truth at a moment which doesn’t privilege any particular history of the
moment of use. In turn, the democratic stance towards the histories of
the moment of use is closely related to the idea that, in a branching con-
text, actuality can only be a relational property. The relational character
of actuality is encoded in the Relational Actuality principle. Moreover, su-
pervaluationists want to validate the excluded middle and the principle
of retrogradation, and thus they reject the definition of truth at a moment
provided by the Peircean semantics.
Supervaluationism answers to (Q1) and (Q2) in an adequate way, given
that
✓ SU refutes the Aristotelian argument and provides a non-bivalent
notion of truth at a moment.
✓ SU refutes the Master argument by rejecting the principle of the ne-
cessity of the pasr, PNP .
SU has some advantages over the Peircean semantics. In particular,
✓ SU validates the future excluded middle.
✓ SU does not introduce a semantic distinction between Fp(n)¬A and
¬Fp(n)A.
But supervaluationism shares with Peirceanism three significant flaws.
✗ SU equates “plain will” with “inevitably will”.
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✗ SU does not account for retrospective truth judgments.
✗ SU yields a notion of intension which is at odds with an eternalist
understanding of the propositions expressed by tensed statements.
Moreover, SU has problems with logical consequence and disquotational
truth. As we have seen, global logical consequence not only entails that
several classical inferential rules are unsound, but it also implies that
✗ A,$B ⊢G $(A∧B), and
✗ #G A→ TA.
If, on the other hand, one subscribes to the local reading of logical conse-
quence, classical inferential rules are restored, andA,$B ⊢L $(A∧B) fails
to hold. Truth, however, continues to be non-disquotational. Indeed the
local reading entails that:
✗ #L A→ TA, and
✗ A #L TA.
Can one do better? According to John MacFarlane (2014: 226), Thomason’s
analysis about actuality – according to which actuality can only be a rela-
tional property – is correct. Moreover, the supervaluationist semantics has
many virtues, and we don’t have to throw it out completely. In MacFar-
lane’s view, supervaluationism just needs to be tweaked minimally. The
modification MacFarlane has in mind is known as relativism.
3.5 Relativism
MacFarlane (2014: 222–223) disagrees with the analysis about superval-
uationism just proposed. In his view, a supervaluationist can legitimately
use an object-language truth operator which does not express super-truth.
This asymmetry is justified as follows.
[...] whichever view we take, the context-relativized truth pred-
icate used in semantics is a technical term, which gets its mean-
ing in part from an account of its pragmatic relevance (for ex-
ample, in Lewis’s theory, the view that speakers at c try to as-
sert what is true at c, and trust others to be doing so). It is not
the ordinary truth predicate used in everyday talk—a monadic
predicate that applies to propositions, and is governed by the
Equivalence Schema. The proposition that Φ is true iff Φ.
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The relativist (or nonindexical contextualist) can treat themonadic
predicate “true” as just another predicate of the object lan-
guage—the language for which she is giving a semantics. (Mac-
Farlane 2014: 93)
The quotation says that the semantical notion of truth need not to be iden-
tical with that used at the object language level. Semantical truth is just
a technical device whose role is to vindicate ordinary linguistic practices.
Among these practices, there are also ordinary uses of the world “true”.
And there is no need that the way in which we ordinarily use “true” is the
same as that in which a semanticist uses her technical notion of metalin-
guistic truth.
I think that, at least in the case of future contingents, there is room to
resist MacFarlane’s argument, and thus to pretend to express the seman-
tical notion of truth within the object language. But for the sake of the
argument, I’ll assume that MacFarlane may be right, and concede that the
object language may not be able to express the semantical truth.
If so, a supervaluationist may be happy to take the V operator to re-
produce how we ordinarily characterise truth, and thus she can recast the
disquotational properties of truth (both ⊢ A ↔ VA and A ⊣⊢ VA are lo-
cally and globally sound.). Moreover, a supervaluationist can also capture
retrospective truth judgments, for A ⊢ P(n)VF(n)A holds both locally and
globally. MacFarlane is not worried about the possible shortcomings of
global logical consequence, and he doesn’t see the collapse of the “plain”
future over what inevitably would come about as a flaw.
What he seems to be concerned about are retractions involving future
contingents. In his view, retractions are speech acts that have a signifi-
cant pragmatic role. In general, speech acts involve commitments. For in-
stance, an assertion commits the assertors to the truth of the content thus
expressed, while a question is an obligation for the audience to answer.
There are scenarios, however, where agents are obliged to withdraw some
of the commitments undertaken by past speech acts, and to do so they
perform retractions.
So, for example, in retracting a question, one releases the au-
dience from an obligation to answer it, and in retracting an
offer, one withdraws a permission that one has extended. Sim-
ilarly, in retracting an assertion, one disavows the assertoric
commitment undertaken in the original assertion. (MacFarlane
2014: 108)
According to MacFarlane, retractions are speech acts governed by the fol-
lowing rule.
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Retraction Rule. An agent in context ma is required to retract
an (unretracted) assertion of A made at mu if A is not true as
used at mu and assessed from ma. (MacFarlane 2014: 108)
31
Here mu is the context (moment) in which a statement is asserted, while
ma is the context (moment) from which what is asserted at mu is assessed.
Intuitively, ma represents a moment that may differ from that in which
a sentence is uttered. A context of assessment can thus represent an im-
proved viewpoint in order to evaluate a prediction made in the past. And
given the retraction rule, it is easy to see that a context of assessment ma is
non-redundant only if the truth status of A, as used and assessed at mu , is
different from its truth status as used at mu but assessed at ma. Indeed, if
what was asserted at mu conserved its truth status at any possible context
of assessment, ma would play no role in the application of the retraction
rule. In other terms,ma would be redundant and thus eliminable. An anal-
ogous remark applies to the characterisation of speech acts accuracy.
Accuracy. An attitude or speech act occurring at mu is accurate,
as assessed from a moment ma, just in case its content is true as
used at mu and assessed from ma. (MacFarlane 2014: 127)
According to MacFarlane (2008, 2014), the retraction rule, along with
an account for (non-redundant) contexts of assessment, are needed to cap-
ture two linguistic data involving retractions of future contingents. Here
there are the two (alleged) data.
(1) Present assertions concerning the future can be shown to be inaccu-
rate by a proof of present unsettledness. Thus, present utterance of
future contingents should be retracted.
(2) Past claims concerning the present cannot be shown to have been
inaccurate by a proof of past unsettledness. Hence, a proof of past
unsettledness is not sufficient to compel to retract future contingents
uttered in the past.32
In MacFarlane’s view, (1)-(2) should hold for the following reason. Assume
that yesterday I have asserted “Tomorrow will be sunny”, and
[s]uppose that the Director of the Bureau of QuantumWeather
Prediction now offers me an irrefutable proof that, at the time
of my utterance yesterday, it was still an open possibility that
it would not be sunny today. Would such a proof compel me
31Notation changed. For a similar rule, see MacFarlane (2005: 320).
32See MacFarlane (2014: 206).
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to withdraw my assertion? Hardly. If I had asserted that it was
settled that it would be sunny today, I would have to stand cor-
rected. But I did not assert that. I just said that it would be
sunny—and it is. My prediction was true, as we can demon-
strate simply by looking outside. But suppose that the Director
had visited me yesterday, just after I made my assertion, and
confrontedme with exactly the same facts. Wouldn’t I have had
to acknowledge that my claim was untrue? For it would have
been arbitrary to understand what I said to concern any partic-
ular one of the many worlds I occupied. (It is useless, recall, to
appeal to the “actual world” in this context.) By showing that
some of those overlapping worlds contained a sunny tomorrow,
while others did not, the Director would have shown that there
was no objective basis for calling my utterance true rather than
false. (MacFarlane 2008: 89)
A proof of the present unsettledness would show that present assertions
of future contingents are inaccurate, for they would express an untrue
content when assessed at the moment of their use (the present moment).33
And the Retraction Rule obliges the assertor to withdraw her assertion of
a future contingent. This is exactly what (1) says.
However, if what I have predicted – being contingent or not – turns out
to be the case, a proof of the unsettledness of the moment in which I made
the prediction (the moment of use) does not characterise my past speech
act as inaccurate (this is data (2)). Now I am evaluating the accuracy of my
past speech act from an improved viewpoint, that is, from a moment (of
assessment) which is later than the moment of use. And in that moment
(of assessment) what I had predicted is actually happening.
Let us assume that MacFarlane is right in claiming that (1)-(2) are lin-
guistic data that need to be accounted for. It is easy to see that superval-
uationism can only satisfy (1), and something different is needed to meet
(2).34 Let us introduce the moment of assessment as a parameter for super-
truth, and let us do that without modifying the overall supervaluationist
semantics:A is SU-true (SU-false) at a moment of usemu and a moment of
assessment ma iff A is BO-true (BO-false) at any history passing through
mu .
33Notice, by the way, that future contingents, when assessed at their moments of use,
are untrue. And this is so because there is no actual world. Here the truth which a fu-
ture contingents may have,as assessed at its moment of use, is justified by assuming the
relational view about actuality introduced by Thomason.
34The same of course holds for Peirceanism.
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(3) mu ,ma #SU A⇔∀h(mu ∈ h⇒mu/h #BO A)
(4) mu ,ma !SU A⇔∀h(mu ∈ h⇒mu/h !BO A)
By (3), it is straightforward to see that any future contingent is untrue
(and hence inaccurate) when used and assessed at its moment of use (that
is, when one takesmu =ma). But then the Retraction Rule obliges an asser-
tor to retract at that moment of use her utterance of a future contingent.
And the retraction is mandatory at that moment of use because, by Accu-
racy, what is asserted is inaccurate as used and assessed at that moment.
Thus, (1) is met: by (3)-(4), a present assertion of a future contingent – qua
assertion of a future contingent – is inaccurate. And a proof of the present
unsettledness – i.e., a proof that what is asserted is a future contingent –
compel to retract a present utterance of a future contingent.
According to the supervaluationist clauses (3)-(4), if A is untrue as
used at mu , A remains untrue as used at mu and assessed from ma, for
any value which ma may take. The moment of assessment parameter in
(3)-(4) is redundant. Therefore, if “Tomorrow it will be sunny”, as used
on Monday, is a future contingent, then it is untrue as used on Monday
and assessed from Tuesday, even if Tuesday turns out to be sunny. Thus,
if on Tuesday the whether is sunny, but someone comes along and proves
that on Monday it was unsettled whether the next day would have been
sunny, a supervaluationist should retract her assertion of “Tomorrow it
will be sunny” made on Monday. Furthermore, she should take the proof
as showing that “Tomorrow it will be sunny” is inaccurate even form Tues-
day’s perspective. But this counts against data (2): past claims concerning
the present cannot be shown to have been inaccurate by a proof of past
unsettledness.
In order to account for (2), MacFarlane suggests to modify (3)-(4) in
such a way that the moment of assessment, ma, ceases to be redundant. He
adopts a technique originally developed by Belnap (2000), and formulates
the following, relativistic semantics.
Definition 3.5.1. (Relativism) Given a BO-model MBO = (T ,dT , I ), the cor-
respondent relativist model isMRE = (T ,dT ,RT ,RF), whereRT (relative truth)
and SF (relative falsity) are relativist evaluation functions from wffs of LT to
ordered pairs of moments (mu ,ma), such that
(a) {h :ma ∈ h} ⊆ {h :mu ∈ h}
(b) (mu ,ma) ∈ RT (A)⇔∀h(ma ∈ h⇒mu/h #BO A)
(c) (mu ,ma) ∈ RF(A)⇔∀h(ma ∈ h⇒mu/h !BO A)
Condition (a) can be viewed as an accessibility relation between mo-
ments of use and moments of assessment. Indeed, a moment at which
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assess a statement uttered at mu must be such that the histories passing
through it form a subset of those passing throughmu . In general, ifm <m
′ ,
then {h :m ∈ h} $ {h :m′ ∈ h}. This means that, in general, a statement used
at a moment mu cannot be assessed at moments that precede mu itself.
35
It is possible to prove that, whenever m $m′ , then {h :m′ ∈ h} ⊆ {h :m ∈ h}.
Thus any moment in the future of a moment of use mu is a (possible) mo-
ment of assessment for a statement used at mu .
36In the picture below, m3
is taken as a moment of use; the (possible) moments of assessment for A
used at m3 are ticked (✓), while those that cannot be moments of assess-
ment for A, as used at m3, are crossed (✗).
h4h3h2h1
✓m7m6✓m5✗m4✗
✓m3m2✗
m1✗
✓= possible moments of
assessment for A, used at m3.
✗= impossible moments of
assessment for A, used at m3.
Conditions (b)–(c) of Definition 3.5.1 attributes toma a non-redundant
semantical role. (b) says that A is RE-true as used at mu and assessed at
ma iff is BO-true at mu/h, for any history h passing through the moment of
assessment ma. Analogously, (c) says that A is RE-false as used at mu and
assessed at ma iff is BO-false at mu /h, for any history h passing through the
35I said “in general” because there are trees which falsify the conditional from m < m′
to {h : m ∈ h} $ {h : m′ ∈ h}. Suppose, indeed, that m < m′ , but there is no m′′ s.t. m < m′′,
m′ % m′′ and m′′ ≮ m′. Then the set of histories passing through m must be the same as
that of the histories passing throughm′, and thus {h :m ∈ h} $ {h :m′ ∈ h} tourns out to be
false.
36Here is the proof.
Fact 8. If m $m′, then {h :m′ ∈ h} ⊆ {h :m ∈ h}
Proof. Assume that m $ m′ but {h : m′ ∈ h} $ {h : m ∈ h}. By {h : m′ ∈ h} $ {h : m ∈ h}, there
must be a history h1 s.t. m
′ ∈ h1 and m # h1. By m $ m
′, either m < m′ or m = m′. If the
latter, by m′ ∈ h1 it follows that m ∈ h1, and thus one has the contradiction that m ∈ h1
andm # h1. Ifm $m
′, the pairing axiom and the union axiom guarantee that there is a set
g s.t. g = h1∪ {m}. Therefore, m ∈ g and h1 ⊆ g . Recall that h1 is linearly ordered by <. But
given that m′ ∈ h1, m ∈ g , and m < m
′, then g must be linearly ordered by < as well. Since
h1 is a <-maximal chain, h1 = g . Thus, m ∈ h1 and m # h1. By reductio, Fact 8 follows.
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moment of assessment ma. Thus, we can rewrite (b) and (c) as follows (as
usual, “#RE” and “!RE” denote RE-truth and RE-falsity, respectively).
(RE1) mu ,ma #RE A⇔∀h(ma ∈ h⇒mu/h #BO A)
(RE2) mu ,ma !RE A⇔∀h(ma ∈ h⇒mu/h !BO A)
A remarkable feature of (RE1)-(RE2) is that the moment of use, as in the
supervaluationism semantics, initialises the time at which evaluate a given
sentenceA, though the history variable in the truth conditions ofA ranges
over a domain individuated by the moment of assessment, ma. And given
that, in general, ma is either identical or later than mu , it may well happen
that the histories passing through ma are less than those passing through
mu .
Notice, however, that RE-truth (RE-falsity) is relative not just to a mo-
ment (of use), but to couples of a moment of use and a moment of assess-
ment. This trait may give raise to a qualm, according to which relativism
cannot adequately answer the Aristotelian question (Q1). Indeed, question
(Q1) asks for a definition of truth that is relative to a unique parameter
only, i.e it asks to define a notion of truth which is relative to a moment of
use only. In my view, this qualm can be easily overcome, for (RE1)-(RE2)
can be used to define a notion of truth at a context of use. Such a context,
in turn, is formed by a moment and a set of histories.37
Definition 3.5.2. (Relativistic context) A relativistic context of use, cRE , is a
couple (mcRE ,HcRE ), where
(a) mcRE is the moment at which a statement A may be uttered, and
(b) HcRE is a set of histories such that HcRE ⊆ {h :mcRE ∈ h}.
If mcRE is a usual moment of use, HcRE represents the set of histories
at which one assesses a statement uttered at mcRE . Definition 3.5.2 entails
that, given a subset H of the histories passing through m1, any couple of
the form (m1,H) is a context for an utterance ofA atm1. As a consequence,
37Recall that MacFarlane agrees with Thomason’s thesis, according to which, in an in-
deterministic setting, actuality can only be a relational notion. And thus relativism, if
it has to be consistent with indeterminism, does not have to privilege a unique, actual
history. As a result, MacFarlane elaborates the following criterion for contexts.
Nondetermination Thesis. In frameworks with branching worlds, a con-
text of use does not, in general, determine a unique “world of the context of
use,” but at most a class of worlds that overlap at the context. (MacFarlane
2014: 208)
It is easy to see that Definition 3.5.2 satisfies the non-determination thesis, for a relativis-
tic context specifies a set possible histories, overlapping at the moment of use.
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it is compatible with the idea that the very same utterance can have many
contexts of use.38 And it is easy to check that the following clauses for a
relativistic notion of truth at a context are equivalent with (RE1)-(RE2).
(RE1’) cRE #RE A⇔∀h(h ∈HcRE ⇒mcRE /h !BO A)
(RE2’) cRE !RE A⇔∀h(h ∈HcRE ⇒mcRE /h !BO A)
Clauses (RE1’)-(RE2’) show that relativism can consistently yield a notion
of truth (falsity) at a context of use, and that notion is perfectly adequate
to answer the Aristotelian question (Q1) (“Are we to drop contingency,
bivalence (relative to a context of use), or neither?”). But before we go on
and explore some of the properties relativism has, let us use MacFarlane’s
notation, and speak of relative truth at a moment of use and a moment of
assessment.
As noticed above, relativism is meant to improve supervaluationism.
The relativistic semantics is designed to account for the (alleged) linguistic
data described in (2), which is not capture by supervaluationism. Let’s see
how this can be done.
h2h1
Monday
m1
m3: Sunny
Tuesday
m2: Rainy
Given the picture above, if one takes m1 as a monent of use and as a mo-
ment of assessment for “Tomorrow it will be sunny”, then this sentence is
RE-true (RE-false) just in case it is BO-true (BO-false) at any history pass-
ing through m1. And since it is a future contingent as used and assessed
at m1, it is neither RE-true nor RE-false at that point. More generally, it
is easy to see that whenever mu = ma, the relativist semantics boils down
down to supervaluationism.
Accordingly, relativism inherits many of the features of supervalua-
tionism, such as
• the acceptance of premises (Pa)-(Pb) of the Aristotelian argument,
38See Bonomi & Del Prete (2008) and Del Prete (2010).
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• the rejection of bivalence,
• the rejection of the Master argument, given that the principle of ret-
rogradation P(n)A→ !P(n)A is not RE-valid,
• the validation of the future excluded middle, F(n)A∨ F(n)¬A,
• the rejection of truth-functionality for logical connectives,
• the equivalence between F(n)¬A and ¬F(n)A,
• relativism, as well as supervaluationism, does account for (1): present
assertions concerning the future can be shown to be inaccurate by a
proof of present unsettledness. Therefore they should be retracted at
the moments of their utterance.
But look at the picture above once again, and suppose that “Tomorrow
it will be sunny”, used on Monday (m1), is assessed from the sunny ver-
sion of Tuesday (m3). Given that “Tomorrow it will be sunny”, used on
Monday (m1), is BO-true at any history passing through the sunny ver-
sion of Tuesday (m3), then “Tomorrow it will be sunny”, used on Monday
(m1), is RE-true as assessed at m3. The retraction rule, therefore, cannot be
used to infer that who asserted “Tomorrow it will be sunny” on Monday
should retract her speech act at m3, for that speech act is accurate as as-
sessed from m3. Contrary to supervaluationism, relativism vindicates (2):
past claims concerning the present cannot be shown to have been inac-
curate by a proof of past unsettledness. In MacFarlane’s view, this latter
feature would make relativism the adequate semantics for future contin-
gents. Relativism accounts for (2), and thus it would fix the unique flaw
affecting supervaluationism.
But is it true that the only flaw of supervaluationism has to do with
(2)? And is the fix proposed by MacFarlane really needed?
3.5.1 Against Relativism
Objection 1. Relative truth – which is not diquotational – should be express-
ible within the object language.
According to MacFarlane, semantical truth may not be mirrored at the
object language level. The role played by a object language truth opera-
tor is to mimic how we ordinarily use the word “true”, while semantical
truth must provide a distribution of truth values which fits linguistic data
taken from ordinary discourse. Under this view, the disquotational prop-
erties of truth only involve the way in which we ordinarily use the word
“true”, whose behaviour may differ from that of the metalinguistic notion
of semantical truth.
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[...] whichever view we take, the context-relativized truth pred-
icate used in semantics is a technical term, which gets its mean-
ing in part from an account of its pragmatic relevance (for ex-
ample, in Lewis’s theory, the view that speakers at c try to as-
sert what is true at c, and trust others to be doing so). It is not
the ordinary truth predicate used in everyday talk—a monadic
predicate that applies to propositions, and is governed by the
Equivalence Schema. The proposition that Φ is true iff Φ.
The relativist (or nonindexical contextualist) can treat themonadic
predicate “true” as just another predicate of the object lan-
guage—the language for which she is giving a semantics. (Mac-
Farlane 2014: 93)
This explains why MacFarlane holds that V is the only truth operator that
both supervaluationists and relativists should contemplate in their object
languages. Thus, both supervaluationism and relativism can fail to have
an object language device that explicitly expresses semantical truth. This
failure, as far as it does not preclude to account for ordinary talk, cannot
be considered a bug.
I’ll try to argue that, if (1) is correct, one should have an operator that
explicitly expresses semantical truth. And given that MacFarlane consid-
ers (1) as correct, his object language should have a device which explic-
itly mirrors relative truth. If so, MacFarlane’s relativism cannot restore the
disquotational properties of truth.
Statement (1) says that present assertions concerning the future can be
shown to be inaccurate by a proof of present unsettledness. Thus, there
must be some kind of disagreement between who asserts a future contin-
gent and someone who proves that the future is unsettled. Accordingly,
the following dialogue should sound natural to whoever believes in (1).
Alice: Tomorrow I will take the train.
Bob: You’re wrong, but it might be that you’ll take it.
Intuitively, Bob uses “wrong” to signal that Alice has said something un-
true. If one follows MacFarlane’s advice, and use only V as our object lan-
guage truth operator, Bob’s answer would be something like
(5) ¬V(F(1)p)∧$F(1)p.
Statement (5) cannot be RE-true when F(1)p is a future contingent at mu ,
and ma =mu . But this seems strange. In MacFarlane’s view, if Alice’s state-
ment is a future contingent, Bob’s reply – formalised as (5) – should be
RE-true as assessed at its moment of use.
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A relativist who wants to adequately formalise Bob’s objection should
first equip her objet language with a truth operator that expresses relative
truth. This can be done by following a proposal due to Cobreros (2016).
(6) m/h #BO TREA⇔∀h
′(ma ∈ h
′ ⇒m/h′ #BO A).
The TRE operator expresses relative truth, and clause (6) says that TREA is
BO-true at a pointm/h just in caseA is BO-true atm, at any history passing
trough the moment of assessment ma. Notice that when one tries to eval-
uate a statement of the form TREA by (RE1)-(RE2), the moment at which
one has to evaluate A may be initialised by the moment of use. Neverthe-
less, it can also be a different one if TREA is embedded by a tense operator.
In each case, however, the set of histories at which A must be evaluated
remain fixed by the moment of assessment. This trait is meant to reflect
the semantical role that moments of assessment have within relativism:
they isolate the relevant set of histories at which one has to look at for the
evaluation.
With clause (6) at hand, Bob’s answer may be formalised as
(7) ¬TRE(F(1)p)∧$F(1)p,
which is RE-true when used and assessed at mu , and F(1)p is a future con-
tingent at mu . And this, in turn, is a desired result for a relativist, for it
perfectly reflects what one may want to say once that (1) is accepted.
But TRE has a non-disquotational nature. Indeed, when mu = ma, the
TRE operator expresses super-truth at mu , and a conditional as A→ TSUA
is not SU-valid. Therefore, there are couples (mu ,ma) at which A→ TREA
is not RE-true. Thus, if a relativist finds (1) perfectly natural, she should
be able to evaluate Bob’s answer Alice in a way that is consistent with (1)
itself. But then she has to express RE-truth within her object language.
This, in turn, entails that a relativist cannot subscribe to a disquotational
notion of truth.
Some advantages of Relativism. Having been true, having been inevitable
and retrospective truth judgments.
It is fair to say that the relativist truth operator fares better than the
supervaluationist. To see why, assume the following notion of relativist
logical consequence, based on RE-truth preservation.39
39The notion of logical consequence of Definition 3.5.3 is the so-called absolute logical
consequence presented in MacFarlane (2014: 69). It differs from the so-called diagonal
logical consequence – see MacFarlane (2014: 70) – which boils down to the global logical
consequence defined for supervaluationism.
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Definition 3.5.3. (Relativist logical consequence) Given two sets of wffs Γ,∆
of LT ∪ {TRE}, ∆ is a relativist logical consequence of Γ (in symbols. Γ ⊢RE ∆)
just in case, for any MRE and any couples (mu ,ma) in it, if mu ,ma #RE A for
any A ∈ Γ, then there is a B ∈ ∆ such that mu ,ma #RE B.
The relativist logical consequence, as the global logical consequence,
invalidates Contraposition, the Deduction theorem, Conditional proof, Ar-
gument by cases and Reductio ad absurdum.
However, it is easy to check that Definition 3.5.3, along with TRE , en-
ables to distinguish having-been-true statements form having-been-necessary
sentences. Indeed,
(8) P(n)TREF(m)A ⊢RE P(n)!F(m)A
is not sound. If P(n)TREF(m)A is RE-true at (mu ,mu), but F(m)A is a future
contingent at n time units in the past ofmu , then P(n)!F(m)A is RE-false at
(mu ,mu). When one asserts that it was true that a thing would come about,
truth is relative to events up to the moment of assessment. If something
in the past was inevitable, it was settled relative to any history passing
through a moment that may be in the past of that of assessment. It follows
that what has been true does not collapse over what was inevitable.
Analogously, a relativist can easily capture the phenomenon of retro-
spective truth judgments, given that
(9) A ⊢RE P(n)TREF(n)A
is a sound pattern. If A is settled relative to any h passing through the
moment of assessment ma, then, in the past of the moment of use of A, it
was true to say that any h ∋ma would have featured A.
Objection 2. Intensions and the plain future.
Relativismmay appear to have a further advantage over both Peirceanism
and supervaluationism. Prima facie, relativism yields two notions of in-
tension which seems to be compatible with our natural understanding of
tensed sentences. To see why, let us define both temporalist and eternalist
intensions in a relativistic fashion. As a notational remark, “hma” refers a
history passing through the moment of assessment ma.
Definition 3.5.4. (Temporalist propositions and temporalist intensions.)
[A]T(mu ,ma)
is the temporalist proposition expressed by A as used at mu and as-
sessed from ma. The intension of [A]
T
(mu ,ma)
is the function ∥A∥T from moment-
history pairs mu/hma to truth values {1,0, i}, such that
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• ∥A∥T (mu/hma) = 1⇔mu ,ma #RE A
• ∥A∥T (mu/hma) = 0⇔mu ,ma !RE A
• ∥A∥T (mu/hma) = i ⇔ neither mu ,ma #RE A, nor mu ,ma !RE A
Definition 3.5.5. (Eternalist propositions and eternalist intensions.) [A]E(mu ,ma)
is the eternalist proposition expressed by A as used at mu and assessed at ma.
The intension of [A]E(mu ,ma)
is the function ∥A∥E from histories hma to truth
values {1,0, i}, such that
• ∥A∥E(hma) = 1⇔mu ,ma #RE A
• ∥A∥E(hma) = 0⇔mu ,ma !RE A
• ∥A∥E(hma) = i ⇔ neither mu ,ma #RE A, nor mu ,ma !RE A
Given Definition 3.5.4 and 3.5.5, relativism can easily vindicate the
following reasoning.
a. A yesterday’s utterance of “Tomorrow it will be sunny”, as assessed
today, means the same thing as a today’s utterance of “Today is sunny”,
as assessed today.
b. If A, as used at mu and assessed from ma, means the same thing as
B, used at m′u and assessed from ma, A at (mu ,ma) and B at (m
′
u ,ma)
have the same intension.
∴ “Tomorrow it will be sunny”, as uttered yesterday but assessed from
today, has the same intension of “Today is sunny”, as uttered and
assessed today.
Relativism is perfectly compatible with the conclusion just given. Suppose
that days are expressed in time units, and formalise “Tomorrow it will be
sunny” as F(1)p (p, obviously, means “Today it is sunny”). Now, suppose
that today we are located atm2, which is the moment we assume to be that
of assessment. If F(1)p was used yesterday, it was used at a moment m1
s.t. m1 < m2, where dT (m1,m2) = 1. By (RE1)-(RE2) and Definition 3.5.4,
∥F(1)p∥T (m1/hm2) = 1 just in case ∀h(h ∋m2 ⇒m2/h #BO p). In turn, ∀h(h ∋
m2 ⇒m2/h #BO p) iff ∥p∥T (m2,hm2) = 1. Thus,
∥p∥E(hm2) = 1⇔ ∥F(1)p∥E(hm2) = 1.
40
It is easy to see that an analogous reasoning shows that:
∥p∥E(hm2) = 0⇔ ∥F(1)p∥E(hm2) = 0,
∥p∥E(hm2) = i ⇔ ∥F(1)p∥E(hm2) = i.
40Notice that an analogous conclusion follows for the temporalist view.
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The value of the (eternalist) intension of “Tomorrow it will be sunny”, as
used yesterday and assessed today, is the same of the (eternalist) intension
of “Today is sunny”, used and assessed today. Therefore, relativism, un-
like supervaluationism and Peirceanism, seems to be compatible with an
eternalist understanding of what is said by tensed statement.
However, it is worth to notice that premise a says that a yesterday’s ut-
terance of “Tomorrow it will be sunny” means the same as a today’s utter-
ance of “Today it is sunny” when both utterances are assessed at the same
moment (namely, today). And it is immediate to notice that, if both utter-
ances are assessed at their respective moments of use, relativism yields the
same results of supervaluationism. Hence, an eternalist relativist cannot
subscribe to the validity of the following principle.
a’. A yesterday’s utterance of “Tomorrow it will be sunny”, as assessed
yesterday, means the same thing as a today’s utterance of “Today it
is sunny”, as assessed today.
But this seems strange. Relativism is compatible with the view that
a yesterday’s utterance of “Tomorrow it will be sunny” means the same
thing as a today’s utterance of “Today it is sunny” when both utterances
are assessed today. But relativism also entails that, if one sticks to the eter-
nalist view, then a yesterday’s utterance of “Tomorrow it will be sunny”
may fail to mean the same thing as a today’s utterance of “Today it is
sunny”, when both utterances are assessed at their moments of use, re-
spectively. I take it as a bad result.
A relativist can insist that the intension of a future tensed statement
does not depend on the moment of use only, for it is sensible to the mo-
ment of assessment as well. Therefore, there is no surprise that a principle
such as a′ fails within a relativistic framework. Under this view, reject-
ing relativism because the very same utterance can express different inten-
sions at different moments of assessment is to beg the question against
relativism.
Maybe. But the rejection of a′ – which an eternalist relativist is forces
to subscribe to – helps to highlight a more general problem. “Tomorrow
it will be sunny”, as uttered and assessed yesterday, expresses that yes-
terday’s future was inevitably sunny. And this strong modal reading of a
future tensed sentence signals that, whenever the moment of use is the
moment of assessment, the plain future collapses over what inevitably
will come about. In my view, this result is wrong, and it is wrong inde-
pendently of whether utterances’ intensions are allowed to vary relative
to moments of assessment. Again, if “Tomorrow it will be rainy” and “In-
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evitably, tomorrow it will be rainy” are uttered at the same moment, they
mean different things.
Objection 3. Retractions and the rationality of relativism.
In my view, MacFarlane is right in subscribing to (2).
(2) Past claims concerning the present cannot be shown to have been
inaccurate by a proof of past unsettledness. Hence, a proof of past
unsettledness is not sufficient to compel to retract future contingents
uttered in the past.
I also perfectly agree with his explanation about why (2) is a reasonable
thing to believe. If yesterday I uttered that tomorrow it would be sunny,
and if someone offers me a proof of past unsettledness, I can ask:
[w]ould such a proof compel me to withdraw my assertion?
Hardly. If I had asserted that it was settled that it would be
sunny today, I would have to stand corrected. But I did not
assert that. I just said that it would be sunny—and it is. My
prediction was true, as we can demonstrate simply by looking
outside. (MacFarlane 2008: 89)
Principle (2) holds because yesterday, when I asserted that the next day
it would be sunny, I didn’t meant that it was settled that next day’s weather
would have been sunny (and, therefore, not contingent). This explains why
a present proof that yesterday’s future was unsettled does not contradict
what I have said back then. But this explanation, in my view, is sufficient
to reject (1),
(1) Present assertions concerning the future can be shown to be inaccu-
rate by a proof of present unsettledness. Thus, present utterance of
future contingents should be retracted.
If my yesterday’s utterance of “Tomorrow it will be sunny” didn’t mean
that the next day the weather would have been inevitably sunny, why a
yesterday’s proof of yesterday’s unsettledness should have been sufficient
to compel me retract what I have predicted? Intuitively, that proof would
be incompatible with the content of my assertion only if I had predicted
that some future contingent event was inevitably going to happen. As al-
ready said, if plain future does not collapse over what inevitably is going
to happen, then a yesterday’s utterance of a future contingent does not ex-
press future inevitability. Again, “It will be the case that A” simply does
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not mean that, inevitably, it will be the case that A. This difference, fur-
thermore, is independent of where I place the moment at which assess an
utterance of a tensed sentences. Accordingly, a proof of present unsettled-
ness cannot be sufficient to show that present assertions of future contin-
gents are untrue. And it cannot be sufficient to compel to retract present
assertions of future contingents.
Sure, a proof of present unsettledness may be epistemically significant.
For instance, it may highlight that one cannot know how the future would
be. Thus, a proof of the present unsettledness may show that one may lack
a justification for asserting either that F(n)A or that F(n)¬A. But unless one
adopts an epistemic notion of truth, lack of justification does not entail
untruth. And if (2) holds, then a proof of past unsettledness is irrelevant
for the truth of yesterday’s prediction concerning the present. And this,
in turn, suggests that yesterdays’ lack of justification does not entail any-
thing about the truth status of a future contingent uttered yesterday. And
if retractions should only involve utterances of untrue contents, a proof of
the present unsettledness does not entail that one should retract present
utterances of future contingents.
Recall that MacFarlane presents a motivation for a transition from su-
pervaluationism to relativism. Supervaluationism can only account for (1),
but relativism meets both (1) and (2). Thus, one should tweak supervalu-
ationism in order to obtain the relativistic semantics. As I tried to argue,
what MacFarlane takes to be a reason to tweak supervaluationism is in-
deed a motivation to reject both supervaluationism and relativism. This
because (2), which is a sensible principle, suggests to deny (1). And given
that supervaluationism, as well as relativism, meet (1), both of them seems
to be inadequate.
There is a sense, however, in which relativism is even more inade-
quate that supervaluationism in accounting for retractions. Suppose that
on Monday I said that tomorrow it will be sunny, but assume that it is
possible that Tuesday it will be rainy. According to supervaluationism, I
should retract my assertion made on Monday because it is untrue. And,
in general, if yesterday (i.e., on Monday) I predicted something untrue,
and today (i.e., on Tuesday) I didn’t retracted it yet, I should withdraw my
past assertion. And this, in general, seems a reasonable thing to do. What
I tried to argue against supervaluationism, among other things, is that fu-
ture contingents cannot be taken to be untrue – and therefore, that they
should not be retracted – just because they are contingent.
But relativism seems to entail something even more controversial. Ac-
cording to relativism, if it turns out that Tuesday it is sunny, on Tuesday
I am not obliged to retract a yesterday’s utterance of “Tomorrow it will
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be sunny”, even if I should have retracted it on Monday. Thus, for a rela-
tivist is perfectly reasonable to hold that yesterday I should have retracted
something that today I am not obliged to withdraw anymore.
Moreover, let us focus on a norm that, according to MacFarlane, regu-
lates assertions.
Reflexive Truth Rule. An agent is permitted to assert thatA at mu only if
mu ,mu #RE A.
41
Now, by (RE1)-(RE2) a future contingent is RE-untrue when assessed at its
moment of use and, by the Reflexive Truth Rule, one is never permitted
to assert a future contingent. This consequence is quite weird, for compe-
tent speakers would be responsible of a massive infraction of the Reflexive
Truth Rule. Competent speakers, indeed, assert future contingents all the
time.42
And since a future contingent can turn out to be RE-true when assessed
at a moment later than that of its use, the Retraction Rule cannot be used
to entail that one is required to retract what predicted at that moment (of
assessment). Thus, relativism is compatible with the idea that I can keep
myself from retracting a past assertion that I shouldn’t have made. There is
room to think that these kinds of permissions and obligations are far from
being fully rational.43
3.5.2 Assessing Relativism.
MacFarlane agrees with Thomason’s analysis of actuality, according to which
actuality itself can only be a relational property. However, MacFarlane
wants to modify supervaluationism in order to account for two alleged
linguistic data, (1)-(2). In doing that, MacFarlane elaborates a semantics
which allows to answer (Q1)-(Q2) as follows:
✓ RE refutes the Aristotelian argument and provides a non-bivalent
notion of truth at a moment, and
✓ RE refutes the Master argument by rejecting the principle of the ne-
cessity of the past, PNP .
Relativism is advantaged over the Peircean semantics, for
41See MacFarlane (2014: 103), notation slightly changed.
42Notice that, once that the Reflexive Truth Rule is assumed, supervaluationism and
Peirceanism suffer of the same assertion problem.
43For a similar view about the rationality of relativism, see García-Carpintero (2013)
and Moruzzi (2008).
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✓ RE validates the future excluded middle.
✓ RE does not introduce a semantic distinction between F(n)¬A and
¬F(n)A.
Furthermore, contrary to supervaluationism,
✓ RE does account for retrospective truth judgments.
But relativism shares with supervaluationism several flaws. For instance,
many classical inferential rules are not relativistically sound. Moreover,
✗ Relative truth is not disquotational, #RE A→ TREA.
✗ Anytime that a prediction is assessed at its moment of use, RE equates
“will” with “inevitably will”..
It may be debatable whether relativism is compatible with an eternalist
view about propositions. But apart from that, several qualms about the
rationality of relativism still remain. Indeed
✗ RE accounts for (1), which I take to be a wrong principle,
✗ RE is consistent with the claim that yesterday I should have retracted
something that today I am not obliged to withdraw anymore,
✗ RE entails that one is never permitted to assert a future contingent,
✗ RE is consistent with the claim that I can keepmyself from retracting
a past assertion that I shouldn’t have performed.
Thus, even relativism has several, significant flaws. To sum up, the re-
visionist strategy seems to be at odds with several, natural requirements
one may adopt in interpreting a tensed language.
According to the view that will explored in the next chapter, the flaws
affecting the revisionist approach suggest that, given a branching concep-
tion of reality, truth must be relative to the historical parameter.
Chapter 4
The conservative strategy and
actuality
As we have seen in the previous sections, the BO-semantics does not allow
us to provide an adequate answer for the Aristotelian question:
(Q1) Are we to drop indeterminism, bivalence, or neither?
The reason of this failure should be familiar by now: (Q1) presupposes
a notion of bivalence in which truth is relative to moments only. In the
BO-semantics, however, truth is relative to moment-history pairs.
As we have seen, in the revisionary strategy, this discrepancy is con-
ceived as a flaw of the BO-semantics. A revisionary philosopher, in turn,
can take two different routes. On the one hand, the advocates of Peirceanism
define a notion of truth at a moment which allows them to answer (Q1) by
conserving both contingency and bivalence. On the other hand, a revision-
ary philosopher may adopt supervaluationism, or relativism, and define a
notion of truth at a moment (or, in the case of relativism, truth at a rela-
tivist context) that allows him to answer (Q1) by conserving indetermin-
ism but rejecting bivalence.
The revisionary strategy, nevertheless, is not the only reaction one may
have to the discrepancy between the BO-semantics and the Aristotelian
question. Revisionists charge the BO-semantics of being somehow inade-
quate, and its inadequacy explains why BO cannot yield an answer (Q1).
Nonetheless, one may go the other way round, and claim that there’s noth-
ing wrong with BO, for the Aristotelian question itself is misleading. In-
deed, it is natural to take the three alternatives that (Q1) evokes (viz. (i)
dropping contingency, (ii) rejecting bivalence, (iii) neither of the two) as
jointly exhaustive. But they need not be such.
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The conservative strategy says that, if we accept indeterminism, and
adopt a branching conception of reality, we should take truth (and bi-
valence) as relative to moment-history pairs. The Aristotelian question
(Q1) presupposes that truth (falsity) is relative to moments only. But such
presupposition is at odds with branching indeterminism, properly under-
stood. Or at least, this is so according to the view we explore in the next
section.
4.1 Belnap’s viewpoint
One of the most influential branching theorists is Nuel Belnap. According
to his view, the conservative strategy is perfectly right.
[T]he indispensable idea from Prior-Thomason is that truth shall
be relativized to moment-history pairs, where the moment be-
longs to the history. So, in addition to the immobile tree struc-
ture itself, there are two newmobile parameters to which truth
(as well as denotation, etc.) is relativized: the moment of evalu-
ation, and the history of evaluation. [...] The most difficult part
of this Prior-Thomason idea, the part that goes beyond linear
tense logic, is negative in character:
Given indeterminism, it does not suffice to think of truth (or
denotation, etc.) as relative only to moments. (Belnap et al.
2001: 224-225)
As we have seen, Peirceanism defines a notion of truth at a moment
by quantifying over the histories passing through the moment of evalua-
tion of future tensed statements.1 Supervaluationism, on the other hand,
defines a notion of truth at a moment by quantifying over the histories
passing through the moment of use of an arbitrary statement. And when
the moment of assessment is identical with the moment of use, relativism
boils down to supervaluationism.
Belnap resolutely rejects Peirceanism, for it cannot make sense
of someone who purports to assert that the coin will land heads
even though it might not, that is, who sincerely asserts both
that Will:A and that Poss:¬Will:A. (Belnap et al. 2001: 159)
The reason is that, under the Peircean semantics, any statement of the form
1Again, recall that PE predicts that the set of histories passing through the moment of
evaluation may differ from those passing through the moment of use.
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(1) Fp(n)A∧ fp(n)¬A
is false at any moment.
Belnap seems to suggest that there is a motivation to reject supervalua-
tionism (and hence, relativism) too. It has to do with plain-will statements
of the form “It will be the case that A”. In Belnap’s view, the truth value of
“It will be the case that A” cannot be only relative to the moment of use,
and
[o]ne must relativize truth to the history parameter as well. The
reason is that only thus can we make sense, in branching time,
out of plain (linear) future-tense sentences such as
(2) There will be a sea battle tomorrow.
Think of (2) as uttered before the admirals have made their
decisions. Then the truth of that sentence (given indetermin-
ism) depends not only on the moment at which the sentence
is uttered. It depends in addition on which future course of
events—which history—is being considered. [...] To put themat-
ter in easily understood words: Given indeterminism, what will
happen (for example, whether or not there will be a sea battle
tomorrow) depends on what will happen (i.e., on which history
is being considered). (Belnap et al. 2001: 225)
If the truth of “there will be a sea battle tomorrow” is sensitive to the his-
torical parameter, it cannot only depend on the moment of use. Hence, it
seems that Peirceanism, supervaluationism and relativism are essentially
misguided.
These considerations lead Belnap to adopt the following principle:
Openess by constancy: The truth-values of future contingents are not con-
stant as the history of evaluation varies. (Belnap & Green 1994: 377)
To sum up, Belnap rejects the revisionary strategy. Peirceanism is wrong,
for it entails that F(n)A∧$¬F(n)A is always false. Supervaluationism (and
hence, relativism) does not account for plain future-tense sentences such
as “It will be the case that A”. According to Belnap, such sentences should
be always assessed at moment-history pairs. Furthermore, Belnap endorses
the Openess by constancy principle, which suggests that the relativisation
of truth to moment-history pairs is the best we can get in an indetermin-
istic context.
However, Belnap’s approach shares with revisionism several assump-
tions. In his view, contexts of use should satisfy the following property.
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Openness by the context of use: The context in which a future contingent is
uttered cannot supply a privileged history for its evaluation. (Belnap
& Green 1994: 377)
In turn, a context cannot provide a privileged, actual history, for there is
no such a thing as the actual history. And the rejection of the existence
of a unique, privileged course of event is justified by the adoption of the
Relational actuality principle developed by Lewis and Thomason.
As Lewis (1970) has argued, this world’s being the actual world
does not favor it over any others, but is just a reflection of the
fact that this is the world at which we are conversing. Thinking
now about Our World, suppose we have arrived at an indeter-
ministic moment m. To suppose that there is one from among
the histories flowing out ofm that is the actual history is rather
like purporting to stand outside Lewis’ realm of concrete pos-
sibilia and pointing to the one that is actual. But this is wrong.
For a world to be actual is for it to be the world we inhabit. For a
history to be actual would be for it to be the history to which the
moment we inhabit belongs. (Belnap & Green 1994: 381)2
This quotation is pretty important. Indeed, it clearly establish that Belnap
endorses the relational actuality we encountered above.
Moment-History Actuality @1(h,m)⇔ h is the history h
′ such that (m ∈ h′).
Belnap shares with Thomason the intuition that actuality can only be an
indexical, relative matter: “@1” is a relational term, and the truth (falsity)
of @1(m,h) depends on whether h happens to be the unique history pass-
ing through m. And, as we have seen before, theMoment-History Actuality,
along with the Definition 2.2.3 of objective branching indeterminism, are
incompatible with the commitment to a unique history that is ‘seen’ as ac-
tual from any moment. And given that, in general, a moment of use has
more than one history passing through it, a context of use cannot provide
the history of the moment it specifies. Be as it may, nothing in Belnap’s
view appears to be incompatible with the other relational readings of ac-
tuality that we encountered above.
Branch-Moment Actuality: @2(m,b)⇔∀m
′ ∈ b (m′ ≤m)
Moment-Moment Actuality: @3(m,m
′)⇔m′ ≤m
2Emphasis added.
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The Openness by the context of use principle, along with the Openess by
constancy principle, help to understand why Belnap’s view is incompat-
ible with Thomason’s (and MacFarlane’s) motivations to reform the BO-
semantics. One main motivation for supervaluationism is the following
assumption:
Second Interpretation: Moment-history pairs m/h can legitimately occur
within a definition of truth for LT only if h refers to the unique actual
history.
Now, the Openness by constancy principle says that the truth values of fu-
ture contingents are not constant as the history of evaluation varies. Thus,
it seems that moment-history pairs should be taken as legitimate candi-
date for a definition of truth for a tensed language. However, the Openess
by the context of use principle says that a context cannot yield any priv-
ileged history among those passing through the moment of the context.
And this principe is justified on the basis of the Moment-History Actuality
principle and Definition 2.2.3. They jointly entail that a unique actual his-
tory (viz. a history that is ‘seen’ as actual from any moment) cannot exist.
Hence, moment-history pairs m/h can legitimately occur within a defini-
tion of truth for LT , even if there is no absolute, actual history. Therefore,
the Second Interpretation principle, according to Belnap, must be assessed
as false.
Even if Belnap’s conservative strategy rejects one principle that moti-
vates supervaluationism, it has to face a difficult task. This task has to do
with the elaboration of a notion of truth-at-a-context which is compati-
ble with both Openness by the context of use and the Openness by constancy
principle, but which does not collapse over supervaluationism.
4.2 Belanp’s view and Supervaluationism
Recall two principles of Belnap’s view, that is
Openness by the context of use: The context in which a future contingent is
uttered cannot supply a privileged history for its evaluation.
Openness by constancy: The truth-values of future contingents are not con-
stant as the history of evaluation varies.
In his mind, these two principles should allow to draw an analogy between
future contingents and open formulas. Belnap takes contexts of use to be
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moments.3 Now, let us see how Belnap defines the truth conditions for
future tensed statements and quantified sentences, as evaluated at a point
initialised by a context of use.
Quantifiers. mc ,g,m/h # ∀xiA iff mc,g1,m/h # A for every as-
signment g1 that does not differ from g except perhaps at the
variable xi .
Tense connectives. mc,g,m/h # PA iff there is a moment m1 in
the past of m such that mc ,g,m1/h # A. Also mc,g,m/h # FA iff
there is a moment m1 in the future of m along history h such
that mc ,g,m1/h # A. (Tenses never move off h.) (Belnap et al.
2001: 152)
The clauses in Quantifiers and in Tense connectives are metalinguis-
tic conditions of truth-at-a-context-at-a-point (truth-at-an-index for short).
Given the standard treatment of quantifiers, an open formula such as “x1
is brindle” is open relative to the assignment parameter: indeed, there are
points (as, say, mc,g1,m/h) where it comes out true (assuming g1(x1) is in-
deed brindle), but others points (such as mc ,g2,m/h) where it comes out
untrue (assuming g2(x1) is not brindle).
4 Analogously, if A is a future con-
tingent at mc, there are points (as, say, mc,g,mc/h1) where it comes out
true, but other points (such as mc ,g,mc/h2) where it comes out untrue.
According to Belnap, the analogy between future contingents and open
formulas has significant consequences for the evaluation of predictions
relative to a context. Consider the following, metalinguistic sentences, and
assume that “F(The coin lands tails)” is a future contingent at mc:
(2) mc # x1 is brindle
(3) mc # F(The coin lands tails)
Belnap et al. (2001) claim that both (2) and (3) have no meaning, for both
“x1 is brindle” and “F (The coin lands tails)” can only be evaluated if a fur-
ther parameter, which is not settled by the context, is specified (an assign-
ment and a history, respectively). Thus, open formulas, as well as future
contingents, have no truth value in their contexts of use. As Belnap and
Green put it,
3Clearly, one may enrich contexts with parameters that may be useful to interpret
indexical expression or non-historical modalities. However, as far as LT is concerned,
Belnap’s notion of a context of use coincides with a moment of use only.
4Recall the definition of open sentences: a sentence, A, considered as stand-alone,
is open in a parameter, Z , iff A’s evaluation depends on Z , and Z is not initialized by
context.
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In the absence of a specific convention, there is no sense to say-
ing that an open stand-alone sentence has a truth value inde-
pendently of the evaluation parameter with respect to which it
is open. If a sentence is neither closed by context nor closed by
constancy, it has no truth value save relative to the parameter
in question. (Belnap & Green 1994: 377)
Notice that (2)-(3) use a notion of truth-at-a-context, while Quantifiers
and Tense connectives use the notion of truth-at-an-index. Given a Ka-
planian, Lewisian framework, it is usual to define truth-at-a-context as a
function of truth-at-an-index. Belnap et al. (2001) do not provide such a
definition. However, Belnap himself seems to recognise the need of defin-
ing truth-at-a-context in terms of truth-at-an-index.5
‘Occamist’ semantics, also mentioned by (Prior 1967: 121-127),
employs an auxiliary history parameter, the ‘history of evalu-
ation’, and takes truth to be relative to a triple (mc ,m,h) (mo-
ment of utterance, moment of evaluation, and history of evalu-
ation), where h must contain m; [...] Being auxiliary, the history
of evaluation parameter must eventually be canceled. (Belnap &
Müller 2010: 690)6
Thus one may wonder how the auxiliary history may be cancelled, and
what kind of connection between the notions of truth-at-a-context and
truth-at-an-index best fits what Belnap wants to say.
Future contingents lack truth values at contexts because (a) their truth-
at-an-index is function of the historical parameter, but (b) contexts do not
initialise the historical parameter. A uniform semantical treatment, how-
ever, requires that any sentence whose truth-at-an-index is function of the
historical parameter has to lack truth values at contexts. But the semantic
value that any sentence takes at an index such as mc ,g,m/h is function of
the historical parameter. Thus, a uniform semantical treatment requires
that any sentence lacks truth value at a context. This conclusion, however,
is absurd.
Belnap et al. (2001: 225) do not face this difficulty directly, but they
highlight a way to overcome it. Quantified statements, as well as sentences
5Belnap & Müller (2010: 694) adopts a semantical notion of truth-at-a-context which
boils down to relativism. However, I take this choice to be incompatible with several re-
marks of Belnap et al. (2001), according to which truth (and plausibly, truth-at-a-context)
should be relativised to the historical parameter. Moreover, relativism clearly contradicts
the conservative approach.
6Emphasis added.
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about the present and the past, are “closed” in both the historical and the
assignment parameters. Their truth value at an index does not vary as the
history or the assignment varies. Thus, these kinds of statements should
turn out to be either true or false at a context.
“mc # Meg is hungry” makes sense since “Meg is hungry” is
closed in each of the mobile parameters. We could indeed de-
fine “truth” given model and context as follows: For every (or
some, or most, or your favourite) g and h, mc,g,mc/h # Meg is
hungry. (Belnap et al. 2001: 155)7
If one tries to generalise this suggestion, a quantification over assign-
ments and histories is needed. This quantification, in turn, allows to at-
tribute truth values to closed sentences at a context. But an existential
quantification won’t work.
(4) mc #A⇔∃g∃h(h ∋mc ⇒mc,g,mc/h #A)
According to (4), future contingents are true at their contexts of use, as
well as their negations.8 This is not only weird, but it is incompatible with
Belnap’s requirement, according to which future contingents should not
have a truth value at their moments of use. Assuming we do not want
to substitute the existential quantification in (4) with “most” or “your
favourite”, only a universal quantification can do the job:
(5) mc #A⇔∀g∀h(h ∋mc ⇒mc,g,mc/h #A)
mc !A⇔∀g∀h(h ∋mc ⇒mc,g,mc/h !A)
It is easy to see that (5) captures several things Belnap wants to say:
• only future contingents, along with some open formulas, lack truth
values at their contexts of use.
• the context of use does not provide any value for the historical pa-
rameter. Hence, the Openness by the context of use principle holds.
• Sentences about the present and the past, as well as quantified state-
ments, are either true or false at their contexts.
However, (5) entails that the truth-at-a-context of a future contingent is
not sensitive to the historical parameter. Indeed, (5) defines truth-at-a-
context by a universal quantification over the histories passing through
mc. Accordingly, the Openness by constancy principle does not hold at the
7Notation slightly changed.
8(4) is actually a form of subvaluationism, see Ciuni & Proietti (2013).
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truth-at-a-context level, but it holds at the truth-at-an-index level only.
Moreover, (5) boils down to supervaluationism.
These are bad results, for they undermine several reasons that lead
Belnap to adopt the conservative strategy. The conservative strategy (i)
requires a notion of truth that is relative to moment-history pairs, (ii) it
demands to distinguish plain predictions from predictions about what in-
evitably will be the case, and (iii) it calls for a semantics which makes
F(n)A∧$¬F(n)A satisfiable when F(n)A is a future contingent. Supervalua-
tionism, however, cannot account for (i)-(iii). Moreover, truth-at-a-context
is not sensitive to the historical parameter.
In my view, these results underline something relevant. If one wants to
adopt a uniform semantic machinery, which, as usual, defines truth-at-a-
context in terms of truth-at-an-index, one has to make a choice.
(i) Either one adds an historical parameter to the context and allows
the Openness by the constancy principle to hold also at the truth-at-a-
context level,
(ii) or one assumes the Openness by the context principle and (a) either
one evaluates any statement as neither true nor false at its context of
use, or (b) one adopts the supervaluationist semantics, which entails
that future contingents do not have truth values at their contexts of
use.
Option (ii.a) entails something absurd, viz. that any statement whatsoever
fails to have a truth value at a context. Option (ii.b) boils down to superval-
uationism, and thus it undermines the reasons for adopting conservation-
ism. In the next section, I’ll argue that a conservationist can easily make
sense of option (i).
4.3 Belnap’s view reformed
In my mind, we can retain the pros of Belnap’s conservative strategy by
dropping the following principle:
Openness by the context of use: The context in which a future contingent is
uttered cannot supply a privileged history for its evaluation.
Once that theOpenness by the context of use principle is rejected, one is free
to conceive a context of use as a tuple formed by a moment and a history,
mc/hc.
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One can suspect that this way of modelling contexts is in tension with
something that Belnap assumes, viz. the Moment-History Actuality princi-
ple. This latter principle, indeed, entails that, in general, there is nothing
as a unique actual history passing through a moment. But if one models
contexts as moment-history pairs, one seems to contravene to what the
Moment-History Actuality principle entails.
This tension can be dissolved by making a move that we have already
encountered in connection with the Definition 3.5.2 of a relativist context
of use. Recall that a relativistic context of use, cRE , is a couple of a moment
of use mcRE and a set of histories, HcRE . Since HcRE can be a subset of the
histories passing through mcRE , for a relativist the very same utterance can
have many contexts of use. Analogously, if a conservationist conceives a
context as a moment-history couple, but she sticks to the Moment-History
Actuality principle, she can say that an utterance made at mc has, in gen-
eral, many contexts of use: any (mc,h) s.t. mc ∈ h would be a context for a
statement used at mc. If there is no privileged history passing through mc,
an utterance made at mc can be conceived as something that happens in
many contexts, none of which is privileged over the others.
And once that one can use such a notion of context, it is easy to see that
one can identify BO-truth (falsity) with truth at-a-context:
(6) mc/hc #A⇔mc/hc #BO A.
By (6), one can recover several desiderata that a conservationist wants to
satisfy, that is:
• Truth-at-a-context is relative to moment-history pairs. Accordingly,
the Openness by constancy principle holds at the truth-at-a-context
level.
• BO does not equate “will” with “inevitably will”.
• The formula F(n)A ∧$¬F(n)A is satisfiable when F(n)A is a future
contingent at mc.
Notice, moreover, that (6) solves several problems affecting the revisionist
semantics, for
✓ BO validates the future excluded middle.
✓ BO does not introduce a semantic distinction between F(n)¬A and
¬F(n)A.
✓ BO does account for retrospective truth judgments. Indeed, A ⊢L
P(n)VF(n)A is sound (here ⊢L is the local logical consequence of Def-
inition 3.4.5, which is the natural notion of logical consequence for
the BO-semantics).
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✓ BO-truth is disquotational; VA ↔ A is BO-valid, and VA ⊣⊢ A is
sound w.r.t. the local notion of logical consequence.
Furthermore, by adopting the conservative approach and (6), one can rea-
sonably say that
(7) mc #A
does not make sense independently of the formula which one substitutes to
A. This because (7) employs a notion of truth-at-a-context which is relative
to the moment of the context only, while a conservationist can hold that
the right notion of truth-at-a-context must be relative to both the moment
of the context and the history of the context. And this, in turn, vindicates
the Openness by constancy principle, which holds at the truth-at-a-context
level.
Nonetheless, there is an interesting analogy between a deterministic
interpretation of a tree structure and (6). As we shall see, a semantics such
as (6) is attractive especially for those that assume a deterministic read-
ing of tree structures. Next section explores some connections between (6)
and a deterministic interpretation of tree structures, i.e., the many-worlds
view.
4.4 Many worlds and Ockhamism
The label “many-worlds theory” refers to an interpretation of quantum
mechanics due to Hugh Everett III. The many-worlds theory is usually
conceived as a proposal to solve the so-called measurement problem.9 The
measurement problem, as we have already seen, characterises the tension
between two principles of Von Neumann (1955)’s standard formulation of
quantum mechanics.
Dynamical postulate: When no measurements are going on, the states of
all physical systems invariably evolve in accordance with the dynam-
ical equations of motion.10
Collapse postulate: When a measurement takes place at time t, the state of
the measured system S collapses over one element of the superposi-
tion (if any) among those described by the equations of motion of S
at t.11
9See DeWitt & Graham (2015).
10See Albert (2009: 80).
11See Albert (2009: 80).
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TheDynamical and theCollapse postulates are problematic, given that they
use an undefined, ordinary notion such as that of measurement. Hence,
the measurement problem: how to deal with the notion of measurement?
And relatedly, how the Dynamical and the Collapse postulates have to be
understood?
The many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics answers these
questions by adopting a two-step strategy. First, many-worlds theorists
claim that the notion of “measurement”, as it is used in the Dynamical
and the Collapse postulates, “[...] leads to an artificial dichotomy of the
universe into ordinary phenomena, and measurements”.12
As a second step, many-worlds theorists hold that there is a way to un-
derstand superpositions which does not require to attribute to measure-
ments any distinguished role. This understanding, moreover, should be
perfectly compatible with both our experience and with the fundamental
equations of motion for quantum systems.
The general idea is this. At any instant, every physically possible out-
come of any quantum interaction occurs. Suppose, for instance, that the
Schrödinger’s ’s equation predicts that, at time t1, the electron a will be
in a superposition of having spin ↑x and ↓x. The many-worlds view states
that, at time t1, reality splits into two sets of branches. One set contains
the branches at which a is in ↑x; the other is the set of those branches in
which a is in ↓x. In general, many-worlds theorists hold that
[t]his universe is constantly splitting into a stupendous num-
ber of branches, all resulting from the measurement like in-
teractions between its myriads of components. Moreover, ev-
ery quantum transition taking place on every star, in every
galaxy, in every remote corner of the universe is splitting our
local world on earth into myriads of copies of itself. (DeWitt
1970: 161)
Any element of a superposition describes an outcome of a quantum inter-
action, obtaining in (at least) a branch of the universe. Thus, superposi-
tions
[...] are just states of the world in which more than one [...] def-
inite thing is happening at once. [...] superpositions do not de-
scribe indefiniteness, they describe multiplicity. (Wallace 2012: 36-
37)
12See Everett et al. (2012: 59).
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A many-worlds theorist would tend to say that the definiteness of our ex-
perience is due to the fact that we are conscious of – we interact with – just
a single collection of branches of reality at a time (say, the one with a in
state ↑x). But there are copies of us inhabiting other collections of overlap-
ping branches: in particular, there are copies that measure those outcomes
that were possible to obtain, but which we didn’t measure (thus, there are
copies of us located in other branches, and these copies measure a in state
↓x).
If this is the case, the Collapse postulate is wrong, for it says precisely
what a many-worlds theorist denies. In a many-worlds perspective, it is
false that a measurement induces the measured system to collapse into
a unique definite outcome. Sure, any measurement would measure just a
single, definite outcome, but any possible outcome, as well as any possible
measurement, actually takes place somewhere in the branching universe.
Furthermore, a new reading of theDynamical postulate should be adopted:
Dynamical* postulate: The states of all physical systems invariably evolve
in accordance with the dynamical equations of motion.13
The new Dynamical* postulate does not mention the notion of measure-
ment, which thus does not have any privileged status over other physical
interactions. Moreover, the dynamical equations of motion – plausibly, the
Schrödinger’s equation associated with the entire physical reality – is the
only theoretical element that plays an explicatory role.
Given the Dynamical* postulate, along with the interpretation of su-
perpositions just highlighted, it appears quite natural for a many-worlds
theorist to subscribe to a branching conception of reality.14 And anymany-
worlds theorists who adopts a branching conception of reality is perfectly
entitled to endorse the BO-semantics (or, equivalently, (6)). After all, in
the BO-semantics all histories are ‘equally real’, in that none of them is
privileged over the others. This is perfectly consistent with the idea that
they are all bound to happen. Thus, relativising truth (and, in particular
the truth of predictions) to moment-history pairs appears to be justified by
the endorsed, background metaphysics. As a matter of fact, David Wallace
assumes a version of the many-worlds view equipped with an Ockhamist-
inspired semantics (what he calls the “second model”).
On the second model, certainly spin up will occur in some
parts of pretty much any possible world (i.e. pretty much any
13See Wallace (2012: 38).
14There are several many-worlds theorists that accept a branching conception of real-
ity: Bacciagaluppi (2002), Belnap & Müller (2010), Saunders & Wallace (2008), Wallace
(2005) and Wallace (2012). For a critical perspective, see Wilson (2012).
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quantum-mechanical branching structure); so will spin down.
Indeed, both spin up and spin down results will occur in some
of the branches which branch off from any instance in which
the measurement is correctly performed. So the truth condi-
tions of future-directed sentences appear to tell us that ‘X will
occur’, uttered at time t, is true in all those possible worlds
which assign nonzero branchweight toX occurring conditional
on the context of utterance (that is: to X occurring in some
branch futurewards of the event of utterance).
(Wallace 2012: 268)
Now, recall that the conservative view– properly reformed as (6) – amounts
to adopting the BO-semantics. Thus, the conservative view adopts a se-
mantical machinery that a many-worlds theorist should be happy to en-
dorse.
The fact that many-worlds theorists have reasons to adopt the BO-
semantics might be taken as an evidence for the conservative view. As far
as indeterminism is concerned, however, this evidence is illusory.
4.5 The many-worlds view and determinism.
Given Definition 2.2.3 of BranchingObjective Indeterminism (BOI), a many-
worlds theorist who subscribes to a branching conception of reality would
count as an indeterminist. Indeed, according to this definition, a history
(possible world) is objectively indeterministic just in case it shares a mo-
ment with another, numerically distinct history. But this cannot be cor-
rect, though. And the reason why Definition 2.2.3 cannot be correct is that
many-worlds theorists are willing to restore determinism at the very foun-
dations of physics. After all, the fundamental law that rules the evolution
of reality is the Schrödinger’s equation, and there are good reasons to call
such a rule “deterministic”.
[w]e have a causal and deterministic evolution prescribed by
the Schrödinger’s equation. It is causal in the sense that any
later state of a system is functionally determined by its earlier
states. It is deterministic since any two trajectories of a system
in a relevant Hilbert space H agree on their earlier segment,
they agree everywhere. (Placek 2000: 99)
The Schrödinger’s equation, governing the time evolution of
the state, is deterministic in exactly the same way as the equa-
tions of classical mechanics, i.e. it allows us to determine the
4.5. THE MANY-WORLDS VIEW AND DETERMINISM. 139
undisturbed state of the system at all times, given the state at
t = 0. (Weber 1993: 201)
[t]he basic dynamical assumption of quantummechanics is that
if you know the state at one time, then the quantum equations
of motion tell you what it will be later. Without loss of gener-
ality, we can take the initial time to be zero and the later time
to be t. The state at time t is given by some operation that we
callU (t), acting on the state at time zero. Without further spec-
ifying the properties of U (t), this tells us very little except that
|Ψ(t) > is determined by |Ψ(t0) >. [...] We are setting up U (t) in
such a way that the state-vector will evolve in a deterministic
manner. Yes, you heard me correctly—the time evolution of the
state-vector is deterministic. (Susskind & Friedman 2015: 95-
96)
If the Schrödinger’s equation governs nature’s evolution, reality can
hardly be said to evolve stochastically. And if many-worlds theorists are
determinists, but they can perfectly adopt a branching conception of re-
ality, having a branching conception of reality cannot be sufficient to be
an indeterminist. Accordingly, if a history h shares a moment with an-
other history, this does not suffice to say that the underlying metaphysical
framework is indeterministic. Hence, it seems that there are good reasons
to reform Definition 2.2.3 of Branching Objective Indeterminism.
Indeterminism, it is tempting to think, is the view that there are many
possible futures. This is not quite right, though, for the existence of a vari-
ety of possible futures is, as such, consistent with determinism. The reason
is that we can coherently hold that many futures are possible and, at the
same time, maintain that all of them will happen. If so, we have a deter-
minist scenario, for there is nothing contingent in the future evolution of
reality: as of now, it is already determined what future possible moments
are going to happen.
As John Bell puts it, the deterministic character of the many-worlds
theory consists in the view that
[i]t is just an illusion that the physical world makes a particular
choice among many macroscopic possibilities [...]; they are all
realized, and no reduction of the wave function occurs. (Bell
2004: 95)
It is interesting to compare this typical trait of the many-worlds theory
with a feature shared by the stochastic versions of quantum mechanics.
These latter theories fail to be deterministic, for
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[s]ystems prepared identically and with the maximum accu-
racy permitted by the theoretical scheme, when subjected to
identical measurements, can in general give different results.
This is the essence of quantum indeterminism. It compels us
to give up the principle that different effects arise from differ-
ent causes. (Weber 1993: 202)
Now, themany-worlds theory does not give up “the principle that different
effects arise from different causes”. Anytime that one measures the spin of
an electron with z-spin down (up) along the x axis, two classes of outcomes
would then obtain: the class of outcomes with the electron having x-spin
down, and the class of outcomes with the electron having x-spin up. The
failure of the collapse of superpositions guarantees that same effects arise
from same causes.
If, on the other hand, different effects arise from same causes, differ-
ent measures of the x-spin of an electron in ↑z would give different out-
comes. But each time that such a measurement is performed, just one sin-
gle outcome will obtain. In other terms, reality would evolve by making
one choice among many possible routes.
Of all the possible futures represented by space-time mani-
folds which branch off from the first branch point on themodel,
one and only one becomes ‘actual’, i.e. becomes part of the past.
The other branches vanish. The universe model is a tree that
‘grows’ or ages by losing branches. (McCall 1994: 3)
The emergence of actuality, and the progressive vanishing of
all but one future branch, is one of the two principal differ-
ences between the present theory [i.e., the open future] and
the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. (Mc-
Call 2009: 420-421)
On the one hand, each continuation from a branch point is
individually possible; on the other hand, it is impossible that
more than one of these continuations should be realized. (Bel-
nap et al. 2001: v)
[T]here are alternative incompatible ways the future might be,
which fit together not by “both ways happening,” but precisely
by having a branch point at which they both were possibilities.
At the branch point, the future can be either way, but not both
ways. (Belnap et al. 2001: 170fn)
4.5. THE MANY-WORLDS VIEW AND DETERMINISM. 141
Current possibilities drop off (McCall (1994)) with passage into
the future [...]. (Belnap et al. 2001: 207)
Branching indeterminism is definitely not amany-ways (or amany-worlds)
view. What is characteristic of an indeterministic reading of a branching
structure is that, at any fork, things evolve along just one way. Indeter-
minists, therefore, should be able to express the principle that only some
possible outcomes (or, more plausibly, just one outcome) of an experiment
will obtain. Expressing this principle would allow indeterminists to deny
the deterministic claim that none of the future possibilities will obtain,
and to deny the deterministic claim that any future possibility will obtain.
The moral is that genuine objective indeterminism requires that
Possible futures: There are many possible future alternatives, but
Choice: among the several, possible alternatives, only a single future al-
ternative would obtain.15
BOI, as it is defined in Definition 2.2.3, guarantees the Possible futures
condition only. And, as we have just seen, such a condition can be easily
satisfied by those many-worlds theorists – which, again, are determinists
– who adopt a branching conception of reality. What Definition 2.2.3 alone
does not guarantee – and what many-worlds theorists firmly deny – is the
Choice principle. Accordingly, one needs to enrich Definition 2.2.3 with
some further requirement which captures the Choice condition.
To express the Choice condition, in turn, one has to have a notion that
distinguishes merely possible moments (viz., possible states of the world
that fail to obtain) from possible moments which fail to be merely possible
(viz., possible states of the world that obtain). Traditionally, the philosoph-
ical notion that has been employed to draw such a distinction is precisely
that of actuality.16 Intuitively, the Choice condition says that, whenever
there is a moment m that has more than one possible future, even though
it is indeterminate which possible future will be actualised, one of them
will.
Notice that expressing the Choice principle is not only relevant to get
a clearer understanding of branching indeterminism. It is also useful to
15 Sure, one may object that indeterminism requires that, among the several, possible
futures, only a proper subset of them would obtain. In my view, this objection is mislead-
ing. It seems arbitrary, indeed, to say that more than one possible future would obtain,
but deny that any possible future will. Why it should be so? If one agrees that more than
one single future will obtain, the only plausible thing to say then is that it is so because
any future possibility will.
16See Menzel (2016), Plantinga (1974), Plantinga (1976) and Stalnaker (1976).
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assess the conservative view developed by Belnap and his collaborators.
The conservative strategy assumes BOI, which, as I have tried to argue,
is insufficient to characterise indeterminism. Moreover, conservationists
adopt a semantic machinery which is perfectly compatible with what the
many-worlds view. Thus, one may wonder whether a conservationist has
enough resources to tell herself apart from a many-worlds theorist. After
all, conservationists such as Belnap (and his collaborators) take themselves
as indeterminists. Thus they should be able to say what kind of difference
tells their position apart from that of an advocate of a determinist, many-
worlds view.
It may be the case, for instance, that the analogies between the conser-
vative view and the many-worlds view turn out to be only superficial, as it
were. Sure, a many-worlds theorist can adopt the same semantics as a con-
servationist. And a many-worlds theorist can adopt the same branching
conception of reality as a conservationist. But there may be some meta-
physical difference that enables to tell apart the two positions from one
other. This metaphysical difference, in turn, would make it possible to
distinguish conservationists, qua indeterminists, from many-worlds theo-
rists, qua determinists. And, as we have seen, such a metaphysical differ-
ence should plausibly concern the notion of actuality. At the end of the
day, many-worlds theorists disagree with indeterminists about whether
anything that’s possible obtains, or just a proper subset of possibilities
obtains. We have seen that conservationists have several readings for ac-
tuality, but each of these reading is relational. Thus, it is interesting to see
what are the notions of actuality that a many-worlds theorist can adopt.
4.6 Many worlds and actuality
Here’s a telling quotation from Hugh Everett III, the founding father of
the many-worlds view.
From the viewpoint of the [many-worlds] theory all elements
of a superposition (all “branches”) are “actual,” none any more
“real” than the rest. It is unnecessary to suppose that all but
one are somehow destroyed, since all the separate elements
of a superposition individually obey the wave equation with
complete indifference to the presence or absence (“actuality”
or not) of any other elements. (Everett et al. 2012: 189)
Here Everett does not use the relational notions of actuality we encoun-
tered above. When he claims that all “branches” are “actual”, he is not
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claiming that there is a unique possible history, passing through any pos-
sible moment. Nor he is claiming that any possible moment is later than
any other moment.
A clue which suggests that he’s not assuming a relational notion of
actuality is the fact that he is speaking from “the viewpoint of the [many-
worlds] theory.” He’s abstracting from any location that a possible outcome
may have, taking an absolute standpoint over the plethora of all physical
possibilities. Once that one has taken such a viewpoint, it is misleading to
use a relational notion of actuality. By taking such a view from nowhere,
it is misleading to speak of what is ‘seen’ as actual from the particular
viewpoint one is located at. Indeed, if one takes a view from nowhere, one
is supposing not to be located at all.
More plausibly, when Everett uses “actual” from this God’s eye stand-
point, he’s using a substantial, non-relational notion of actuality. The sub-
stantial notion of actuality divides the space of (physical) possibilities into
two kinds: on the one hand, there are those (physical) possibilities that ob-
tains, and are said to be substantially actual. On the other hand, if there is
a physical possibility that does not obtain, it is said to be merely possible.
What is important, though, is that the substantial actuality of a moment
is not a perspectival matter. It does not depend on the perspective of a
given moment. In other terms, the substantial actuality of a moment is a
primitive, monadic property. Analogously, that a history is substantially
actual means – plausibly – that any of its moment is substantially actual,
and thus that any of its moments obtain. And the substantial actuality of a
history h does not depend on the relations that h has with other histories,
nor with the relations that its moments have with other histories. It only
depends on whether any moment in h is substantially actual.
Once that it is acknowledged what kind of notion of actuality Everett
is speaking about, it is easy to understand what he’s saying. According to
him, any possible outcome obtains, and thus any possible outcomes is sub-
stantially actual. Therefore, themany-worlds view assumes that to say that
a possible moment (history) is substantially actual is trivially true. And to
say that what is possible is merely possible is trivially false. According to
Everett, the substantial actuality does not capture any difference among
physical possibilities, and hence it is perfectly redundant.
Interestingly, David Lewis reasons in a way that is perfectly analogous
to that of Everett.
If we take a timeless point of view and ignore our own loca-
tion in time, the big difference between the present time and
other times vanishes. That is not because we regard all times
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as equally present, but rather because if we ignore our own lo-
cation in time we cannot use temporally indexical terms like
“present” at all. And similarly, I claim, if we take an a priori
point of view and ignore our own location among the worlds,
the big difference between the actual world and other worlds
should vanish. (Lewis 1970: 19-20)
According to Lewis, if one takes a nowhere standpoint over possible worlds,
and uses the notion of (substantial) actuality to draw a distinction from
one possible world to another, that notion turns out to be perfectly useless.
Any possible world, in Lewis’ view, is (substantially) actual when ‘seen’
from nowhere.
Lewis also suggests an interesting link among the substantial and the
relational readings of actuality. If one thinks that substantial actuality is
redundant, one may reasonably apply the relational readings of actuality
in order to convey non-trivial information.
[possible worlds differ] not in kind, but only in what goes on
at them. Our actual world is only one world among others. We
call it alone actual not because it differs in kind from all the
rest, but because it is the world we inhabit. (Lewis 1973a: 85)
If actuality receives one of its indexical, relational readings, it may convey
non-trivial information. Recall the relational notions of actuality we have
encountered thus far.
Moment-History Actuality @1(h,m)⇔ h is the history h
′ such that (m ∈ h′)
Branch-Moment Actuality: @2(m,b)⇔∀m
′ ∈ b (m′ ≤m)
Moment-Moment Actuality: @3(m,m
′)⇔m′ ≤m
If @1(h,m) is true,m has a unique history passing through it. When@2(m,b)
is true, any m′ ∈ b is earlier than or equal to m. And if @3(m,m
′) is true, m′
is earlier than or it is equal to m.
On the contrary, under a many-worlds view, that a possible world is
(substantially) actual is trivially true. Thus, the only non-trivial applica-
tions of the concept of actuality are the relational ones.
There is no surprise, therefore, that a many-worlds theorist such as
Simon Sounders is happy to concede that
[w]hat is “actual”, just what is “now”, is to be understood as
facts as relations. There is nothing more to be put in; neither
the “flow” of time, taking us from one “now” to the next, nor
the reduction state, taking us from one “actuality” to another.
(Saunders 1995: 244)
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To sum up, if one thinks that anything that’s possible happens, one nat-
urally loses interest in the notion of substantial actuality: anything that’s
possible is substantially actual. Hence, the relational readings of actual-
ity become the only interesting ones, for they are the only readings that
allows to say non-trivial things. And a many-worlds theorist is thus per-
fectly justified in adopting a Lewisian view about actuality: if “actual” has
to receive an informative reading, it can only be relational.
But this seems to undermine the conservationist view: a conservation-
ist, indeed, shares with a many-worlds theorist too many things. The two
share the same semantics, they have the same conception of branching re-
ality, and they also agree that the interesting readings that actuality may
have are the relational ones. This latter trait, as we shall see, prohibits
conservationists to formulate the Choice principle in a way that tells con-
servationism itself apart from the family of branching determinists. This
result, moreover, suggests that, if indeterminism is true, the substantial
notion of actuality cannot be redundant.17
4.7 The Choice principle and relational actual-
ity
As I have argued above, branching objective indeterminism – as it is de-
fined in Definition 2.2.3 – consists in the following principle.
Possible futures: There are many possible future alternatives.
When one adopts a branching conception of reality, it is natural to trans-
late the Possible futures postulate with these two, equivalent statements.
(8) ∃m,m′ ,m′′(m <m′ & m <m′′ & m′ &m′′& m′ ≮m′′)
(9) ∃m ∃h,h′(m ∈ h & m ∈ h′ & h " h′)
However, Definition 2.2.3 does not say anything about a further con-
dition, which is needed to distinguish an indeterministic reading of a tree
from its determinist interpretations. This condition is:
Choice: Among the several, possible alternatives, only a single future al-
ternative would obtain.
As we have seen, this is what many philosophers say when they claim that,
according to indeterminism, just one single outcome, among those that are
17For a similar conclusion, see Borghini & Torrengo 2013.
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possible at a given moment, will ‘be realised’. And the Choice principle is
precisely what amany-worlds theorist would deny: according to themany-
worlds perspective, any possible future is bound to ‘be realised’.
Intuitively, to say that only a single future obtains is to say that only a
single future is actual. Thus, the Choice principle has to involve actuality.
But recall that, in dealing with the many-worlds view, one may distinguish
two main kinds of actuality. There are readings according to which actu-
ality is a relation. The substantial reading of actuality, on the contrary, en-
tails that being actual is a monadic property of moments, and for a history
to be (substantially) actual is to contain only moments that are (substan-
tially) actual. Thus, when one tries to formulate the Choice principle in
an explicit way, one has to employ either one of the relational readings of
actuality, or its substantial interpretation.
The Choice principle, moreover, is not mean to be a mere guess. On the
contrary, it has to be intended as a law governing the way in which real-
ity evolves. For instance, any time that a system S is in a superposition, it
may evolve in different, possible ways. But anytime that a measurement-
like interaction takes place on S, the system collapses into one among the
elements of its superposition. Thus, anytime that things might go in sev-
eral ways, they turn out to take just a singular path. The law-like character
of the Choice principle allows to claim that, if the principle holds, it must
hold anytime that there is a fork in the tree.
With these information at hand, let us try to formulate the principle in
a branching friendly way. First, let us introduce the notion of instant.
Definition 4.7.1. (Instants) The set Instant is a partition of a branching frame
T into equivalence classes; that is, Instant is a set of nonempty sets of moments
such that each moment in T belongs to exactly one member of Instant. More-
over,
(i) Unique intersection. Each i ∈ Instant intersects each history in a unique
moment; that is, for each instant i and history h, i ∩ h has exactly one
member.
(ii) Order preservation. Given two instants i1 and i2 and two histories h
and h′, if the moment at which i1 intersects h precedes, or is the same as,
or comes after the moment at which i2 intersects h, then the same relation
holds between the moment at which i1 intersects h
′ and the moment at
which i2 intersects h
′.18
18The definition is taken from Belnap et al. (2001: 194-195). See also Di Maio & Za-
nardo (1994).
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Intuitively, any instant i is a set of contemporaneous but alternative
moments. Thus, if i(m) is the instant at which m belongs, i(m) contains m
itself, plus any alternative moment which lies at the same chronological
height of m. Instants can be pictured as horizontal lines (see Figure 4.1).
Given Definition 4.7.1, one can impose a linear order over instants: let us
h3h2h1h0
m6m5m4m3
m2m1
m0
i(m3)
i(m1)
i(m0)
Figure 4.1
say that i <i i
′ just in case there existm ∈ i,m′ ∈ i ′, andm <m′. Accordingly,
in the model of Figure 4.1, it is the case that i(m0) <i i(m1) <i i(m3).
The notion of instant allows to express the intuition that, among sev-
eral alternatives, just one of them would be realised as the physical world
evolves. In particular, the Choice principle can be formulated as follows.
Choice*: ∀i, i ′(i <i i
′ ⇒∃!m′′(m′′ ∈ i ′ & m′′ is actual))
The Choice* postulate says that, for any instant i ′ whose moments are later
than those in i, there is a unique moment in i ′ that is actual. However, the
notion of actuality occurring in the postulate is ambiguous. As we have
seen, one may adopt either (one of) the relational notions of actuality, or a
substantive reading.
If one adopts the relational notion, one has to relativise the actuality
predicate occurring in the Choice* principle. Let us see whether there is
a relativisation that is plausible and, moreover, that enables to use the
Choice* principle to tell apart indeterminists from many-worlds theorists.
Recall the firts notion of relational actuality that we encountered above,
namely:
Moment-History Actuality @1(h,m)⇔ h is the history h
′ such that (m ∈ h′)
Plausibly, if one relativises the actuality predicate occurring in the Choice*
principle with the help of @1, one may obtain the two following versions.
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(10) ∀i, i ′(i <i i
′ ⇒∃h∃!m(m ∈ i ′ & @1(h,m)))
(11) ∀i, i ′(i <i i
′ ⇒∀h∃!m(m ∈ i ′ & @1(h,m)))
Statement (10) says that, for any i ′ that is later than i, there is a unique
moment in i ′ whose future is settled, for there is a unique history passing
through it. Clearly, this principle seems to be perfectly arbitrary, and it
should be denied by both indeterminists and many-worlds theorists.
Statement (11), furthermore, says that any history whatsoever is the
unique history passing through m, where m is a moment in i ′, and i ′ is
later than i. This statement directly contradicts the branching conception
of reality encoded in (8)-(9), for it entails that any possible history is the
unique history passing through m. Thus, (11) is denied by any branching
theorist.
As a result, both many-worlds theorists and indeterminists should re-
ject (10) and (11). Hence, it seems that @1 cannot provide a version of
the Choice* principle which distinguishes the two parties. Let us try with
another relational notion of actuality.19
Branch-Moment Actuality: @2(m,b)⇔∀m
′ ∈ b (m′ ≤m)
If one relativises the Choice* principle by using @2, one should plausibly
obtain the following two other versions of the principle.
(12) ∀i, i ′(i <i i
′ ⇒∃b∃!m(m ∈ i ′ & @2(m,b)))
(13) ∀i, i ′(i <i i
′ ⇒∀b∃!m(m ∈ i ′ & @2(m,b)))
Statement (12) says that, for any i ′ that is later than i, there is a set
of moments b, and a unique moment m in i ′, such that any moment in
b is either earler than or equal to m. This condition is easily satisfied by
any branching frame, because for any moment m whatsoever there is a b
whose moments are earlier than or equal tom: namely, {m}. Therefore, (12)
is assumed by any branching theorist.
Statement (13) says that, for any i ′ that is later than i, there is a unique
moment m in i ′ such that any moment in b is either earlier than or equal
to m, for any set of moments b. If the antecedent in (13) holds, there are
at leat two instants i <i i
′, and then two moments, m and m′ , such that
m′ ∈ i andm ∈ i ′. Since for any set of moments b, any moment in b is either
earlier or equal tom, there cannot be a moment later thanm. Furthermore,
if there is amoment earlier thanm′, there would be a set that has amoment
that is later thanm′ , namely {m}. And this is something that (13) prohibits.
19Recall that b is a set of moments. Thus, b may fail to be a history, which is a maximal
<-chain of moments.
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And there cannot be a moment that is not <-related with m′ , for otherwise
there would be a set with a moment that is neither earlier nor equal to m.
Therefore, (13) entails that there exists a unique history with twomoments
only, {m′,m}. This, in turn, is denied by any branching theorist.
To sum up, any branching theorist assumes (12) and rejects (13). Again,
it seems that @2 is not useful to provide a version of the Choice* principle
which tells apart branching determinists from branching indeterminists.
Let us consider the third relational notion of actuality.
Moment-Moment Actuality: @3(m,m
′)⇔m′ ≤m
Let us try to relativise the actuality predicate in the Choice* principle with
the help of @3. Let us see the two following relativised versions of the
principle.
(14) ∀i, i ′(i <i i
′ ⇒∃m′∃!m(m ∈ i ′ & @3(m,m
′)))
(15) ∀i, i ′(i <i i
′ ⇒∀m′∃!m(m ∈ i ′ & @3(m,m
′)))
Statement (14) is trivial: any instant has at least a moment, and any
moment is identical with itself. Statement (15) says that, for any i ′ that
is later than i, there is a unique moment m in i ′ such that any moment
whatsoever is either earlier than or equal to m. It is easy to see that (15),
like (13), entails the existence of a unique history, and thus contradicts the
branching conception of reality.
Once again, (14) and (15) cannot tell apart branching determinists
form branching indeterminists: both parties assume (14) and reject (15).
These results suggest that the Choice* principle can hardly involve a
notion of relational actuality. And, in general, one cannot tell apart many-
worlds and indeterminism only by using branching structures and the re-
lational notions of actuality. Why? Because both views adopt a branch-
ing conception of reality – that is, both views adopt tree structures – and
@1,@2 and @3 just involve the relations that points (or sets of points) have
within tree structures.
In general, the notions of relational actuality cannot – by themselves – be
useful to tell apart indeterminists from those who adopt a deterministic reading
of the tree. This, in turn, suggests that the relational notions of actuality
are useless to convey the information that, at any fork, reality would take
just one path. And if this is true, then the relational notions of actuality
cannot express the intended meaning of the Choice* principle. But then
conservationists such as Belnap and his collaborators, as well as Thomason
and MacFarlane, do not have enough resources to describe themselves as
indeterminists.
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4.8 The Choice principle and substantial actu-
ality
In my view, indeterminists disagree with many-worlds theorists on the
distribution that substantial actuality has over the tree. And since the
Choice* principle should describe the way reality evolves indeterminis-
tically, it is sensible to take it as talking about substantial actuality:
Choice**: ∀i, i ′(i <i i
′ ⇒∃!m′′(m′′ ∈ i ′ & m′′ is substantially actual))
Once the principle is read this way, it is easy to see that a many-worlds
theorist cannot accept it. For a many-worlds theorist, indeed, substantial
actuality is redundant, in the sense that any possible moment is substan-
tially actual. Hence, anymoment of an instant is substantially actual. Now,
given a tree T and (8)-(9), there must be at least two histories, say h and
h′. This means, in turn, that there are at least two moments, m and m′, s.t.
m <m′ , m ∈ h∩ h′, m′ ∈ h but m′ # h′. By Definition 4.7.1, there are at least
two instants, i and i ′, such that i ∩h = i ∩h′ = {m}, but i ′ ∩h = {m′} " i ′ ∩h′.
And since m <m′, then i <i i
′. Notice, moreover, that both i ′ ∩ h and i ′ ∩ h′
are singlets. Hence, i ′ must have at least two elements. The Choice** prin-
ciple entails that i ′ must have a unique (substantially) actual moment, and
hence it has at least a merely possible moment.
This conclusion, as we have argued just above, cannot be accepted by a
many-worlds theorist, for it entails that the notion of substantial actuality
is not redundant. Furthermore, the Choice** principle, along with (8)-(9),
entails something that any indeterminist should say: any time that the
physical world can evolve in more than one way, it actually evolves by
following just one alternative among those that are possible.
Furthermore, the Choice** principle and (8)-(9) express the idea that,
according to indeterminism, same causes can have different effects. If one
measures the x-spin of an electron being, say, in state ↑z, the Choice** prin-
ciple guarantees that the physical world would evolve in such a way that
either ↑x or ↓x would obtain. Moreover, it guarantees that it is never the
case that both outcomes will obtain. And the branching structure that
physical possibilities take – and which is encoded in (8)-(9) – does not
secure that, whenever one measures the x-spin of an electron in state ↑z,
it is settled that one would obtain ↑x. It does not secure, moreover, that
whenever one measures the x-spin of an electron in state ↑z, it is settled
that one would obtain ↓x. Thus, the same cause (the measurement of the
x-spin of an electron in state ↑z) can have different effects (either ↑x or ↓x
– but again, not both).
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I have argued that a branching indeterminist needs the Choice** princi-
ple to be distinguished from a determinist such as a many-worlds theorist.
Thus, one may reform the Definition 2.2.3 for branching indeterminism by
adding to it the Choice** principle. This move, yet, would be too hasty, for
there is another principle that one should reasonably invoke:
Past Actuality: ∀m,m′(m is substantially actual & m′ ≤m⇒m′ is substan-
tially actual)
The Past Actuality postulate says that the past of a substantially actual
moment is substantially actual. I take this principle to be quite reasonable.
First, notice that anymoment in the past of a momentm is linearly ordered
by <. Thus the past of m – that is, the set {m′ :m′ < m} – can be taken to be
as a singular course of event up to m. And if m happens to obtain – viz. if
m happens to be substantially actual – it is so, plausibly, because how the
physical world has evolved before m had m as one of its possible future
outcomes. This means, in set theoretical terms, that any moment that did
obtain in an instant i ′ such that i ′ <i i(m) is <-related with m. Hence, if m
is substantially actual, the past of m must be substantially actual too.
It would be very odd to deny the Past Actuality principle. It would be
really unreasonable, for instance, to stick to the Choice* principle, but at
the same time to say that there are two instants i <i i
′ whose (substan-
tially) actual moments are not <-related. This, indeed, would amount to
say that there are two moments that are substantially actual, but none of
them is modally consistent with the other. The Past Actuality postulate,
furthermore, prohibits that there is a merely possible moment in the past
of a substantially actual moment. From this prohibition it follows that
substantial actuality does not “jump”: if m < m′ < m′′, and m and m′′ are
substantially actual, m′ must be substantially actual as well. I take this as
a reasonable thing to hold.
Notice that the Past Actuality postulate is independent of whether one
accepts the Choice** principle. Take, once again, a many-worlds theorist.
As we have seen before, such a theorist must deny the Choice** principle,
for it entails that substantial actuality fails to be redundant. But she would
be willing to hold the Past Actuality postulate. Indeed, if any moment is
substantially actual, any past moment of a substantially actual moment
must be substantially actual as well.
With the Choice** and the Past Actuality principles at hand, one can in-
tegrate Definition 2.2.3 of Branching Objective Indeterminism as follows.
Definition 4.8.1. (Branching Objective Indeterminism*(BOI*)) Given a set
of physically possible histories (worlds)H(T ), a history h ∈H(T ) is objectively
indeterministic iff
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Possible futures principle: There is a momentm and a history h′ ∈H(T )
such that m ∈ h, m ∈ h′ and h " h′.
Choice** principle: ∀i, i ′(i <i i
′ ⇒ ∃!m′′(m′′ ∈ i ′ & m′′ is substantially
actual)).
Past Actuality principle: ∀m,m′(m is substantially actual & m′ ≤ m ⇒
m′ is substantially actual).
The definition just given is pretty important. As we have seen, is some-
thing that a many-worlds theorist cannot accept. But Definition 4.8.1 has
also another relevant feature. It entails that there must exist a unique (sub-
stantially) actual history. Before proving this fact, let us state some useful
definitions.
Definition 4.8.2. (The set of substantially actual moments) Given a tree
T = (M,<), let |A| be a subset of the set of moments M in T , such that |A| =
{m :m is substantially actual}.
Definition 4.8.3. (Trunk) A set of moments p is a tunk iff (i) p is linearly
ordered by <, (ii) p has a maximal element, that is, there is an m s.t., for any
m′ ∈ p, m ≤ m′ entails m = m′ (iii) p contains any moment in the past of its
maximal element. Let p(m) be the trunk whose maximal element is m, that
is p(m) = {m′ : m′ ≤ m}. I write m > p(m′) (p(m′) > m) if m > m′(m′ > m).
Analogously, p(m) > p(m′)′ iff m >m′ .
Let us see two facts that will be useful later.
Fact 9. Branching Objective Indeterminism* entails that, whenever i <i i
′,m ∈
i, m′ ∈ i ′, m,m′ ∈ |A|, then p(m) < p(m′).
Proof. Assume i <i i
′, m ∈ i, m′ ∈ i ′ and m,m′ ∈ |A|. If p(m) ≮ p(m′), either
m′ ≤m, or m′ and m are not <-related. m′ ≤m is not possible, for m′ ∈ i ′,m ∈ i
and i <i i
′, and by the definition of instant, it follows that either m′ and m
are not <-related, or m < m′. If m and m′ are not <-related, the definition of
instant entails that i∩p(m′) is non-empty and, by the Past actuality principle,
i ∩ p(m′) ⊆ |A|. Moreover, i ∩ p(m) ⊆ |A|, i ∩ p(m′) ⊆ |A|, and i ∩ p(m) " i ∩
p(m′). Otherwise m < m′. But then i must have two actual moments, against
the Choice** principle. By reductio, p(m) < p(m′).
Fact 10. (Recursion Theorem) For any set A, and any a ∈ A, and any function
g : A ×N 2−→ A, there exists a unique infinite sequence f :N 2−→ A such that
(a) f (0) = a,
(b) f (n+1) = g(f (n),n), for all n ∈N.20
20See Hrbacek & Jech (1999: 48) for a proof.
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Facts 9 and 10 are useful to prove that:
Fact 11. Branching Objective Indeterminism* entails the existence of a unique,
substantially actual history.
Proof. Either (a) there is an if s.t. i ≤i if for any i, or (b) for any i, there is an
i ′ s.t. i <i i
′.
If (a), by the Choice** principle and the Past actuality principle, there is an
mf in if such that p(mf ) ⊆ |A|. If p(mf ) is not a history then either p(mf ) has
two moments that are not <-related, or it fails to be maximal. p(mf ) cannot
contain two moments that are not <-related, for p(mf ) = {m : m ≤ mf }, and <
is linear towards the past. If p(mf ) is not maximal, there must be a m > p(mf );
but this cannot be, for if is the last instant that there is. Thus, p(mf ) is a
history. Now, either p(mf ) = |A| or p(mf ) " |A|. If p(mf ) " |A|, either m ∈ |A|
butm # p(mf ), orm # |A| butm ∈ p(mf ), for somem. Ifm ∈ |A| butm # p(mf ),
then m belongs either to if or not. If m ∈ if , then if has two actual moments,
mf and m, against the Choice** principle. If m # if , it must belong to some i
such that i <i if . The Past Actuality principle entails that, for anym
′ ∈ p(mf ),
m′ ∈ |A|. According to the definition of instant, then, i ∩ p(mf ) ⊆ |A|. Hence, i
has two actual moments, m and the element in i∩p(mf ), against the Choice**
principle. Hence, there is no m s.t. m ∈ |A| but m # p(mf ). If m # |A| but
m ∈ p(mf ), m must be either equal to or earlier than mf . If m = mf , then
m ∈ |A|. Thus,m < mf . Butmf ∈ |A|. By the Past Actuality principle, m ∈ |A|.
Accordingly, it must be the case that p(mf ) = |A|, and p(mf ) is a history.
If (b), then there is no last instant if . And thus, by the Choice** principle
and Fact 9, it follows that, for any p0 ⊆ |A|, there exists a p1 s.t. p0 < p1 and
p1 ⊆ |A|. Accordingly, for any sequence of trunks (p0, ...,pn) s.t. p0 < ... < pn
and pn ⊆ |A|, there is a pn+1 s.t. pn < pn+1 and p0 ⊆ ... ⊆ pn ⊆ pn+1 ⊆ |A|. Let
us define a set of functions F, such that any f ∈ F maps sequences of trunks
sn(p0, ...,pn), where
⋃n−1
0 sn ⊆ pn and pn ⊆ |A|, to sequences sn+1 = (p0, ...,pn+1)
s.t.
⋃n
0 sn ⊆ pn+1 and pn+1 ⊆ |A|. Intuitively, any function f takes actuality
‘one step further in the future’, and yields a sequence sn+1 that has more actual
trunks than sn. The Recursion Theorem (Fact 10) guarantees that there is a
unique infinite sequence s@ = {pn}
∞
n=0 such that pn+1 = f (p0, ...,pn), for any n ∈
N. Then, s@ is an infinite sequence of trunks: therefore, for any m,m
′ ∈
⋃
s@,
either m ≤m′ or m′ < m. Accordingly,
⋃
s@ is linearly ordered by <. Moreover,
for any m ∈
⋃
s@, m ∈ |A|. If
⋃
s@ is not a maximal <-chain, there must be
somem ∈ |A| such thatm > pn, for any pn ∈
⋃
s@. But given the construction of
s@, this is impossible. Therefore,
⋃
s@ is a maximal <-chain of actual moments,
and |A| =
⋃
s@. Hence, any actual moment is in history
⋃
s@.
The commitment to a unique, substantially actual history is directly
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entailed by Definition 4.8.1 of Branching Objective Indeterminism*. In-
determinism, therefore, is not only compatible with the existence of a
unique, substantially actual history. Indeterminism requires such a com-
mitment (with the proviso stated in refnote)
Notice, for clarity’s sake, that Fact 11 does not contradict Thomason’s
and Belnap’s claim, according to which a unique, relationally actual his-
tory cannot exist. If “there is a unique (relationally) actual history” means
that there is a unique history which passes through any possible moment,
whoever adopts Definition 4.8.1 (and hence, subscribes to Fact 11) de-
nies the existence of such a history. What Fact 11 highlights, however, is
that relational actuality cannot be everything that there is to know about
actuality, at least within an indeterministic perspective. According to a
many-worlds theorist, we have many futures. According to Fact 11, on the
contrary, we have only one single future – i.e., the future that lies along
the unique, substantially actual history.
4.9 “We have a single future”
Belnap, MacFarlane and Thomason claim that the Choice principle, viz.
Choice: among the several, possible alternatives, only a single future al-
ternative would obtain,
can be expressed without positing a (substantially) actual history. Thus,
the commitment to a unique a (substantially) actual history is unneces-
sary.21 In particular, they suggest letthat the view that the physical world
evolves by ‘choosing’ just one future alternative at a time is expressed by
certain tense-logical validities.
On the one hand, certain validities encodes the view that at least one of
tomorrow’s alternatives will obtain.
But ‘It will or it won’t’ has the force of tautology. It is invari-
ably true to say things such as ‘Either it will rain tomorrow
or it wont’t’, even in cases where there is no more justifica-
tion for saying it will than for saying it won’t rain. (Thomason
1970: 267)
One or another will happen. On the Peircean view, it is always
false to say
21See, for instance, Placek & Belnap (2012: 460-461).
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(16) It is possible that it will be sunny tomorrow, and it is possible
that it won’t be, but either it will be or it won’t be.
[...] But this seems something that we can say truly [...]. It ex-
presses the natural thought that, even if the future is open,
one or the other of the alternatives will take place. (MacFarlane
2014: 217)
On the other hand, other validities guarantee that, among the several al-
ternatives for tomorrow, exactly one will occur.
“We have a single future.” [ . . . ] If it means that it is settled that
incompatible events will never happen, it is true. (Belnap et al.
2001: 206)
It won’t be both ways. Perhaps it will be sunny here at this time
tomorrow, perhaps it won’t. But we know it won’t be both ways—it
will be one or the other. [. . . ] All we conclude from the datum
that it won’t be both ways is that our semantic theory must
avoid making
(17) Tomorrow it will be sunny here and won’t be sunny here.
Tomorrow (Here is sunny ∧¬ Here is sunny)
true at any context. (MacFarlane 2014: 211)
Apparently, according to belnap, MacFarlane and Thomason, the prin-
ciple that, among future possibilities, just one of them will obtain is cap-
tured by these two schemas:
(18) F(n)(A)∨ F(n)(¬A)
(19) ¬F(n)(A∧¬A)
Hence, the principle that we have a single future – that is, the Choice prin-
ciple – can be expressed without positing any substantially actual history.
This cannot be true, however. Given the BO semantics, (18) is valid
because any future moment (lying on a given history) satisfies either A or
its negation (Clearly, I am assuming that histories have to be unbounded
towards the past and the future). This, in turn, is due to nothing but the
fact that, according to the BO semantics, negation and disjunction behave
classically: for anyA and every point m/h, either A is BO-true at m/h (and
¬A is BO-false at m/h) or A is BO-false at m/h (and ¬A is BO-true at m/h).
Furthermore, the validity of (19) only ensures that any future moment is
consistent.
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Notice, moreover, that (18)-(19) are completely silent about (substan-
tial) actuality. Therefore, the advocates of the many-worlds view can take
(18)-(19) as valid. Many-worlds theorists are committed to the claim that
any history is substantially actual, not to the (independent) views that (i)
there are future moments that fail to satisfy both A and ¬A, and (ii) there
are future moments that are inconsistent. As a matter of fact, the many-
worlds philosopher David Wallace (2012: 268) says explicitly that BO can
be perfectly coherent with his favourite metaphysical picture. And notice,
once again, that BO validates both (18) and (19) (if histories are taken to
be unbounded both towards the past and the future). But surely Wallace
wouldn’t subscribe to the Choice principle: in his view, any future alterna-
tive would obtain.
Surely, there is a way to say that just a single future will obtain – which
a many-worlds theorist cannot accept – and which is based on the validity
of principles analogous to (18)-(19). This way forces the many-worlds the-
orist to reject a validity that an indeterminist may accept. It also entails,
however, the existence of the actual history. Thus, if tense-logic validities
analogous to (18)–(19) encode the view that we have a single future, they
also entail that there is a unique, substantially actual history.
Let’s see why. First, let’s distribute the future operator over the con-
juncts in (19):
(20) ¬(F(n)(A)∧ F(n)(¬A))
Notice that (20) is a BO validity: thus, as far as the BO semantics is con-
cerned, (20) can be accepted both by branching indeterminists and many-
worlds theorists. As a further step, let us introduce a bunch of definitions
which will be useful later on.
Definition 4.9.1. (Metaphysical frames) A metaphysical frame is a tuple
FM = (T , |A|), where T is a tree and |A| is a set of actual moments of T , that is,
|A| ⊆M ∈ T .
What is peculiar about metaphysical frames is that they specify the
extension the actuality predicate may have over trees.
Definition 4.9.2. (Models based on metaphysical frames) A model MFM
based on a metaphysical frame FM is a sequence (FM , I ), where I is an inter-
pretation of the atoms of Lt .
Definition 4.9.3. (Interpretation of ‘Will’) F(n)A is true at m in a model
MFM iff there is an actual moment m
′ which is n time units in the future ofm,
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and A is true at m′ in MFM .
22 In symbols,
MFM ,m # F(n)A⇔∃m
′(dT (m,m
′) = n & m <m′ & m′ ∈ |A| &MFM ,m
′
#A)
Definition 4.9.4. (Validity on a model) A is valid on a model MFM just in
case A is true at any moment m ∈ |A| inMFM . In symbols,
MFM #A⇔∀m(m ∈ |A| ∈MFM ⇒MFM ,m #A)
Definition 4.9.5. (Non-pathological models)MFM is non-pathological only
if, for any m,m′ s.t. m,m′ ∈ i and m " m, then there is a formula A such that
MFM ,m #A but MFM ,m
′
# ¬A.
The non-pathological requirement states that any two moments lying
at the same instant satisfy different sets of formulas. This condition cap-
tures the intuition that two versions of tomorrow, say A and B, are alter-
native because something that would obtain if A were to happen wouldn’t
obtain if B were to happen. As we shall see, this requirement is crucial for
the present purposes. However, it may appear problematic. For instance,
one can satisfy the non-pathological condition by imposing that any ac-
tual moment has its own nominal (i.e, for anym ∈ |A|, there is an atom p of
Lt such that I(p) = {m}).
23 However, if |A|’s cardinality is the continuum,
one would need uncountable many nominals. It is possible to avoid these
difficulties by following the method developed in Meyer (2009), and con-
structing moments as maximal consistent sets of sentences. In this case,
the non-pathological requirement can be easily satisfied without assum-
ing any problematic, infinitary language.
By Definitions 4.9.1-4.9.5 it follows that the conjunction of (18) and
(20) encodes the principle that, among the many future alternatives, just
one will obtain.
Fact 12. If (18) and (20) are valid on a non-pathological model MFM , for any
two instants i, i ′ s.t. i <i i
′ and i, i ′ ⊆M ∈ T ∈ FM , there is a unique m in i
′ s.t.
m ∈ |A|.
If (18)-(20) are valid on a non-pathological model MFM , then MFM
is based on a metaphysical frameFM = (T , |A|) that satisfies the Choice**
principle. This is the sense in which (18)-(20) can express that we have a
single future. However,
22 In Definition 4.9.3, the requirement that the moment shifted by the future operator,
m′, must be actual is responsible for the failure of (18) at non-actual moments. However,
bear in mind that the notion of validity that will be assumed in the proof of Fact 13 is
defined as truth at every actual moment (see the following definition).
23See Blackburn (1994).
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Fact 13. (18) and (20) are valid on a non-pathological model MFM just in
case the metaphysical frame FM = (FBT , |A|) on which MFM is such that |A| is
a history.
Proof. As for Fact 12, if MFM # F(n)(A)∨ F(n)(¬A) for any m ∈ |A| ∈MFM ,
then
∃m′(dT (m,m
′) = n & m <m′ & m′ ∈ |A| & MFM ,m
′
#A) or
∃m′(dT (m,m
′) = n & m <m′ & m′ ∈ |A| & MFM ,m
′
# ¬A)
Recall that histories are assumed to be unbounded both to the past and to the
future. Moreover, any m is such that either MFM ,m # A or MFM ,m # ¬A.
Thus, (18)’s validity means that, for any actual moment in MFM , there is at
least one of its future moments that is actual. On the other hand, if MFM #
¬(F(n)(A) & F(n)(¬A)) for any m ∈ |A| ∈MFM , then
¬(∃m′(dT (m,m
′) = n & m <m′ & m′ ∈ |A| & MFM ,m
′
#A) &
∃m′(dT (m,m
′) = n & m <m′ & m′ ∈ |A| & MFM ,m
′
# ¬A))
which is equivalent to
∀m′(dT (m,m
′) = n & m <m′ & m′ ∈ |A|⇒MFM ,m
′
# ¬A) or
∀m′(dT (m,m
′) = n & m <m′ & m′ ∈ |A|⇒MFM ,m
′
#A),
which says that any two actual moments, lying at n time units in the future
of m, must satisfy the same set of formulas. Since we are dealing with non-
pathological models, any two moments in the same instant must satisfy differ-
ent sets of formulas. Hence, if (18) and (20) are valid on a non-pathological
model MFM , for any actual moment m in MFM , there is a unique actual mo-
ment at n time units in the future of m. This, obviously, entails the Choice**
principle: for any two instants i, i ′ s.t. i <i i
′, there exists a unique m ∈ i ′ s.t.
m ∈ |A|. This proves Fact 12. As for Fact 13, the right-to-left direction is quite
trivial. Let us then proove its left-to-right direction only. Assume that (18) and
(20) are valid in MFM . Thus, by Fact 12, it follows that MFM must satisfy
the Choice** principle. Suppose thatMFM does not satisfy the Past Actuality
principle, for there are two moments in it, saym andm′ , s.t.m,m′ ∈ |A|,m ∈ i,
m′ ∈ i ′, i <i i
′ but m and m′ are not <-related. Assume that dT (m,m
′) = n′.
Since (18) and (20) are valid inMFM , there must be a unique m
′′ s.t.m′ < m′′ ,
m′′ ∈ |A| and dT (m
′ ,m′′) = n, for any n. And there must be a unique m′′′
s.t. m < m′′′, m′′′ ∈ |A| and dT (m,m
′′′) = n, for any n. Consider an instant
i ′ s.t. i(m) <i i
′ and i(m′) <i i
′. Then, there must be two moments in i ′, say
m′′ and m′′′, s.t. m < m′′, m′ < m′′′, dT (m,m
′′) "↑ and dT (m
′,m′′′) "↑. Then,
m′′,m′′′ ∈ |A|, and thus i ′ contains two actual moments. This contradicts the
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Choice** principle. It follows thatMFM satisfies both the Choice** principle
and the Past actuality principle. By Fact 11, MFM must specify a unique,
substantially actual history. Accordingly, Fact 13 follows.
A many-worlds advocate must asses the non-pathological models in
which (18) and (20) are both valid as metaphysically inadequate. In par-
ticular, the many-worlds theory entails that everything that is possible
is substantially actual, and thus it is incompatible with the validity of
(20) on non-pathological models. More generally, the class of metaphysical
frames compatible with the many-worlds view are such that, for any frame
FM = (T , |A|) in that class, T = |A|. On the other hand, if (18) and (20) are
valid according to Definitions 4.9.1-4.9.5, they express the Choice** princi-
ple. Hence, their validity can indeed convey the information that we have
a single future. But (18) and (20) are valid in the class of models based on
those metaphysical frames FM = (T , |A|) such that |A| = h. Accordingly, if
(18) and (20) express that we have a single future, they forces to accept the
existence of a unique, substantially actual history.
4.10 Metaphysical worries
Belnap et al. (2001) express a worry related to the commitment of a unique,
substantially actual history.
What in the structure of our world could determine a single
possibility from among all the others to be “actual”? (Belnap
et al. 2001: 162-163)
Suppose we name the unique, substantially actual history as h. Then – as
Jacek Wawer (2014) rightly points out – the question «What in the struc-
ture of our world could determine a single possibility from among all the
others to be “actual”?» has two readings.
First reading: What in the structure of our world makes it necessary that
history h is substantially actual?
Second reading: What in the structure of our world makes it necessary that
there is a unique history that is substantially actual?
The first reading asks whether something necessitates h to be actual. In
my view, the notion of modality involved here cannot be historical. In
other terms, the first reading does not use “necessity” in the same sense in
which, given a moment m in a tree, one may say that at m it is inevitable
that there will be a sea battle tomorrow. And this because the question uses
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the expression “the structure of our world”, which, presumably, refers to
those metaphysical principles – such as those in Definition 4.8.1 – which
rule the physical possibilities of the reality we live in. In other terms, “the
structure of our world” can be taken to refer to those principles that are
satisfied by the metaphysical frame we are located at, but may be satisfied
by other metaphysical frames as well. If this is so, I perfectly agree with
Wawer:
[T]he answer is: “Nothing!”. The world is indeterministic and
it can develop along any of the possible ways. It simply devel-
ops along one of them which we call TRLh [that is, h]. (Wawer
2014: 392)
If one uses the notion of metaphysical frame, it is easy to see that nothing
in Definition 4.8.1 of Branching Objective Indeterminism* necessitates h
to be the actual history. Indeed, FM = (T , |A| = h) is not the only meta-
physical frame that satisfies that definition. There are, for instance, other
metaphysical framesF ′M = (T , |A| " h) which are perfectly compatible with
Branching Objective Indeterminism*, but they do not specify h as their
substantially actual history. Definition 4.8.1 of Branching Objective Inde-
terminism*, indeed, does not isolate a unique metaphysical frame, but a
class of frames. In this sense, nothing in the structure of our world necessi-
tates h to be the actual history. However, any metaphysical frame compat-
ible with Branching Objective Indeterminism* specifies a unique, actual
history. Hence, in this sense it is necessary that there is a unique history
that is substantially actual. This, in turn, directly answers the second read-
ing of Belnap’s question.
4.11 Towards the Thin red line semantics.
As I tried to argue, Belnap’s conservative strategy should adopt the BO
semantics to be distinguished from supervaluationism. The BO semantics,
in turn, can only be attractive for those who subscribe to a many-worlds,
deterministic view. And this because, on a many-worlds perspective, any
possible history obtains.
Moreover, conservationists, as well as Thomason andMacFarlane, hold
that actuality can only be a relational matter. This conception of actuality,
moreover, cannot tell apart branching indeterminists from branching de-
terminists. Thus, to express some basic tenets of indeterminism, one needs
to use a notion of substantial actuality.
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Once that the Choice and the Past actuality principles are interpreted
with substantial actuality, one can easily define a notion of branching in-
determinism that a many-worlds theorist cannot accept. However, this no-
tion entails the commitment to a unique actual history.
Thus, it is tempting to think that, when it comes to interpret a tensed
language against a tree structure, a branching indeterminist should at-
tribute to the unique, substantially actual history a crucial role. Next chap-
ter explores several semantics which employ the substantially actual his-
tory.
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Chapter 5
Thin Red Line
The thin red line semantics model the intuition that histories are not on an
equal footing with one another. One of them, the actual history, or, as it is
called, the thin red line, is privileged. This approach was first suggested by
Øhrstrøm (1981). It was defended by Borghini & Torrengo (2013), Braüner
et al. (2000), Øhrstrøm (2009, 2014), Malpass &Wawer (2012) and Wawer
(2014) from the criticism raised by Belnap & Green (1994), Belnap et al.
(2001), MacFarlane (2014) and Iacona (2014).
The contemporary debate inherits the thin red line intuition from the
solution William of Ockham (1978) gave to the puzzle involving free will
and divine foreknowledge.1 If today God knows what I will do tomorrow,
then it is inevitable that tomorrow I will act as God’s knowledge tells me to
act. Hence, either God has foreknowledge but there is no free will, or I am
free to will but God doesn’t have foreknowledge. Ockham replies that not
any truth known by God is inevitable. For instance, if today God knows
that I willA-ing tomorrow, today it is true that tomorrow I willA-ing. But
is not inevitably so. Future tensed statements that are true at a moment
m are those that are true in the future of m along the actual history that
that passes through m. But they might be true at m even if they are not
inevitably so – even if they are not true at some history passing through m.
As we have seen, however, the commitment to a unique, substantially
actual history is entailed by Definition 4.8.1 of Branching Objective In-
determinism*. This commitment, in turn, suggests that the substantially
actual history should play a relevant semantical role in the interpretation
of a tensed language such as LT . Recall, for instance, that according to
David Lewis,
[t]he trouble with branching exactly is that it conflicts with our
1See also Øhrstrøm (2009) and Malpass & Wawer (2012) on this matter.
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ordinary presupposition that we have a single future. If two
futures are equally mine, one with a sea fight tomorrow and
one without, it is nonsense to wonder which way it will be [...]
and yet I do wonder. (Lewis 1986a: 207-208)
If the presupposition that we have a single future is ordinary, the way
we talk should reflect it. And if indeterminism entails the existence of a
unique actual future, it is natural to expect that the unique actual future
helps to make sense of predictions about future contingent events – viz.,
it may help to make sense of how and why people “wonder which way it
will be”. Very roughly, one may say that
[o]n the relevant semantics for ‘will’, something ‘will’ happen
(as a first approximation) if and only if ‘the unique actual fu-
ture’ features the thing happening. (Todd 2015: 2)
As we shall see, however, to yield a semantic framework in which the
actual history plays a crucial role is not an easy task. Furthermore, authors
such as Belnap and Placek to claim that
[o]ur central argument against the TRL—the history contain-
ing the“actual future”— is this: Positing a TRL does no work
in understanding statements involving a reference to future
happenings, whether commonsensical or in the language of
physics, and indeed tends to interfere with that understand-
ing. (Placek & Belnap 2012: 463)
This chapter is devoted to defend the opposite claim: positing a TRL does
work in understanding statements involving a reference to future hap-
penings. And positing a TRL does not interfere with commonsensical lan-
guage, nor with the language of physics. Moreover, I shall argue that (i)
there is a suitable TRL semantics which helps to answer the Aristotelian
question (Q1) by saving both contingency and bivalence, (ii) this seman-
tics answers (Q2) by rejecting the principle of the necessity of the past,
PNP, and (iii) it does not suffer of any of the flaws affecting the other se-
mantics analysed thus far.
First, let us distinguish two semantic roles that the actual history may
play.
Recursive Thin Red Line: The thin red linemay occur in the recursive clauses
of a given semantics. For instance, the actual history may occur within
the truth conditions of future tensed statements. Under this view,
one might say that F(n)A is true at m iff A is true at the moment
which is n time units in the future of m along the actual history.
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Post-Semantic thin red line: The thin red line may occur within the defini-
tion of truth at amoment. For instance, one can state that a statement
of LT is true at m iff it is BO-true at m on the thin red line.
Among the semantics which attribute to the thin red line the recursive
role, there are two main variants. The former assumes that the thin red
line is unique. We call this theory the absolute thin red line (AT). The second
kind subscribes to the idea that any moment of the tree has its own thin
red line. The two semantics satisfying the latter condition are the relative
thin red line (RT) and the dynamic thin red line (DT).
There are two semantics in which the thin red line plays the post-
semantic role: these are the post-semantic thin red line, (PT), and the su-
pervaluationist thin red line (ST). Next section analyses the recursive ap-
proaches. Next chapter analyses the recursive approaches.
5.1 Recursive thin red line
Let us start with the so-called Absolute thin red line semantics, AT.2
Definition 5.1.1. (AT-models) An AT-model is a tuple MAT = (T ,dT , I ,h),
such that
(a) T is a tree,
(b) dT is a T -duration function,
(c) I is an interpretation function from atoms of LT to the the set of moment
history pairs m/h, such that, if m/h ∈ I(p), then, for any h′ s.t. m ∈ h′,
m/h′ ∈ I(p).
(d) h is the actual history of T .
The AT-semantics interprets LT as follows.
Definition 5.1.2 (AT-semantics). Given a AT-model MAT for LT ,
(AT1) m #AT p⇔m ∈ I(p)
(AT2) m #AT ¬A⇔ not m #AT A⇔m !AT A
(AT3) m #AT A∨B⇔ either m #AT A or m #AT B
(AT4) m #AT F(n)A⇔∃m
′(m′ ∈ h & m <m′ & dT (m,m
′) = n & m′ #AT A))
(AT5) m #AT P(n)A⇔∃m
′(m′ < m & dT (m,m
′) = n & m′ #AT A)
(AT6) m #AT $A⇔∃m
′(m <m′ & m′ #AT A)
2See Wawer (2014: 370).
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(AT7) m #AT !A⇔∀h
′(m ∈ h′ ⇒∃m′(m′ ∈ h′ & m <m′ & m′ #AT A))
Notice that AT-truth (AT-falsity) is relative to moments only, and AT
is perfectly bivalent. Furthermore, AT refelects what Branching Objective
Indeterminism* entails: an MAT model, indeed, specifies a unique ac-
tual history. Accordingly, AT provides an adequate answer the Aristotelian
question (Q1), for it conserves both contingency and bivalence. Further-
more, it is easy to see that P(n)A → !P(n)A fails to be AT-valid. Hence,
AT allows to answer (Q2) by rejecting the principle of the necessity of the
past.
It is interesting to notice that ! and $ are not dual, and thus they have
to be defined separately. In the AT-semantics, indeed, ¬$¬A, uttered atm,
entails that any possible moment m′ s.t. m < m′ satisfies A. m #AT ¬!¬A,
however, entails that there is a h passing through m s.t. any moment m′
satisfies A, wherem′ ∈ h and m <m′. But this seems to be incorrect: saying
at m that it is inevitable that A is to say that ¬A is historically impossible
at m. But if there are two h,h′ passing through m s.t. (i) for any moment
m′ that is in h s.t. m < m′, m′ satisfies A, and (ii) there is a moment m′′ ∈ h′
that satisfies ¬A, it follows that m #AT !A∧$¬A. This blatantly violates
the intended meaning of the historical operators ! and $.
Furthermore, according to clause (AT4), F(n)A is true at m iff A is true
at the moment m′ that is n time units in the future of m along the actual
history h; otherwise F(n)A is false at m. This entails that:
We have no trouble with predictions that will be or have been
made, but we have no way of understanding predictions that
might have been made.(Belnap et al. 2001: 162)
What Belnap et al. (2001) are questioning is the way in which AT evaluates
predictions that might have been made, viz., predictions made at non-
actual moments. Whenever m is not actual (m # h), AT predicts that any
A, uttered at m, must be assessed as false. This, in turn, seems wrong, for
we should have a semantics that enables us to evaluate those predictions
that one might have made. Furthermore, schemas such as the excluded
middle, A∨¬A, as well as the principle of non-contradiction, ¬(A∧¬A)
fails at non-actual moments, and thus they cannot be AT-validities.3
The relative thin red line semantics, RT, is a natural strategy to overcome
some of the difficulties which characterise AT. RT relativises the actual
history to moments: the same history may be actual for a given moment,
but may fail to be so for another moment. Formally, this move consists in
3Obviously, here I am assuming that A is AT-valid iff it is AT-true at any m.
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defining a function TRL which maps any moment m to its actual history,
TRL(m). Once that the TRL function is introduced, it is possible to specify
the truth conditions for future tensed statements as follows (the clauses
for the other formulas of LT are the same as those of AT):
(RT) m #RT F(n)A⇔∃m
′(m <m′ & m′ ∈ TRL(m) & dT (m,m
′) = n &
m′ #RT A)
RT avoids some of the problems related to AT. For instance, RT does not
entail that predictions that might have been made are false, for any m has
its own thin red line TRL(m). In a sense, RT predicts that there are no
‘predictions that might have been made’. Furthermore, schemas such as
the excluded middle and the principle of non-contradiction turn out to be
RT-valid. However, Belnap & Green (1994) argue that RT contradicts the
assumption that there are several possible futures accessible from a given
arbitrary moment m. From their perspective, an adequate semantics for
future contingents should validate the following, intuitive schema:
(1) F(n)F(n′)A→ F(n+n′)A
In order to guarantee the validity of (1), one needs to specify some condi-
tion on the TRL function. One natural requirement is:
(A1) ∀m(m ∈ TRL(m))
Condition (A1) states that anymoment is actual from its own ‘perspective’.
It is possible to prove that (1) is an RT-validity if the TRL function satisfies,
in addition to (A1), also the following condition:
(A2) ∀m,m′(m < m′ ⇒ TRL(m) = TRL(m′))
But the conjunction of (A1) and (A2) forbids forward branching, yielding
a linear time structure. Here there is the proof.
Fact 14. (A1) and (A2) entails the existence of a unique, possible history.
Proof. Assume that m < m′ and that m < m′′. By (A2), TRL(m) = TRL(m′)
and TRL(m) = TRL(m′′). Therefore, TRL(m′) = TRL(m′′). By (A1) it follows
that m′ ∈ TRL(m′) and m′′ ∈ TRL(m′), which entails that either m′ < m′′,
or m′′ ≤ m′. Thus, there cannot be two moments that are not <-related. This
directly entails that there is a unique possible history.
Intuitively, if any moment has its own thin red line, which nonetheless
is inherited by earlier moments, every moment must belong to the same
thin red line. Braüner et al. (2000) and Øhrstrøm (2009) have objected that
an advocate of RT is not forced to adopt (A2). Indeed, she can assume a
weaker condition:
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(A2’) ∀m,m′(m <m′ & m′ ∈ TRL(m)⇒ TRL(m) = TRL(m′))
The new condition does not entail that, for a given moment m, any later
moment m′ has to belong to the thin red line TRL(m) of m. (A2’) simply
requires that, if m′ is in TRL(m), then m′ has TRL(m) as its own thin red
line. Hence, the conjunction of (A1) and (A2’) is consistent with forward
branching. Moreover, (A1) and (A2’) guarantee that (1) is RT-valid.
Be as it may, recall that the clauses that RT gives for statements such
as !A and $A are identical to those of AT. Hence, the RT-semantics, as
well as AT, does not account for the intended meaning of ! and $. Indeed,
statements of the form !A∧$¬A are still RT-satisfiable.
Furthermore, (A1) and (A2’) are such that the principle of retrograda-
tion is not an RT-validity. Consider Figure 5.1 and suppose that TRL(m0) =
h2 and dT (m0,m1) = dT (m0,m2) = 1. Then the conditional p→ P(1)F(1)p is
RT-false at m1, since p is RT-true at m1, but P(1)F(1)p is RT-false at m1.
h2h1
m2: ¬pm1: p
m0
Figure 5.1
In order to overcome these difficulties, Braüner et al. (2000) andØhrstrøm
(2009, 2014) adopt a new semantics. Let us call it the dynamic thin red
line, DT.
First of all, notice that the problem related to historical modalities may
solved by interpreting ! and $ in the usual way, that is, as quantifications
over the histories of evaluation. Moreover, the retrogradation principle,
A → P(n)F(n)A, fails to be a RT-validity since the TRL function may as-
sign distinct actual histories to distinct but successive moments. Accord-
ingly, one may restrict the number of histories that are relevant for the
evaluation of a statement used at a given moment m. In particular, one
may exclude those histories that pass through some moment m′ that is
later than m, but that are not the thin red line of m′ . In other terms, the
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set C(m) of those histories that can occur within a point of evaluation of a
sentence used at m is:
(2) C(m) = {h :m ∈ h & ∀m′(m′ > m & m′ ∈ h→ TRL(m′) = h)}
Once that (2) is introduced, let us define DT-models as follows.
Definition 5.1.3. (DT-models) ADT-model is a tupleMDT = (T ,dT , I ,TRL),
such that
(a) T is a tree,
(b) dT is a T -duration function,
(c) I is an interpretation function from atoms of LT to the the set of moment
history pairs m/h, such that, if m/h ∈ I(p), then, for any h′ s.t. m ∈ h′,
m/h′ ∈ I(p).
(d) TRL is a function from moments of T to histories of T , and TRL satisfies
(A1), (A2’) .
DT interprets wffs of LT as follows.
Definition 5.1.4 (DT-semantics). Given a DT-model MDT for LT , let hc be a
history in C(m).
(DT1) m/hc #DT p⇔m/hc ∈ I(p)
(DT2) m/hc #DT ¬A⇔ not m/hc #DT A⇔m/hc !DT A
(DT3) m/hc #DT A∨B⇔ either m/hc #DT A or m/hc #DT B
(DT4) m/hc #DT F(n)A⇔∃m
′(m′ ∈ hc & m <m
′ & dT (m,m
′) = n &
m′/hc #DT A)
(DT5) m/hc #DT P(n)A⇔∃m
′(m′ ∈ hc &m
′ < m& dT (m,m
′′) = n&m′/hc #DT
A)
(DT6) m/hc #DT !A⇔∀h
′
c(m ∈ h
′
c ⇒m/h
′
c #DT A)
It is worth to noticing that the conjunction of (A1) and (A2’) entails
that the thin red line of m is one of the histories at which it is legitimate
to evaluate a statement used at m. In general, DT validates both (1) and
the retrogradation principle: A→ P(n)F(n)A. Moreover, intuitive schemas
such as the excluded middle, as well as the principle of non-contradiction,
turn out to be DT-valid. DT restores the intended meaning of historical
modalities, in the sense that !A ∧ $¬A is unsatisfiable. These features
save DT from the criticism raised against RT.
As far as (Q2) is concerned, DT, as well as BO, refutes the principle of
the necessity of the past: P(n)A → !P(n)A. Accordingly, the advocates of
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DT reject the Master argument. Notice, however, that the recursive clauses
provided by DT are very similar to that of BO. The only difference is that
DT requires that the history occurring in a point of evaluation m/hc must
belong to C(m). This, in turn, makes DT an inadequate semantic frame-
work to answer the Aristotelian question (Q1), for DT – even if perfectly
bivalent – defines truth (falsity) at moment-history pairs.
And there are other reasons to reject DT. First, notice that hc inm/hc can
fail to be TRL(m). This trait does not capture a basic tenet of the thin red
line approaches, according to which a prediction, uttered at a given mo-
ment, is true since its ‘real future’ verifies what it is predicted. Even worst,
DT doesn’t capture one of the most basic principle purported by those
indeterminists who – rightly in our mind – are committed to a unique,
substantially actual history. The function TRL, indeed, attributes to any
moment its actual history. But this is inadequate, at least from the indeter-
ministic perspective defined in the previous chapter. If Branching Objec-
tive Indeterminism* is true, there are moments that are merely possible.
And these moments, in turn, cannot be part of the unique substantially
actual history (recall, indeed, that a history is substantially actual iff it
contains substantially actual moment only). Thus, it is wrong to attribute
to those moments a thin red line.
5.2 Post-semantic thin red line
If Branching Objective Indeterminism* entails the existence of a unique,
substantially actual history, it is plausible to think that this history is sig-
nificant for the truth of arbitrary statements. In particular, any statement
A – whatever its logical form may be – is true at its moment of use just in
case it is true at that moment on the unique actual history. To my mind,
this is the most straightforward, natural way to attribute a semantical role
to the actual history.
Accordingly, one may define a post-semantical, thin red line model as
follows:
Definition 5.2.1. (PTmodels) APT-model is a tupleMPT = (T ,dT ,h), where
T is a tree, dT is a T -duration function, and h the unique actual history.
Definition 5.2.2. (PT semantics) Given a PT model MPT and an arbitrary
statement A of LT ,
m #PT A⇔m/h #BO A; m !PT A otherwise.
5.2. POST-SEMANTIC THIN RED LINE 171
The PT semantics has many virtues. It is perfectly bivalent and rejects
the Aristotelian premises (Pa)-(Pb). The principle of the necessity of the
past, P(n)A→ !P(n)A, cannot be PT-valid, and hence any advocate of PT
rejects the Master argument. Moreover, PT-models are based on frames
which specify a unique actual history, and this seems to be what branching
indeterminism, properly understood, requires. This brief overview seems
to save PT from many criticisms.
Nonetheless, Belnap et al. (2001: 162) and Iacona (2014: 2638) argue
that PT has two serious logical flaws.
Objection 1: PT falsifies any statement used at a moment which is
not in h.
As we have seen before, also AT suffered of this feature. And Objection 1
entails several unwelcome results. For instance, the excluded middle, the
future excluded middle and the principle of retrogradation are all false at
any non-actual moment. Hence, it seems that they cannot be PT-valid.
Malpass &Wawer (2012) take up the challenge raised by the objection,
while maintaining their commitment to the unique actual history.4 They
observe that – by definition – a statement is inevitable (impossible) at m
just in case it is BO-true (BO-false) at any history which passes through m.
Hence, inevitable (impossible) statements have a determinate truth value,
no matter whether their moment of use is either actual or merely possible.
On the other hand, future contingents have determinate truth values
at their moment of use – so the argument goes – just in case there is an
actual history passing through that moment, and against which an eval-
uation can be made. The existence of the actual history guarantees that
any future contingent that is uttered at an actual moment has a deter-
minate truth value. However, the uniqueness of the actual history entails
that there is nothing as the actual history of a non-actual moment. Hence,
future contingents, used at non-actual moments, must lack a determinate
truth value.
In order to overcome the objection, Belnap et al. (2001) and Iacona
(2014) raised against PT, one has to define a semantics which leaves con-
tingent predictions, made at non-actual moments, devoid of any determi-
nate truth value.
These considerations lead Malpass & Wawer (2012) to adopt the fol-
lowing disjunctive clauses, which define their supervaluationist thin red
line semantics (ST). Given an arbitrary statement A of LT , and an MPT
model,
4See also Malpass (2013, 2016).
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(ST1) A is true at m iff (for any history h which passes through m, A is
BO-true at m/h) or (A is BO-true at m/h)
(ST2) A is false at m iff (for any history h which passes through m, A is
BO-false at m/h) or (A is BO-false at m/h)
It is easy to see that (ST1)-(ST2) are apt to reject the two premises of the
Aristotelian argument, (Pa) and (Pb). Moreover, the new semantics con-
serves any BO-validity and defines truth (falsity) only relative to moments.
It is worth noting that (ST1)-(ST2) assign determinate truth values only
to two kinds of statements: inevitable (impossible) sentences and future
contingents uttered at actual moments. For instance, suppose that A is a
future contingent uttered at an actual moment m. By (ST1)-(ST2), it must
be either true or false at m. Its determinate truth value depends on what
happens both on the actual future and on the possible futures accessible
fromm. However, ifA is a future contingent used at a non-actual moment,
it is neither true nor false. This example shows that ST does not satisfy
bivalence: any future contingent, used at amerely possible moment, comes
out neither true nor false.
ST has a hybrid nature. It combines the intuition lying behind the post-
semantics approach with the supervaluationist technique. As we shall see,
supervaluationism assumes that a statement has a determinate truth value
at its moment of use iff either it is settled true or settled false at that mo-
ment. Contingent sentences lack determinate truth values. In the ST se-
mantics, the supervaluationist strategy is only applied to future contin-
gents uttered at non-actual moment. In turn, this formal feature reflects
the conclusion Malpass & Wawer (2012) inferred from the argument we
have just seen above.
I think that one can reasonably reject the assumption that future con-
tingents have truth values just in case they are used at actual moments.
According to Iacona (2014: 2640), for instance, when one evaluates a pre-
diction at a non-actual moment m, the fact that none of the possible fu-
tures of m is actual is irrelevant. What matter is which possibility would
be actual if m were actual. Just as the truth value of a prediction made
at an actual moment depends on the actual future, the truth value of a
counterfactual prediction depends on what would happen if certain con-
ditions were to obtain. Accordingly, there is theoretical room for the idea
that future contingents satisfy bivalence, even when their moment of used
is supposed to be non-actual. This kind of criticism against (ST1)–(ST2) is
on the right track, and it is related to the arguments given in the following
sections.
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5.2.1 Actual history and contexts of use
The dialectical scenario which give raise to ST is ill-conceived. Recall that
ST was designed to overcome PT, which entails that any sentence used at
a non-actual moment is false. According to Wawer (2014), this very ob-
jection is false. Moreover, the notion on which the objection is based –
namely, that of a statement used at a non-actual moment – presupposes a
metaphysical picture that a thin red line theorist has to reject.
Wawer (2014) underlines that a moment occurring in an instance of
(PT) m #PT A⇔m/h #BO A; m !PT A otherwise,
is standardly assumed to be the moment of a context of use. In turn, the
context of use is ordinarily thought as a sequence of semantic relevant
parameters, describing the scenario in which a speech act may take place.
Any parameter specified by a context of use represents a ‘piece of reality’
on which the semantic value of an expression, uttered at that context, may
depend.
Several authors highlight that contexts of use have ‘fact-of-the-matter’
parameters. For instance, Kaplan (1989a: 597) claims that we have a-priori
knowledge about what facts ought to obtain at a world for that world to
contain a context.5 In turn, these facts – i.e., language-independent fea-
tures of reality – are the ingredients of contexts of use. Kaplan (1989a: 593)
himself argues that assignments to variables have a language-dependent
nature. Hence, they cannot occur as parameters of contexts. On the con-
trary, denotations of indexicals such as “I” and “here” – namely, the speaker
and the utterance place – are not language-dependent. Thus, speakers and
places are legitimate context parameters.6
Belnap et al. (2001: 145) share the same assumption:
The context of use provides what is in fact determined by an
idealized speech act using the given sentence as vehicle. The
context provides only what Kaplan calls “fact-of-the-matter pa-
rameters” (Kaplan 1989a: 593). They are what they are, and the
logician is not entitled to make them up.
5Part of this a-priori knowledge (see Kaplan 1989b: 512, footnote 37) should entail
that a context of use must specify the agent of the context, existing during the time of the
context at the world of the context. Furthermore, the agent should be located at the place
of the context. However, this conception of a context of use has been recently criticised
by Predelli (2005: ch. 2).
6Certainly, the fact that “I” has the character that it has is based on the way we use it.
Hence, the character of “I” is, in a sense, conventional. But given the character that “I”
actually has, its denotation at a context (the speaker) is language-independent.
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Moreover, Belnap et al. (2001: 148) insist that context parameters cannot
be stipulated:
You cannot, however, make up features of the context as you
go along. You can reasonably decide to treat “now” or “here”
as context-dependent, but that is only because there is in fact a
time of use and a place of use.
According to Wawer (2014: 380), the fact-of-the-matter character of con-
texts leads to the following conclusion:
After all, a use of a sentence (an idealisation of a speech act)
is a concrete event in our world, and a context consists of con-
crete circumstances that accompany this event. Therefore, I as-
sume that postulating and using certain contexts in the seman-
tic theory is tantamount to the metaphysical commitment to
their concrete existence.7
Here ‘concrete’ means ‘spatiotemporal’: something is concrete if it has spa-
tiotemporal properties. According to Wawer, any parameter of a context
describes something that exists in space and in time. Wawer agrees with
Belnap and Kaplan in that context parameters must have a fact-of-the-
matter character. Moreover, this requirement leads him to stick to the fol-
lowing principle:
Concreteness: Using certain parameters as context parameters commits to
their concrete existence.
If Concreteness is on the right track, there is room to reject that any possi-
ble moment is a moment of (a context of) use. If there is only one actual
history, plausibly, any moment in that history is a concrete piece of reality.
After all, an actual moment is nothing but an instantaneous slice of the ac-
tual world, the world we inhabit. By Concreteness, using actual moments
as moments of use entails their concreteness. In turn, their concreteness is
perfectly compatible with the commitment to a unique actual history.
But what about merely possible moments? Kripke (1980) famously ar-
gued that speaking about possibilities does not force to conceive each of
them as concrete. Quite the contrary, he holds that just one possibility –
the actual one – is concrete. The other possibilities are abstract entities,
in the sense that no spatiotemporal entity, or state, or fact, corresponds
to them.8 Analogously, one may reject that merely possible moments are
7Emphasis added.
8For the opposite metaphysical view, see Lewis (1986a).
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concrete, and, by Concreteness, merely possible moments are not moments
of use. Wawer’s argument may be summarised as follows:
Concreteness: Using certain parameters as context parameters commits to
their concrete existence.
Actuality: Only moments lying on the actual history h are concrete.
∴ Moments of use must belong to the actual history h.
The conclusion allows to restrict the values the moment parameter can
assume within any instance of (PT). Moreover, this latter restriction can-
not be charged of being ad hoc, since it is motivated by the particular
metaphysical view Wawer is assuming. Under this metaphysical reading,
the objection that (PT) falsifies any statement used at merely possible mo-
ments is false, for there is no such thing as a merely possible moment of
use. And if PT-validity is defined as PT-truth at any concrete moment –
viz. truth at any moment in h – it is easy to check that A is PT-valid just in
case it is a BO-validity.
5.2.2 On considering a history as actual
Wawer (2014)’s account of contexts overstates things. Concreteness is un-
necessarily loaded from a metaphysical viewpoint, and it yields unwel-
come results when applied to more general semantic approaches. To see
why, let us focus on the so-called two dimensional semantics.
After thework of Kripke (1980), it is widely accepted that proper names
are rigid designators – viz., a proper name denotes the same individual in
all possible worlds. Thus, identity statements of coreferring proper names
are necessary truths. For instance, “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is necessarily
true, since both “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” are rigid designators refer-
ring to Venus. Given that proper names are rigid designators, it is natural
to interpret them with a kripkean intension: a constant function from pos-
sible worlds to individuals.
On the other hand, it is highly intuitive to hold that two rigid desig-
nators might have failed to corefer: “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” might
have been used differently than the way they are actually used. Hence,
one may ask what the truth value of “Hesperus is Phosphorus” would be
if “Hesperus” were used as it is actually used, but “Phosphorus” were used
to name Jupiter. If the two expressions were used in this latter, ‘deviant’
way, “Hesperus is Phosphorus” would be necessarily false. In other terms,
the particular kripkean intension associated with a name may be contin-
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gent, depending on how whatever fixes the references of names may turn
out to be.
This little piece of reasoning shows that, as Stalnaker (2004: 295) puts
it, the semantic values of expressions will depend on extra-linguistic fea-
tures (let us call them facts) in two different ways. On the one hand, facts
determine what is said. On the other hand, facts determine whether what
is said is true. In order to capture these two different roles that facts may
play in semantics, several philosophers have developed the so-called two
dimensional semantics.9 In the two dimensional approach, statements are
evaluated at pairs of possible worlds, say (x,y). The first member, x, is the
world at which a sentence may be used. Its role is to represent the facts
determining what is said by a given sentence used at world x. The second
member of the pair, y, is the circumstance against which what is said in x
has to be evaluated. The role of y is to represent the facts that enable to
state whether what is said is true.
Suppose thatw1 is the actual world, i.e., the world in which “Hesperus”
and “Phosphorus” are used in such a way that they both refer to Venus.
Assume also that w2 is a (merely) possible world where people use “Hes-
perus” to refer to Venus, but use “Phosphorus” to refer to Jupiter.
If “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is used at w1, it comes out true relative
to both w1 and w2. In other terms, “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is true both
at (w1,w1) and at (w1,w2). Indeed, if the two rigid designators “Hespe-
rus” and “Phosphorus”, as used in w1, refer to Venus, “Hesperus is Phos-
phorus” states an identity which holds both at w1 and at w2. However,
“Hesperus is Phosphorus”, used at w2, is false at (w2,w1) and at (w2,w2).
In this latter case, “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus”, as used at w2, refer to
Venus and Jupiter respectively, and Venus and Jupiter are distinct individ-
uals both in w1 and in w2. These evaluations may be represented by the
following matrix.
Matrix for “Hesperus is Phosphorus”.
w1 w2
w1 True True
w2 False False
Intuitively, worlds on the left column determine what is said by “Hes-
perus is Phosphorus”. Worlds on the top row determine whether what is
9See Baldwin & Stalnaker 2001, Chalmers et al. 2006 and Stalnaker 1999, 2004: 78-
95. In general, the two dimensional semantics is similar to the treatment Kaplan 1989b
applies to indexicals. However, its applications go far beyond Kaplan’s logic of indexicals.
For an overview, see Schroeter 2012.
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said by “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is true.10 The matrix is the propositional
concept expressed by the statement. The diagonal proposition is the diag-
onal row in the matrix (the one that goes from the top left to the bottom
right), and identifies the proposition expressed by “Hesperus is Phospho-
rus” when the world which determineswhat is said is the same of the world
against which what is said has to be evaluated.11
To wonder whether “Hesperus is Phosphorus” were true (or false) if
uttered at w2 amounts to consider w2 both as the world of the context of
utterance and as the world-parameter occurring in the circumstance of
evaluation. In doing that, one is considering a merely possible world, w2, as
actual. What one does is wondering what the identity statement would say,
and what its truth value would be, if w2 turned out to be actual.
This latter feature helps to explain why Wawer (2014)’s interpretation
of contexts is unnecessarily cumbersome from a metaphysical viewpoint.
If Conreteness were correct – if it were true that “using certain contexts
in the semantic theory is tantamount to the metaphysical commitment to
their concrete existence” – any two dimensional semanticist would be com-
mitted to a pletora of concrete possible worlds. In turn, this conclusion is
absurd. One thing is the metaphysical claim that there is just one world
(history) which can be referred to as the ‘true’ or actual one. Quite another
is to use certain sets of parameters as contexts of use. A given set of pa-
rameters, considered as a context of use, describes a situation as if it were
actual. But from considering a scenario as actual, no commitment to its
concreteness should plausibly follow.
But then a problem arises. Recall that Concreteness justifies Wawer’s
conclusion, according to which a moment of use must lie in h. In turn,
this restriction on moments of use is needed to reject Objection 1. It seems
that if one refutes Concreteness, one is forced to reject PT on the basis that
it falsifies any statement used at merely possible moments. However, there
is something wrong with this very objection.
In what follows, an argument for the restriction on moments of use
inferred by Wawer is provided. However, that argument does not rely on
any (implausible or unnecessary) metaphysical assumption. The idea that
amoment of use must belong to the actual history, h, is nothing but a natu-
ral principle, deeply rooted in the way we understand andmodel contexts.
The argument runs as follows.
10The first logicians who used this jargon were Davies & Humberstone (1980).
11The propositional concept expressed by a sentenceAmay be identified with the func-
tion fA :W ×W 2−→ {1,0}, mapping pairs of possible worlds to truth values. The diagonal
proposition d of A, expressed at w, is the function dA(w) = fA(w,w).
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World of use : Given a PT-model MPT = (T ,dT ,h) and clause (PT), h is the
world of use.
Admissible moments: If m is an admissible moment of use, it is located the
world of use, h (that is, m ∈ h).
∴ Ifm is not located at h (viz., m # h), m is not an (admissible) moment
of use.
TheWorld of use premise can be motivated by looking once again at the
two-dimensional semantics. To say that A has truth value n when used at
world x amounts to consider x as actual. But when x is considered actual,
it plays a special semantical role: its value initialises that of the world-
parameter occurring within the circumstance at which A has to be evalu-
ated. When one wonders whether “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is true (false)
used at w2, one considers w2 both as the world of the context of utterance
and as the world parameter occurring in the circumstance of evaluation.
In the two-dimensional jargon, this is equivalent to check whether “Hes-
perus is Phosphorus” is true (false) at (w2,w2). This is quite natural: if one
wants to know the truth value of “Hesperus is Phosphorus” used at w2,
one has to check whether what is said by the statement at w2 fits with the
facts obtaining at that world. In general, when it comes to define the no-
tion of utterance-truth (that is, the notion of the truth of a statement used
at an utterance scenario), the world of use – the world considered actual –
initialises the circumstances of evaluation.
The most natural model for (PT) is a tuple MPT = (T ,dT ,h), where
h is the actual history of the tree T .12 By (PT), the designated history in
MPT = (T ,dT ,h) initialises the circumstances at which a sentence must
be evaluated. In other terms, given a model MPT = (T ,dT ,h) and (PT), h
is the initial value of the world (history) parameter occurring in the cir-
cumstance m/h. But since the history which initialises the circumstances
of evaluation is the history of use, theWorld of use principle follows: given
a model asMPT = (T ,dT ,h) and clause (PT), h is the history of use. When
one applies (PT) to evaluate a formula uttered at m, the model MPT =
(T ,dT ,h) yields the world (history) of utterance by ‘default’.
The Admissible moments premise may be justified as follows. Not any
set of parameters is apt to describe a scenario in which an utterance may
take place. For, as Lewis (1998: 29) suggests, context parameters do not
vary independently. The ‘interdependence’ that contextual parameters bear
with one another is a very deep intuition, and it relates to what can be con-
12Notice that the introduction of a designated history (world) in a model is a standard
move in modal logic, tracing back to the work of Kripke (1963: 3).
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sidered as an actual scenario of utterance. Kaplan (1989b: 512) assumes
that a sequence (w,a, l,m) describes a possible utterance scenario only if
agent a exists at the possible world w during moment m at the spatial lo-
cation l. The interdependence introduced by Kaplan among contexts pa-
rameters is clear: suppose that a is born at moment m at a spatial location
l in world w. As MacFarlane (2014: 56-57) points out, to take an utterance
of a as made in world w at a time m′ preceding the one of a’s birth is pre-
posterous. Agent a does not exist before m in w, so (w,a, l,m′) cannot be
taken as actual – hence, it cannot be considered as a context of use.
Predelli (2003, 2005) criticises the principle that agents must be lo-
cated at the time and at the place in which their utterances are performed.
Indeed, he notes that utterances of “I am not here now” can be true because
they take place at spatiotemporal locations others of those of their agents.
However, he continues to stick to the Kaplanian idea that a sentence used
at a context is true just in case it is true at the time in which is uttered,
relative to the world of the context. We think that this ‘conservatism’ is
supported by a very deep and intuitive principle. What is basically con-
served is that the moment of use signals when an utterance is supposed to
take place at the world of use. If moments of use have this role, once that
h is considered the world of use, it is unreasonable to take counterfactual
moments as moments of use. If one assumes h to be the world of use, it is
natural to hold that what can be uttered at the world of use must be uttered
at one of its moments. This latter principle naturally correlates the moment
of use with the world of use, and justifies the Admissible moments premise.
Hence, the value of the moment (of use) parameter must be located at
the history (world) of use h. In turn, this entails that any moment that is
not located at the actual history h cannot be taken as a moment of use.
Thus, Objection 1 is false.
The reasoning just provided has several virtues when compared with
Wawer’s argument. First, unlike Wawer’s argument, the one just proposed
does not assume Concreteness, avoiding its shortcomings. Furthermore,
denying the Concreteness principle does not amount to give up the fact-of-
the-matter character usually associated with contexts. Given an account of
what does it mean to have a fact-of-the-matter character, one may still dif-
ferentiate sets of parameters that can play the role of contexts from those
that cannot. For instance, one may still require, as Kaplan (1989a: 596)
does, that contexts must specify non-empty worlds. Alternatively, one may
still agree withWawer (2014: 380) and expect contexts to represent certain
portions of space at a time. We remain as neutral as possible about what
does it mean for a set of parameters to have a fact-of-the-matter charac-
ter. We just impose that any pair (m,h) has a fact-of-the-matter charac-
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ter, and may represent an utterance scenario, only if m ∈ h. This minimal
sense of fact-of-the-matter character is captured by the admissible moments
premise.
If the values the moment of use are restricted in the way suggested, it
is easy to check that:
✓ (PT) refutes the Aristotelian argument and provides a bivalent no-
tion of truth at a moment.
✓ (PT) refutes the Master argument by rejecting the principle of the
necessity of the past, PNP.
✓ (PT) validates the future excluded middle.
✓ (PT) does not introduce a semantic distinction between F(n)¬A and
¬F(n)A.
✓ (PT) does account for retrospective truth judgments.
✓ (PT) truth is disquotational.
✓ (PT) does not equates “plain” predictions with what inevitably will
be the case.
✓ (PT) yields a notion of intension which is perfectly compatible with
an eternalist understanding of the propositions.
✓ (PT) conserves any classical inferential rule.
Accordingly, (PT) seems to be advantaged over any other semantics anal-
ysed thus far. On the one hand, (PT) requires the specification of a unique
actual history, in accordance with Branching Objective Indeterminism*.
On the other hand, (PT) is compatible with what we do when we talk
about time and possibility. As we shall see in the next section, however,
many philosophers have further reasons for complaining (PT).
5.3 Counterfactuals and the thin red line
Even when the values the moment of use are restricted in the way sug-
gested, several philosophers complains (PT) on the ground of another, al-
leged logical defect. This time, (PT) is charged of yielding wrong results
for counterfactual reasoning. For instance, Belnap et al. (2001: 164) claim
that
We have no way of getting a grip on “Had things gone other-
wise, Jack would have asserted the following: ‘It will (eventu-
ally) rain’”. Given the context of Jack’s assertion, the TRL is no
longer able to guide us in understanding his reference to his
future.
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The quotation suggests that the actual history fails to play an explanatory
role when it comes to interpret counterfactual predictions.
Similarly, Iacona (2014: 2638) holds that (PT) does not yield correct
evaluations for intuitively true counterfactuals. Suppose I do not toss the
coin in my hand. However, it seems true to say that if I flipped the coin,
It would have landed either heads or tails. According to Iacona, the re-
quirement that moments of use must be actual prohibits to ‘look’ at what
happens at (merely possible) histories that could be actual. But since this
kind of shift is needed to evaluate counterfactuals, one cannot use (PT) to
assign a truth-value to counterfactuals which are intuitively true.
These worries may be summarised as follows:
Objection 2: (PT) does not account for counterfactual statements
such as “Had things gone otherwise, it would be the case that A”.
Objection 2 has two readings, depending on what counterfactuals are
taken to be. Counterfactuals may be thought as subjunctive conditionals
of the object language. If so, Objection 2 says that (PT) cannot yield cor-
rect truth conditions for sentences of the form A% B (where A% B
obviously reads “If A were the case, B would be the case”). On the other
hand, counterfactuals may be taken as sentences formulated at the met-
alinguistic level. They express metalinguistic intuitions about what object
language formulas would be true (false) if the actual history were different
from the one that is marked as such. Under this latter reading, Objection
2 says that the truth value distributions provided by (PT) (for object lan-
guage formulas) conflict which certain thoughts that we can express in the
metalanguage by means of constructions in subjunctive form. To sum up,
Objection 2 has the two following readings:
Objection 2.1: (PT) does not provide correct truth conditions for (ob-
ject language) sentences of the form A% B.
Objection 2.2: The truth value distributions provided by (PT) (for
object language formulas) conflict with metalinguistic subjunctive
conditionals.
Another objection against (PT) which involves counterfactual scenarios
is the following. Suppose that there are just threemoments,m0,m1 andm2,
such that m0 < m1, m0 < m2, m0,m1 ∈ h but m2 # h. If p is true at m1 but
false at m2, by (PT) it follows that “It will be the case that p” is true at m0.
According to MacFarlane (2014), an agent at m2 assesses the prediction
uttered at m0 as accurate (since it is true at m0), even if ¬p is true at the
moment of the assessment, m2. This, he argues, is a bad result. Hence,
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Objection 3.(PT) provides counterintuitive results for the counter-
factual retrospective assessments of future contingents.
In the next sections it will be argued that these three objections – based on
counterfactual scenarios – are innocuous for (PT).
5.3.1 Objection 2.1
If Objection 2.1 is true, (PT) yields incorrect truth conditions for the object-
language formulas such as A% B. But what determines whether a bi-
conditional expresses the correct truth conditions for counterfactuals? A
tentative answer consists in selecting three kinds of inferential patterns
involving %: (i) those that are (taken to be) sound, (ii) those that are
(taken to be) unsound, and (iii) those whose soundness is controversial.
It is reasonable to assume that a semantics for% is incorrect if either it
makes unsound one pattern among those of kind (i), or it makes sound one
pattern among those of kind (ii). Thus, according to Objection 2.1, (PT) is
incorrect, for it makes unsound some pattern of kind (i), or it makes sound
some pattern of kind (ii).
Now, let us look at the patterns of the three different kinds (⊢ is logical
entailment).
Patterns that are (taken to be) uncontroversially sound.
A. A% B,A ⊢ B Modus Ponens
B. A% B,¬B ⊢ ¬A Modus Tollens
Patterns that are (taken to be) uncontroversially unsound.
C. A% B, B% C ⊢A% C Transitivity
D. A% B ⊢ (A∧ C)% B Antecedent Strenghtening
E. ¬B% ¬A ⊢A% B Contraposition
Patterns whose soundness is controversial.
F. ⊢ ¬(A% B)↔ (A% ¬B) Equivalence
G. ⊢ (A% B)∨ (A% ¬B) Conditional Ex.Midd.
H. !(A% B) ⊢A% !(A→ B) Edelberg
I. A% !A,!(A% B) ⊢A% !B Weak Edelberg
Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens capture the conditional nature of %.
On the other hand, Antecedent Strengthening and Transitivity are related
to each another, and both patterns seem to be inappropriate for coun-
terfactual reasoning. First, Transitivity entails Antecedent Strengthening, as
shown as follows.
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1. A% B, B% C ⊢A% C Transitivity
2. (A∧B)% B, B% C ⊢ (A∧B)% C by setting A as (A∧B)
3. B% C ⊢ (A∧B)% C for (A∧B)% B is a logical truth
Step 3 is exactly the Antecedent Strengthening pattern, so whoever refutes
the latter must reject Transitivity as well. And there are very good reasons
to reject Antecedent Strengthening. As argued by Goodman (1947: 116),
Stalnaker (1968: 106) and Bennett & Bennett (2003: 160), whenever
If the match were struck, it would light,
is true, its strengthening
If this match had been soaked in water overnight and it were struck,
it would have light,
is false. Contraposition is another principle which fails in counterfactual
reasoning.13 It may be the case that
If Bob apologised to Alice, she would not forgive him,
since Alice is very, very angry. But its contrapositive,
If Alice did forgive Bob, then he would not apologised to her,
can be false as well, for Bob’s apologies may be necessary for Alice to for-
give him.
Moving to those patterns that are controversial, let us see some rela-
tionships obtaining between Equivalence and Conditional Excluded Middle.
The left-to-right side of Equivalence, ¬(A% B)→ (A% ¬B), is just the
Conditional Excluded Middle, (A% B)∨ (A% ¬B). Its right-to-left side,
L. (A% ¬B)→ ¬(A% B) Weak Boethius Thesis
fails if A% ¬B is vacuously true when A is impossible. But given that
a counterfactual with impossible antecedent is usually taken to be true,
Equivalence’s validity is in general restricted to counterfactuals with pos-
sible antecedents.
With this restriction in mind, Williamson (1988) noticed that, when we
are focused on possibly true antecedents, Equivalence entails Conditional
Excluded Middle once that two other patterns hold, namely
M. B1, ...,Bn ⊢ C⇒A% B1, ...,A% Bn ⊢A% C.
N. ⊢A%A
13The counterexample is readapted from Stalnaker (1968: 107).
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It can be proved that
Fact 15. M, N and Equivalence entail Conditional ExcludedMiddle (recall that
we are supposing that the antecedents of counterfactuals are possibly true).
Proof.
1. ¬
[
(A% B)∨ (A% C)
]
Assumption
2. ¬(A% B)∧¬(A% C) By 1 and Class.Log.
3. (A% ¬B)∧ (A% ¬C) By 2 and Equivalence
4. A% ¬(B∨ C) By 3, M and Class.Log.
5. ¬
[
(A% B)∨ (A% C)
]
→A% ¬(B∨C) By 1–4 and I→
6. ¬
[
(A% B)∨(A% C)
]
→ ¬
[
A% (B∨C)
]
By 5 and Equivalence
7. A% (B∨C)→ (A% B)∨(A% C) By 6 and Class.Log.
Given that ⊢A→ B holds only if A ⊢ B, by statement 7 it follows that
8. A% (B∨ C) ⊢ (A% B)∨ (A% C)
In turn, 8 guarantees Conditional Excluded Middle.
9. A ⊢ B∨¬B Class.Log.
10. A%A ⊢A% (B∨¬B) By 9 and M
11. ⊢A%A By N
12. ⊢A% (B∨¬B) By 10–11
13. ⊢ (A% B)∨ (A% ¬B) By 12 and 8
Now let us see why Equivalence, Conditional Excluded Middle, Edelberg
andWeak Edelberg are controversial principles.
Equivalence
According to Stalnaker (1968: 107), Equivalence reflects the actual use of
counterfactuals, for to deny a counterfactual (with a possibly true an-
tecedent) is to use the same counterfactual, but with opposite consequent.
This explains the fact, noted by Goodman and Chisholm in
their early papers on counterfactuals, that the normal way to
contradict a counterfactual is to contradict the consequent, keep-
ing the same antecedent. To deny “If Kennedy were alive to-
day, we wouldn’t be in this Vietnammess”, we say, “If Kennedy
were alive today, we would so be in this Vietnam mess”. (Stal-
naker 1968: 107)
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However, if “If Kennedy were alive today, we would so be in this Viet-
nam mess” (i.e., A% B) leads to deny “If Kennedy were alive today, we
wouldn’t be in this Vietnam mess” (i.e., ¬(A% ¬B)), then (A% B) →
¬(A% ¬B) and, by contraposition, (A% ¬B) → ¬(A% B) should be
two validities. But these data only supportWeak Boethius Thesis, and some-
thing stronger is needed to conclude that “to contradict a counterfactual
is to contradict the consequent, keeping the same antecedent”.
Furthermore, there are linguistic intuitions which pull towards the op-
posite direction of that of Stalnaker. Suppose Alice does not flip the coin
in her hands, but says “If I flipped the coin, it would land heads” (i.e.,
A% B). Bob can sensibly react to her by saying “Wrong Alice, it might
land tails” (entailing ¬(A% B)). However, an equally reasonable reaction
would be “Wrong Alice, it might land heads, but it also might land tails”
(entailing ¬(A% B)∧¬(A% ¬B)). Notice that ¬(A% B)∧¬(A% ¬B)
amounts to the negation of the left-to-right side of Equivalence. Hence,
Stalnaker’s argument in favour of Equivalence can be resisted.
Equivalence has been defended by Von Fintel & Iatridou (2002), who
claim that the pattern in question is crucial when it comes to interpret
counterfactual statements embedded by quantifiers. They give the follow-
ing argument. Intuitively, these two statements are equivalent:
(A) No student would have passed if they had goofed off.
(B) Every student would have failed to pass if they had goofed off.
In turn, (A) and (B) have to be formalized as follows:
(A’) ¬∃x(x is a student ∧(x goofs off% x passess))
(B’) ∀x(x is a student→ (x goofs off% ¬x passess))
But given the duality of ∀ and ∃ (i.e., ¬∀¬ = ∃), it follows from (A’) that
(A”) ∀x(x is a student→ ¬(x goofs off% x passess))
Since (A”) is equivalent to (A’), (A’) to (A), (A) to (B), and (B) to (B’), by
transitivity (A”) must be equivalent to (B’). Von Fintel & Iatridou (2002)
claims that their point generalises, to the extent that the two schemas
(A*) ∀x(Fx→ ¬(Gx%Hx))
(B*) ∀x(Fx→ (Gx% ¬Hx))
are equivalent. But then ¬(Gx % Hx) and (Gx % ¬Hx) must be co-
extensional, and a quantified version of Equivalence is thus obtained.
A crucial point in von Fintel’s argument is that the equivalence be-
tween (A*) and (B*) concerns any interpretation of any triple of predicates.
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But this assumption is pretty strong, and it can be contested: if no fair coin
is such that, if tossed, it would land heads, it may well be that, for any such
a coin, it is not the case that if it is tossed, it would land tails.
Interestingly, Williamson has another argument to reject Equivalence
which is based on indeterminism. Suppose that a certain apparatus was
not switched on at noon. Assume that nothing about the apparatus and
its surroundings at noon determined whether, had it been switched on, it
would have emitted a particle. Let us abbreviate “the apparatus is switched
on” with p and “the apparatus will emit a particle” with Fq. According to
Williamson, the only natural counterfactual form to express that “nothing
about the apparatus and its surroundings at noon determined whether,
had it been switched on, it would have emitted a particle”14 is
(7) ¬
[
(p% Fq)∨ (p% ¬Fq)
]
However, if Equivalence were in place, (7) would be a contradiction. But
indeterminism is not contradictory; thus, Equivalence has to be refuted.
The idea that (7) is not inconsistent appears to be convincing if we ask
why asserting counterfactuals with contingent consequents may be a sen-
sible practice. A natural answer is that counterfactuals aims to capture
some regularities in the modal structure. In particular, both Fq and ¬Fq
in (7) are meant to be contingent at the counterfactual moments at which
the antecedent holds. As argued in the previous section, counterfactual
moments doesn’t have any actual history which may guide the evaluation
of a prediction. Thus, not only what (7) negates does not capture any gen-
uine regularity in the counterfactual scenario evoked by the antecedent,
but this fact explains why (7) is far from being inconsistent.
Conditional Excluded Middle
Stalnaker (1980: 92-93) thinks that principle 8,
8. A% (B∨ C) ⊢ (A% B)∨ (A% C)
reflects how people reason when they use counterfactuals. As a piece of
evidence, he quotes the famous Verdi-Bizet example, where Quine uses
something quite close to an instance of 8.
It is clear that if Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, then
either Bizet would have been Italian, or Verdi French. But then
one (and only one) of the two counterfactuals, If Bizet and Verdi
14Williamson (1988: 413).
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had been compatriots, Verdi would have been French or If Bizet and
Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have been Italianmust be
true. (Quine 1950: 14)
Since Stalnaker accepts Equivalence, M and N, he sticks to Conditional Ex-
cluded Middle. Surely Stalnaker adduces evidence that we tend to think
that 8 is a plausible pattern. But other examples show that it may fail to
be so. For instance, Williamson argues that
[Prinicple 8] takes us from the trivial premise that, had there
been nothing but a gold or silver sphere, there would have been
nothing but a gold or silver sphere [...] to the implausible con-
clusion that either, had there been nothing but a gold or silver
sphere, it would have been gold or, had there been nothing but
a gold or silver sphere, it would have been silver. (Williamson
1988: 412)15
Moreover, if asserting counterfactuals within an indeterminist context aims
to express modal regularities, it seems strange to endorse Conditional Ex-
cluded Middle. Indeed, an instance such as (p% Fq)∨ (p% ¬Fq) fails to
capture any regularity when the consequents are (counterfactual) future
contingents.
Lewis (1973a: 80-81) and Bennett & Bennett (2003: 189) claim that
Conditional Excluded Middle gives wrong results for ’might’ counterfactu-
als. First, Lewis (1973a) defines the ’might’ counterfactual& as the dual
of ’would’:16
A& B = ¬(A% ¬B) Duality
Then, he formulates the following argument:
1. (A% ¬B)∨ (A% B) Conditional Excluded Middle
2. ¬(A% ¬B)→ (A% B) By 1 and Class.Log.
3. (A& B)→ (A% B) By 2 and Duality
4. (A% B)→ (A& B) By Duality
5. (A% B)↔ (A& B) By 3 and 4
The conclusion is clearly wrong, for “If I tossed the coin, it might land
heads” can be true and ”If I tossed the coin, it would land heads” false.
15Here Williamson is arguing against the soundness of the following pattern: (A ∨
B)% (A∨B) ⊢ ((A∨B)%A)∨ ((A∨B)% B).
16A& B reads “If A were the case, B might be the case”.
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Furthermore, it is tempting to say that the latter statement is false (or not
true) because the former ’might’ conditional is true.
Clearly, one can reject Lewis’ argument and denyDuality. For instance,
Stalnaker (1980: 100) argues that there is nothing strange in saying that
John might not have come to the party if he had been invited, but I
believe he would have come,
even if, by Duality, it should sound as a moorean paradox. Be as it may,
most philosophers who drop Duality read ’might’ counterfactuals as epis-
temic (or quasi-epistemic) modals. Even if this is a strategy that is worth
pursuing, the contemporary debate is far from having reached general
consensus.
Furthermore, there are several philosophers – such as Lewis,Williamson
and Bennett – who are happy to deny Conditional Excluded Middle, for they
refute both Equivalence and principle 8 (see the previous sections).
Edelberg and Weak Edelberg
Edelberg andWeak Edelbergwere introduced by Thomason &Gupta (1980: 74)
in the context of branching time semantics, and are the only patterns
which combine historical modalities with the ‘would’ connective. Each of
them permits to infer a counterfactual with a necessitated consequent. In
particular, Edelberg says that, from the fact that
1. It is inevitable that if A were the case, B would obtain,
!(A% B)
one should infer that
∴ If A were the case, it would be inevitable that if A, then B.
A% !(A→ B)
On the other hand, Weak Edelberg imposes that, whenever it is true that
1. If A were the case, it would be inevitably so,
A% !A
2. It is settled that, if A were the case, B would be the case,
!(A% B)
it follows that
∴ If A were the case, B would inevitably be the case.
A% !B
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h3 h4h2h1
m3: Bus
m8: ¬Time
m4: Car
m5: Time m6: Time
m7:¬Time
m1: Accident m2: Bus
m0
Figure 5.2
Thomason & Gupta (1980: 74) give an example to support the intuition
that both patterns should hold (See figure 5.2).
Suppose that, at m0, I have to go to work, and I am deciding whether
to take the car or the bus. There is one possible future moment, m2, where
I take the bus which arrives at the scheduled time. At m2 is then settled
that I will arrive at work on time (m6).
Thus, at m0 the following statement is intuitively false.
If I were take the bus, I would arrive late at work.
F(Bus)% ¬F(Time)
However, imagine that, soon after m0, the bus has an accident (m1), so
it won’t arrive at the bus stop for the time scheduled (m3), and it would
be too late for me to get on work on time (m7 and m8). Thus, I decide to
take the car (m4) to get to work on time (m5). Intuitively, the following
statements should be true at m4 (i.e., at the moment in which I take the
car).
It is inevitable that, If I were to take the bus, I would arrive late at
work.
!(F(Bus)% ¬F(Time))
If I were to take the bus, it would be inevitably so.
F(Bus)% !F(Bus)
Given this amount of information, Thomason & Gupta (1980: 74) claim
that it is perfectly natural to infer the following two statements (the infor-
mal reading of the second one is left unspecified):
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If I were to take the bus, it would be settled that I would arrive late.
F(Bus)% !(¬F(Time))
F(Bus)%
[
F(Bus)→ ¬F(Time)
]
Even if Thomason & Gupta (1980: 74) treat the example as perfectly in-
tuitive, I find it rather artificial. That is why I consider Edelber and Weak
Edelberg as controversial. However, these two patterns are interesting, for
they challenge the semanticist: as they say, “the difficulty that needs to be
solved is this: how to validate both conditional excluded middle and the
Edelberg inference[s]”. 17 In what follows, it will be shown that there’s a
semantic approach for counterfactuals which validates both kind of infer-
ences, and which is consistent with (PT). Be as it may, it is time to recap.
Recapitulation
We have seen that, according to Objection 2.1, (PT) should yield incorrect
truth conditions counterfatuals. In turn, I take that objection to mean that
either (PT) makes sound some inferences that are (taken to be) uncontro-
versially unsound, or (PT) fails to validate some uncontroversial pattern.
In the next sections, I show that Objection 2.1 is false. Recall that I tried
to argue against Equivalence and Conditional Exclude Middle. I find also
Edelberg and Weak Edelberg rather puzzling. However, since I didn’t pro-
vide any conclusive argument against their adopotion, here there is my
strategy:
• There is a semantic account (call it (C.1)) for % which validates
Conditional Excluded Middle, Equivalence, Edelberg, and Weak Edel-
berg. However, it presupposes the so-called Limit Assumption.
• Another semantic account, (C.2), does not validate Conditional Ex-
cluded Middle,Equivalence, but it doesn’t assume the Limit Assump-
tion.
5.3.2 Counterfactual semantics with the limit assumption
Almost any proposal developed so far (see Thomason & Gupta (1980),
Placek & Müller (2007), Wawer & Wroński (2015)) starts by assuming the
‘similarity intuition’ elaborated by Stalnaker (1968), Stalnaker & Thoma-
son (1970), and Lewis (1973a).18 Their idea is quite simple: take a world
17Thomason & Gupta (1980: 78).
18We won’t take into account the counterfactual semantic offered in Øhrstrøm & Hasle
(1995), since it didn’t had much fortune in the philosophical literature.
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m2: Toss
m5: Tails
m3: ¬Toss
m4: Heads
m1
Figure 5.3
w1 in which A% B may be evaluated. If A is true at w1, the truth of B at
that very same world makes A% B true at w1. However, a counterfactual
is interesting when its antecedent is false at the point of evaluation. Thus,
suppose that A% B is evaluated at w1, but that very same world fails to
satisfy A. Then, the counterfactual takes you from w1 to (at least) a differ-
ent world, say w2, at which the antecedent A is true. World w2 is said to
be minimally different from w1, in the sense that there are no differences
between the two worlds, except those required to make the antecedent A
true at w2. The truth of the consequent B at the most similar world w2
makes the counterfactual A% B true at the original world, w1.
Let us use Figure 5.3 to see how this strategy may be applied to branch-
ing time frames. At m3 I do not toss the coin in my hand, but I say
(7) If I tossed the coin, it would land tails.
Toss% F(Tails)
The idea is to search those moments that are similar to m3, but which
satisfy the antecedent of (7).19 It is standardly assumed that two moments
m,m′ are similar only if they belong to the very same instant (i.e., only if
m,m′ ∈ {m′′ :m ≮m′′ ∧m′′ ≮m}; if m,m′ belong to the same instant, we will
writem ≈m′). In the (oversimplified) case pictured in Figure 5.3,m2 is the
only moment which is similar to m3, and satisfies the antecedent of (7). In
other terms, m2 is an alternative moment to m3 at which it is is true that I
toss the coin. Once we have reached this counterfactual moment, we need
to check whether the consequent of (7) – “The coin will land tails” - comes
out true (false) at m2. If so, (7) is true at m3; otherwise, it is false at that
19For the sake of simplicity, we won’t consider counterfactuals whose antecedents are
absurd.
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moment. Clearly, if the components of a subjunctive conditional are future
contingents, their truth value would depend on what history (or what set
of histories) – among those passing through a similar, counterfactual mo-
ment – is considered relevant for the evaluation. In the toy-example of
Figure 5.3, “The coin will land tails” is a future contingent atm2: indeed it
is BO-true at m2/h1, but it is BO-false atm2/h2. Thus, the truth of (7), used
at m3, depends on whether one takes either m2/h1 or m2/h2 to be relevant
for the evaluation of the consequent.
In general, when one interprets counterfactuals within a branching
conception of time, one has to tell a story about
• how to isolate counterfactual, similar moments, and
• what histories passing through those moments are relevant for the
evaluation.
These two goals can be achieved by imposing suitable conditions to a se-
lection function s, whose role is to tell which moment-history pairs are rel-
evant for the evaluation of a counterfactual. s takes as argument pairs as
(A,m/h), whereA is a sentence that can occur as the antecedent of a coun-
terfactual used at m. A selection s takes as values a moment-history pair
m′/h′ among those which are most similar to m/h, and it can be defined by
the following four conditions.20 Given a pair m/h at which A% B has to
be evaluated,
Antecedent: If s(A,m/h) =m′/h′, then m′/h′ #BO A
The Antecedent condition says that s takes as value a moment-history
pair which satisfies the antecedent. It is worth to notice that s is un-
defined (written s(A,m/h) =↑) whenever A is either logically impos-
sible or counterfactually impossible – that is, when no m′/h′ satisfies
A, where m ≈m′.
Similarity: If m/h #BO A, then s(A,m/h) =m/h
The Similarity condition guarantees that s takes value m/h when-
ever m/h satisfies the antecedent. Intuitively, if m/h satisfies the an-
tecedent in A% B, the most similar couple to m/h at which the
antecedent holds is m/h itself.
Contemporary: If s(A,m/h) =m′/h′, then m ≈m′
20See Wawer & Wroński (2015: 297).
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Intuitively, Contemporary says that m′/h′ is similar to m/h only if m
and m′ are alternative but contemporary moments (i.e. they both lie
on the same instant).
Past Predominance: If s(A,m/h) = m′/h′, then ∀m′′/h′′((m ≈ m′′ ∧ (h ∩ h′ ⊂
h∩ h′′))⇒m′′/h′′ !BO A)
This latter condition states that s(A,m/h) is the last moment-history
pair which satisfies A, since any other pair whose history branches
off from h after that of s(A,m/h), and which specifies a moment lying
at the same instant of m, fails to satisfy A. The intuition behind Past
Predominance is that a similar history to hmust share with h as much
past as possible.
With these four clauses at hand, it is tempting to define the truth con-
ditions for counterfactuals as follows:
(C.1) m/h,s #BO A% B⇔ s(A,m/h) =↑ or s(A,m/h), s #BO B
The first disjunct of the right-hand side in (C.1.) covers (a) the case in
which an antecedent is logically impossible, and (b) the case in which,
given an antecedentA, nom′/h′, s is such thatm′/h′, s #BO A, wherem
′ ≈m.
This means that A is counterfactually impossible. Hence, counterfactuals
with impossible antecedents are true by default. The second disjunct shifts
the evaluation to the most similar point to m/h, and checks whether the
consequent is satisfied at that point.
It is worth to notice that Antecedent and (C.1) jointly entail that, given a
pointm/h,s, any counterfactual with a true antecedent at m/h,s reduces to
a material conditional. This captures Modus Ponens andModus Tollens.21
Moreover, Transitivity,Antecedent Strenghtening andContraposition aren’t
sound, and they have the countermodel pictured in Figure 5.4. Suppose
that
1. m4/h1 #BO A∧B∧¬C
2. m5/h2 #BO ¬A∧B∧ C
21Here the following, natural notion of BO-entailment is presupposed:
BO-Entailment A set of wffs ∆ BO-entails A just in case, for any point m/h,s, if
m/h,s #BO ∆, then m/h,s #BO A. In symbols,
∆ ⊢BO A⇔∀m/h,s(m/h,s #BO ∆⇒m/h,s #BO A)
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Figure 5.4
3. m6/h #BO ¬A∧¬B∧¬C
4. s(m6/h,A) =m4/h1
5. s(m6/h,B) =m5/h2
6. s(m6/h,A∧B) =m4/h1
By 1-6 and (C.1), it follows that A% B,B% C,¬A% ¬C are BO-true
at m6/h, while both A% C and A∧B% C are BO-false at the very same
point. Hence,
A% B,B% C #BO A% C Failure of Transitivity
B% C #BO A∧B% C Failure of Antecedent Strengthening
¬C% ¬A #BO A% C Failure of Contraposition
Thus, (C.1) validates the good patterns and invalidates the bad ones.
As for the controversial inferences, the following results hold.
Fact 16. (C.1) validates Equivalence and Conditional Excluded Middle.
Proof.As for Equivalence: Ifm/h,s #BO ¬(A% B), thenm/h,s !BO A% B,
which, by (C.1), entails that s(A,m/h), s !BO B (it is assumed that s(A,m/h) "↑).
Thus, s(A,m/h), s #BO ¬B, and by (C.1) it follows that m/h,s #BO (A%
¬B). Symmetrically, by assuming m/h,s #BO (A % ¬B) it follows that
m/h,s #BO ¬(A% B). Hence, ⊢BO ¬(A% B) ↔ (A% ¬B). As for Con-
ditional Excluded Middle: since ⊢BO ¬(A% B) ↔ (A% ¬B) holds, ⊢BO
¬(A% B)→ (A% ¬B) holds as well, and it is equivalent to ⊢BO (A%
B)∨ (A% ¬B).
Fact 17. (C.1) and the Ockhamist definition of ! invalidates both Edelberg
and Weak Edelberg.
Proof. Picture 5.5 shows a countermodel for both inferences. Suppose that:
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1. m3/h3 #BO ¬A
2. m2/h2 #BO !A
3. m4/h1 #BO ¬B
4. m5/h2 #BO B.
5. s(m3/h3,A) =m2/h2
By 1–5 and (C.1), it follows that !(A% F(B)),A% !A are BO-true at
m3/h3, but A% !(A → F(B)) and A% !F(B) are BO-false at the very
same point. Thus,
!(A% F(B)) #BO A% !(A→ F(B)) Failure of Edelberg
A% !A,!(A% F(B)) #BO A% !F(B)Failure of Weak Edelberg
Still, Wawer & Wroński (2015) suggest that the Edelberg inferences can
be validated by modifying the Ockhamist definition of ! as follows.
(Def. !s) m/h,s #BO !A⇔∀s
′,h′(m/h′, s′ #BO A)
Obviously, the duality between ! and $ is preserved.
Fact 18. If the Ockhamist clause for ! is substituted with (Def. !s), (C.1) val-
idates both Edelberg and Weak Edelberg.
Proof. As for Edelberg, suppose that m/h,s !BO A% !(A → B). By (C.1)
and (Def !s), there must be an s
′′ such that s′′(A,m/h), s′′ #BO A ∧ ¬B.
By Antecedent, s′′(A,m/h), s′′ #BO A, thus s
′′(A,m/h), s′′ #BO ¬B. It follows
that s′′ is such that m/h,s′′ #BO A% ¬B. But this contradicts m/h,s #BO
!(A% B), which, by (C.1) and (Def. !s), is equivalent to ∀h
′, s′(m ∈ h′ ⇒
s′(A,m/h′), s′ #BO B). Hence, wheneverm/h,s #BO !(A% B) holds,m/h,s #BO
A% !(A → B) holds as well. As for Weak Edelberg, suppose that A%
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!A, which, by (C.1) and (Def. !s), is equivalent to ∀h
′, s′(A,m/h), s′ #BO A
for any s′ and any h′ passing through the moment specified by s′(A,m/h).
Assume also that !(A% B) m/h,s. Now, if m/h,s !BO A% !B, by (C.1)
and (Def !S ) it follows that s(A,m/h), s #BO $¬B. If s(A,m/h) = m
′/h′,
then there is an s′′,h′′, s.t. m′ ∈ h′′ and m′/h′′, s′′ !BO B. But this con-
tradicts that m/h,s #BO !(A% B). Indeed, this latter statement entails
m/h,s #BO A% !(A → B), which is equivalent, by (C.1), (Def !S ), and
s(A,m/h) = m′/h′, to ∀h′′′, s′′′(m′ ∈ h′′′ ⇒ m′/h′′, s′′′ # B). Hence, whenever
m/h,s #BO !(A% B) and m/h,s #BO A% !A hold, it is the case that
m/h,s #BO A% !B.
Principle (C.1) and (Def. !s) meet Thomason & Gupta (1980)’s chal-
lenge, since they yield a semantic account which validates Conditional Ex-
cluded Middle, Edelberg and Weak Edelberg. Given (C.1) and (Def. !s), (PT)
can be easily adapted to capture the truth conditions for counterfactuals,
that is:22
(PT’) m #PT A⇔m/h, s #BO A.
Hence, Objection 2.1 appears to be false.
However, this might seem too hasty. To make (C.1) work, one has to en-
rich a TRL-model with a selection s. But there may be more functions sat-
isfying the four conditions which define a selection. For instance, take the
model pictured in Figure 5.4: both s(A,m3/h) = m2/h2 and s
′(A,m3/h) =
m2/h1 can be taken as legitimate values of the two, distinct selections s and
s′. By (C.1), A% FB is true at m3/h, s, but it comes out false at m3/h, s
′ .
Thus, the truth-values of counterfactuals vary with selections, but no se-
lection is privileged over the others.
Moreover, our intuitions seems to be silent when it comes to decide
whether – as in Figure 5.4 – m2/h1 is more similar to m3/h than m2/h2.
Furthermore, and most importantly, the point of asserting a counterfac-
tual conditional is to capture certain regularities among different, pos-
sible scenarios. In turn, the tree represents physical possibilities. Thus,
if a counterfactual whisks us to merely possible moments, with several,
merely possible histories passing through them, selecting one of these his-
tory for the evaluation of the consequent forbids the counterfactual to ex-
press the regularities it is meant to capture.
However, it is not difficult to modify (PT’) to overcome this difficulty.
Indeed, one may state that:23
22Here, bivalence is assumed, that is, if a formula is not PT-true at a point m/h,s, it is
PT-false at that point. Moreover, the moment in m #PT A is meant to be the moment of
use of A.
23Again, it is assumed that bivalence holds for formulas evaluated with (PT”).
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(PT”) m #PT A⇔∀s(m/h, s #BO A)
(PT”), while conserves the validities we have just seen above, makes any
counterfactual with future contingent consequent false. One can even drop
bivalence for this latter kind of statements, by requiring that an untrue
statement may not be false.
(PT”’) m #PT A⇔∀s(m/h, s #BO A)
m !PT A⇔∀s(m/h, s !BO A)
By (PT”’), counterfactuals with future contingent consequents are neither
true nor false.
Be as it may, there can be qualms about (C.1). The clause depends
on selection functions, and when both s and s′ are defined for argument
(A,m/h), Past Predominance entails that the histories specified by s(A,m/h)
and s′(A,m/h) must branch off form h at the very same moment.24 Put dif-
ferently, if s is defined for argument (A,m/h), there is no infinite series of
histories s.t., for any such history h′, there is another history, say h′′, and
h∩h′ ⊂ h∩h′′. Thus, Past Predominance can be seen as a formulation of what
Lewis (1973b: 63) calls the Limit Assumption: if “we proceed to closer and
closer A-worlds we eventually hit a limit and can go no farther”.
This restriction can be contested. There’s no a priori reason to prevent
the A-words to be infinitely closer to the world we are interested in, es-
pecially when the worlds represent objective modal features of physical
reality. Thus, one may have good reasons to drop this principle. But what
role does it play?
Past Predominance can be seen as a similarity criterion for histories.
More precisely, given the antecedent A of a counterfactual evaluated at
m/h, Past Predominance enables to choose – among the histories in {h′ :
m′/h′ #BO A and m ≈ m
′} – which of them shares with h as much past as
possible. Hence, dropping Past Predominance amounts to identify a more
general similarity criterion for histories.
Another reason why one may be discontent about (C.1) consists in that
it permits to validate some controversial principles such as Conditional
Excluded Middle, Edelberg andWeak Edelberg.
5.3.3 Counterfactual semantics without the limit assump-
tion
As we have seen, Past Predominance can be dropped only if one introduces
a more general relation of comparative similarity among histories. How-
24Wawer & Wroński (2015: 297).
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ever, it is possible to conserve the idea that the more moments two histo-
ries share, the more they are similar. In particular, let us say that h′ is as
similar to h as h′′ (h′ @h h
′) just in case h′ branches off form h at the same
moment of h′′ or at a later moment. On the other hand, the most similar
history to h is h itself. In symbols,
Global Similarity h′ @h h
′′ ⇔ (h∩ h′′ ⊆ h∩ h′)
@h is reflexive, transitive and connected (i.e., @h is a preorder). Notice that
history h is @h-strictly minimal; that is, for any h
′ " h, h @h h
′. This features
reflects the idea that there is no history which is more similar to h than h
itself.25
Let us define a notion of local similarity, that is, a similarity relation
obtaining among moment-history pairs @m/h. Let us conserve the intuition
applied in the previous sections, according to which the counterfactual
moments relevant for the evaluation of A% B at m/h – i.e., the moments
similar to m – are those lying at the same instant of m.
Local Similarity m′/h′ @m/h m
′′/h′′ ⇔ h′ @h h
′′ & m ≈m′ ≈m′′
@m/h inherits the properties of @h. It is a preorder where m/h is @m/h-
strictly- minimal.
Following Swanson (2011: 709), let ∥A∥ be the set of moment-history
pairs at which A is BO-true, i.e. ∥A∥ = {m/h : m/h #BO A}. Hence, ∥A∥
2
is a set of couples whose intersection with @m/h yields a preorder which
agrees with @m/h on the order of its couples. This technical detail is useful
to define a new relation of similarity.
Antecedent Similarity m′/h′ @Am/h m
′′/h′′ ⇔ (m′/h′,m′′/h′′) ∈ (∥A∥2∩ @m/h)
Notice that the similarity conditions defined thus far do not exclude that
there may be an infinite series of A-histories ever close to h. Hence, the
Limit Assumption can fail.
Furthermore, let us define the truth conditions for counterfactuals in
the following, Lewisian fashion:26
(C.2) m/h #BO A% B⇔∀m
′/h′(m′/h′ ∈ ∥A∥ & m ≈m′ ⇒
∃m′′/h′′(m′′/h′′ @Am/h m
′/h′ & ∀m′′′/h′′′(m′′′/h′′′ @Am/h m
′′/h′′ ⇒
m′′′/h′′′ #BO B)))
25For analogous notions of similarity between histories, moment-history pairs and tu-
ples of moments, histories and formulas, see Placek & Müller (2007).
26See Lewis (1981: 230)
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(C.2) says that A% B is BO-true at a point m/h iff, for any A-point m′/h′
that is comparable with m/h, there exists an A-point m′′/h′′ that is at least
as similar to m/h as m′/h′, and for any A-point that is at least as similar to
m/h as m′′/h′′, that point satisfies B.
When there is no m′/h′ s.t. m′/h′ ∈ ∥A∥ & m ≈m′ , A is counterfactually
impossible frome the perspective of m/h. Thus, (C.2) predicts condition-
als with impossible antecedents to be true by ‘default’. In these cases the
antecedent in the right-hand side of (C.2) fails.
Whenever A is BO-true at m/h, it is easy to check that A% B comes
out BO-true at that point just in case B holds at m/h (recall that m/h is
@m/h-strictly-minimal). This feature validates Modus Ponens and Modus
Tollens. Therefore, (C.2) validates the good patterns.
As for the bad ones, it is easy to check that the tree pictured in Figure
5.4 is a countermodel for Transitivity, Antecedent Strenghtening andContra-
position. Hence, (C.2) makes sound what should be sound, and invalidates
what should be invalid.
(C.2) makes Conditional Excluded Middle and Equivalence invalid, as
shown in the simple countermodel of Figure 5.5. If one evaluates A%
FB ∨A% ¬FB at m3/h3, by (C.2) it follows that neither of the two dis-
junct is satisfied. This entails that ¬(A% FB) → (A% ¬FB) is false at
the very same point, so that Equivalence, ¬(A% B)↔ (A% ¬B), is not a
validity according to (C.2). However, Weak Boethius Thesis, (A% ¬B)→
¬(A% B), is validated.
Fact 19. (C.2) validates Weak Boethius Thesis.
Proof. The proof is straightforward by assuming (C.2) and m/h #BO A%
¬B.
Notice that the failure of Equivalence and Conditional Excluded Middle,
which is guaranteed by (C.2), enables to express indeterminism in a coun-
terfactual form. Recall Williamson’s example, according to which, if it is
true that
if nothing about an apparatus and its surroundings necessitate whether,
had the apparatus been switched on, it would emit a particle,
then the two following statement should be false – and the negation of
their disjunction true:
If the apparatus were switched on, it would emit a particle,
p% Fp
If the apparatus were switched on, it wouldn’t emit a particle.
p% ¬Fp
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According to (C.2), if Fq is counterfactually contingent, the two counter-
factuals are false, their conjunction false, and the negation of their con-
junction true. Hence, (C.2) vindicates Williamson’s way of expressing in-
determinism. Furthermore, the following fact holds.
Fact 20. (C.2) validates Edelberg and Weak Edelberg.
Proof. Recall that Edelberg is the pattern !(A% B) ⊢BO A% !(A → B).
Now assume that !(A% B) holds at m/h, which entails thatA% B is holds
at m/h. By (C.2), it follows that there are no m1/h1,m2/h2 s.t. m1/h1 @
A
m/h
m2/h2 and m1/h1 #BO ¬B but m2/h2 #BO B. Now, suppose thatm/h !BO A%
!(A→ B). By (C.2) it follows that there are two points, say m3/h3 and m4/h4
s.t.m3/h3 @
A
m/h m4/h4,m3/h3 #BO $(A∧¬B) and m4/h4 #BO !(A→ B). Now,
m4/h4 #BO !(A→ B) entailsm4/h4 #BO A→ B. Given thatm4/h4 is a member
of some couples in @Am/h, it must satisfies A. Hence, from m4/h4 #BO A→ B, it
follows that m4/h4 #BO B. By m3/h3 #BO $(A∧¬B), there must be a history,
say h5, s.t. m3/h5 #BO A but m3/h5 #BO ¬B. Moreover, since m3/h5 #BO A and
m3 ≈ m, it must be the case that m3/h5 is a member of at least a couple in
@Am/h. Given that @
A
m/h is connected, and since m4/h4 is a member of couples
in @Am/h, either m3/h5 @
A
m/h m4/h4, or m4/h4 ≺
A
m/h m3/h5. If m4/h4 ≺
A
m/h m3/h5
then h ∩ h5 ⊂ h ∩ h4, and thus ther must be a moment, m5, s.t. m5 ∈ h ∩ h4
but m5 # h ∩ h5. However, recall that m3/h3 @
A
m/h m4/h4, which entails that
h ∩ h4 ⊆ h ∩ h3. But since m5 ∈ h ∩ h4, then m5 ∈ h ∩ h3, and thus m5 ∈ h3
and m5 ∈ h. By m5 ∈ h3, m3 ∈ h3, either m3 = m5, or m3 < m5, or m5 < m3.
If m5 < m3, by m5 ∈ h and m3 ∈ h5 it follows that m5 ∈ h ∩ h5, against the
assumption that m5 # h∩h5. If m3 < m5, from m5 ∈ h4 it follows that m3 ∈ h4.
But since m3 ≈m4 ≈m, h4 would contain two <-unrelated moments, which is
impossible. Ifm3 =m5, then, again,m5 ∈ h5, form3 ∈ h5. But thenm5 ∈ h∩h5,
against m5 # h ∩ h5 Thus, to m/h !BO A% !(A → B) to be true, it must
be that m3/h5 @
A
m/h m4/h4. But if m3/h5 @
A
m/h m4/h4, then a ¬B-point such
as m3/h5 would be (at least) as similar to m/h as a B-point m4/h4. Therefore,
m/h #BO A% B would be false, and m/h #BO !(A% B) could not hold,
against our assumption. By reductio, m/h #BO !(A% B) entails m/h #BO
A% !(A→ B), and the Edelberg inference follows. It is easy to see that an
analogous reasoning shows thatWeak Edelberg, viz.A% !A,!(A% B) ⊢BO
A% !B, must be sound as well.
Now, let us modify the truth conditions for counterfactuals in a (post-
semantic) thin red line framework:
(PT””) m #PT A⇔m/h,@m/h#BO A
As we have seen, (PT””) meets several desiderata, such as validating
the good patterns (Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens) and invalidating the bad
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ones (Transitivty, Antecedent Strenghtening and Contraposition). Further-
more, (C.2) does not entail the limit assumption, and validatesWeak Boethius
Thesis, Edelberg and Weak Edelberg. However, if one assumes (C.2), Condi-
tional Excluded Middle and Equivalence are not valid patterns. Last but not
least, (C.2) allows to express indeterminism in a counterfactual construc-
tion. These features represents further reasons to consider Objection 2.1
false.
5.3.4 Objection 2.2
Once that Objection 2.1 is rejected, let’s focus on another worry related to
counterfactual claims:
Objection 2.2: The truth value distributions provided by (PT) (for
object language formulas) conflict with metalinguistic subjunctive
conditionals.
As a motivation for the objection, consider the following example (the ex-
ample is taken from Iacona 2014: 2638). Suppose that in one possible fu-
ture of a merely possible moment, say, in the future of m1 on history h1, it
rains. If one were to consider h1 as actual, an adequate semantics should
evaluate “It will rain”, uttered at m1, as true. But (PT) – so the objection
goes – does not enable to assess this latter (metalinguistic) counterfactual
as true. And this is so because (PT) is completely silent about the evalua-
tions of statements uttered at non-actual moments.
Notice that the example just considered takes actual semantic facts for
granted. In the example, indeed, “It will be rainy” is assessed as true as
uttered at m1 – under the assumption that h1 is taken to be actual – be-
cause it rains in the future onm1, along history h1. This suggests that what
“It will be rainy” says at m1 – its (ordinary) intension – is what it says at
the actual world. That is, the objection presupposes that “It will be rainy”,
when uttered at a merely possible moment, is intended to be a prediction
about the weather (and not, for instance, a sentence saying that the grass
is green). I shall notice that this very presupposition is not uncontrover-
sial. In general, considering a merely possible history as actual does not
only change the history which initialises the circumstances of evaluation,
for it changes the relevant semantic facts as well. In other terms, to take
a merely possible history as actual may change those facts that guaran-
tee that expressions receive their ordinary, actual meanings. Nothing pre-
vents, for instance, that “It will be rainy”, as it is used at h1, means that the
grass is green.
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But let us assume what it seems to be presupposed by the example
which motivates Objection 2.2: for any expression A of LT and any two
histories h and h′, what A says at h is the same as what A says at h′.
From a two-dimensional viewpoint, this assumption amounts to assess
secondary intensions as redundant, for what an expression says – which
may be thought of as a function from circumstances of evaluation to ex-
tensions – does not depend on which world is taken to determine what it
says.
If this is the case, Objection 2.2 has an obvious rejoinder. To take a
merely possible history as actual, say h1, is to change the model from
MPT = (T ,dT ,h) to (MBT ,h1). In the latter model, h is considered merely
possible, where h1 is taken to be actual. Given M
′
PT = (T ,dT ,h1), one can
use (PT) to evaluate a statement used at a merely possible moment, which
is now considered actual since it lies on h1. And if one uses (PT) to evalu-
ate “It will be rainy” at m1 on h1, one obtains the truth value distribution
required by the example (the statement comes out true).
Iacona (2014) has an argument against this solution. He claims that
Sentences can be evaluated at moments relative to different
models, that is, models that differ only in the value of h. The
fact, however, is that relativity tomodels so understood is equiv-
alent to relativity to histories. [...] This means that what can be
expressed in a TRL semantics in terms of relativity to mod-
els can equally be expressed in [Ockhamist] semantics without
postulating any actual history, hence that TRL semantics boils
down to an unnecessarily convoluted variant of [Ockhamist]
semantics.27(Iacona 2014: 2643)
Now, the new objection charges (PT) of being unnecessarily complex,
since it is expressively equivalent to the BO semantics. True, (PT) and the
BO semantics are expressively equivalent. But this very fact does not entail
that they are both well-suited for the same metaphysics.
For instance, the BO semantics is perfectly compatible with many-
worlds view. And again, a many-worlds theorist such asWallace (2012: 268)
assumes a version of many-worlds equipped with an Ockhamist-inspired
semantics. But Wallace would hardly accept (PT), since it defines the no-
tion of truth at a moment as truth at a moment, at the actual history. The
reason of the rejection is clear. According to many-worlds, “the actual his-
tory” is an improper definite description, for it doesn’t meet the unicity
27Notation changed.
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condition. Thus, granted that (PT) has the same expressive power of the
BO semantics, endorsing the BO semantics does not force to stick to (PT).
Furthermore, the thin red line metaphysics – the claim that, among a
plurality of possible courses of events, there exists a unique (substantially)
actual history – motivates the post-semantic approach formulated in (PT).
Indeed, if there is only one outcome that will actually obtain, it is natural
to hold that a prediction such as “Outcome x will obtain” expresses a true
content iff what is predicted obtains with respect to the actual course of
events. From this latter perspective, the BO semantics fails to convey one
crucial piece of metaphysical information.
5.3.5 Counterfactual retrospective assessments.
In his Assessment Sensitivity, John MacFarlane (2014: 209–213) develops
several semantical objections against (PT). According to one of them, (PT)
yields wrong results for counterfactual retrospective assessments of future
contingents. Let us see why.
First, MacFarlane (2014: 27) introduces the following notion of accu-
racy for speech acts:
Accuracy. An attitude or speech act occurring at c1 is accurate, as assessed
from a context c2, just in case its content is true as used at c1 and
assessed from c2.
Let us identify a PT-context of use with a moment of utterance, and thus,
with a moment lying on the thin red line. Notice, moreover, that (PT)
doesn’t invoke any notion of contexts of assessment, so they play no role
in evaluating the accuracy of speech acts when their contents is evaluated
against (PT).
Now, consider the figure below, and suppose that on Monday (at m0)
Jake says
(8) Tomorrow, it will be sunny.
F(1)(Sunny)
Since on Tuesday, m1 lies one day (one time unit) in the future of Mon-
day (m0) on the thin red line h, (PT) predicts that Jake’s claim is true on
Monday (at m0). At m1, any assessor of Jake’s claim should evaluate his
utterance as accurate, for “the assessor has only to feel the sun on her skin
to know that Jake’s assertion was accurate”.28 And this result precisely
follows from (PT) and Accuracy. So far so good.
28MacFarlane (2014: 210).
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h1h
m2: Rainy
Tuesday
m1: Sunny
m0
Monday
Figure 5.6
But imagine an assessor at m2; by (PT) and Accuracy, she should evalu-
ate Jake’s speech act made at m0 as accurate, even though it is rainy at m2.
And this, according to MacFarlane, is wrong. Therefore, MacFarlane con-
cludes, (PT) cannot account for counterfactual retrospective assessments
for future contingents.
I think that this objection is not fair. Indeed, if (PT) entails that a con-
tingent prediction is true at a moment of use just in case it is true at that
moment, relative to the thin red line, why one should care about (merely
possible) assessments of actual speech acts? It is wrong to pretend that an
utterance, whose truth value depends on what actually will be the case,
can be assessed at a moment that is a sheer possibility. Having such a pre-
tence seems like requiring to evaluate the accuracy of an utterance of “It
is the case that p”, made at a world w, relative to another world, say w′ , at
at which ¬p is the case. In other terms, if statement (8) is interpreted with
(PT), then Jake’s assertion aims at establishing what actually will be the
case, but it doesn’t state anything relative to what counterfactually will be
the case. Therefore, whether Jake’s assertion made at m0 is either accurate
or not depends on what is the case in the actual future of m0.
To sum up, it seems that (PT) has no problem with counterfactual rea-
soning. More generally, positing a substantially actual history is not an
obstacle for counterfactual reasoning.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
This essay aims to find a plausible semantics to interpret future tensed
statements – and, in particular, future contingents – in an indeterministic
context.
The problem is pressing, for indeterminism seems to be required to
make sense of certain physical theories. Collapse theories are a plausible
candidates to solve the measurement problem, and they clearly entail that
physical systems, in general, evolve stochastically.
Moreover, the branching approach, when compared with the divergen-
tist view, appears the most plausible framework in which one may model
indeterminism. The branching view seems to be as good as the divergentist
to define a semantics – i.e., the Ockhamist semantics – which refutes both
the Aristotelian and the Master arguments. But a branching conception of
reality is, surely, more intuitive than divergence. And the tower-collapse
case seems to suggest that a branching structure can account for indeter-
ministic phenomena in an easiest way than that of a divergentist.
However, interpreting future contingents against a branching struc-
ture is not an easy task. As we have seen, Peirceanism defines a notion
of truth at a moment which violates the intended meaning of plain-will
predictions. Moreover, Peirceanism fail to validate several tense-logical
schemas (such as, for instance, the future excluded middle). And both
Supervaluationism and Relativism suffer form analogous defects. Super-
valuationism attributes to “plain” predictions a strong modal force, and
it has several problems with logical consequence and with disquotational
truth. Moreover, it cannot account for retrospective truth judgements, and
it is at odds with an eternalist understanding of propositions. Relativism
inherits several flaws that affect supervaluationism, such as those related
to the notion of truth. Moreover, and most importantly, Relativism ap-
pears to have many problems when it comes to evaluate the rationality of
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retractions and assertions.
What is interesting about supervaluationism, though, is that one of its
founding fathers, Richmond Thomason, explicitly adopts a relational no-
tion of actuality. The analysis of the meanings that actuality may have
within a branching structure, indeed, is pretty important to understand
some basic, metaphysical commitments that a branching indeterminists
should adopt.
As Belnap’s viewpoint strongly suggests, the BO semantics clearly solves
several problems that a supervaluationist can hardly overcome. But the
BO-semantics may be appealing only for those who adopt a deterministic
reading of the tree. Indeed, the metaphysical view of a many-worlds the-
orist is perfectly compatible with the relativisation of truth to moment-
history pairs. Moreover, such a compatibility is grounded on the fact that,
in a many-worlds perspective, substantial actuality is a redundant notion,
for everything that is possible obtains. The dialectical scenario introduced
by the many-world view is highly significant, for it allows to through light
on the very notion of (in)determinism. As I try to argue, indeed, a branch-
ing theorist who claims that actuality can only be a relative, perspectival
notion, cannot be distinguished from a branching, many-worlds determin-
ist. And the relational meanings that actuality may assume, in turn, are
insufficient to get a satisfactory definition for branching objective inde-
terminism. Once that the notion of substantial actuality is introduced, it
is easy to distinguish many-worlds theorists form branching indetermin-
ists. Moreover, if, among the possible alternatives, only one of them will
obtain, it is easy to infer that a unique, substantially actual history must
exist.
Hence, the Thin red line semantics appear to be the most sensible ap-
proaches to solve the problem of future contingents. Among these ap-
proaches, the post-semantic thin red line, (PT), defines a notion of truth
that is relative to moments only. It is perfectly bivalent, and it does not suf-
fer from the flaws which affect the other branching semantics. Moreover,
I have argued that positing a Thin red line does not raise any problem
related to counterfactual reasoning. Accordingly, I conclude that (PT) is
the most plausible semantic framework for future tensed statement in an
indeterministic context.
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